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When I am in love, there is palpitating,
 
passionate, unique meaning, but only-
 right here and now, a meaning that
 might be absurd in another conjunction.
—Julia Kristeva, Histoires d'amour
Therefore, one who speaks in 
a
 tongue  
should pray to be able to interpret. For if
 I pray in 
a
 tongue, my spirit is at prayer  
but my mind is unproductive. So what is
 to be done?




In The Ravishing of Lol Stein, Marguerite Duras
 
writes what might be called the primal scene of tie
 formation. We are at a seaside town, in a casino. It’s
 night. The public place is brightly lit, full of people
 enjoying themselves. They are dancing. Food and
 drinks are laid out; huge plants form improvised
 screens beyond which people are chatting and mov
­ing. The moment comes when Anne-Marie Stretter
 appears at the door. Michael Richardson looks 
as
 she  
makes her way through the crowd and stands by oth
­ers. From then on he seeks her. He crosses the crowd
 in her direction; more than once he misses her just
 before their
 
trajectories match, swept astray by people  
moving and dancing. Not long after he reaches her
 and invites her to dance. They dance without mak-
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ing a sound for each other. At the end of the dance, Anne-Marie Stretter leads
 
the way and Michael Richardson, who had been with Lol, follows without
 turning back. Lol has been watching from the start; when the scene slows
 down too much for her eyes, she faints.
Lol’s amnesia draws out
 
for us the essentially schizoid link of social and pri ­
vate. Lol's loss of consciousness remarks flatly
 
— in what other way could one  
comment? — on the incommensurability of the two. Shifted to the position of
 the third as Anne-Marie Stretter comes in and Michael Richardson follows her
 back with unremitting concentration, Lol’s person is taken over by a revolu
­tionary change. She must understand Being as being in a place, a temporary
 place from which the sudden other removes us.1 She must know Being as
 awaiting to be moved to a third position, that of the witness. Through the uni
­vocal encounter of Anne-Marie Stretter and Michael Richardson, Lol 
is
 now  
made to watch what Being had so recently meant to her. She must bear wit
­ness to a brutal, full meaning that asserts itself without history, precedents, or
 knowledge (the two are complete strangers until they walk away so obviously as
 lovers). Lol’s amnesia inaugurates a dissociative link: as I say
 
I, the other rises;  
as I say I, my identity withdraws, shifted at the request of the other that I can
­not — what else could I do? — resist. “What 
is
 at stake here, is the incision of  
an outside in an inside, a withdrawal of identity in the advent of identity”
 (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 200). Lol’s fainting proves how “inaudible,
 untenable” (203) 
is
 this “strange election of dissociation: the choice of a nonob-  
jectifiable object [Lol’s splitting from Michael Richardson who chooses
 Anne-Marie Stretter] which, incorporating itself, divides me,” leaving me rav
­ished every time after this (207). In the casino scene of The Ravishing of Lol
 Stein, Duras records a woman’s birth into the philosophy of the Other. As she
 does so, she throws into relief a problem attendant to this birth.
In the third position the witness cedes to the other, and to the primacy of
 
the other — Anne-Marie Stretter’s velvet sheet was irresistible! — which she
 cannot change. The third position is ethical subjectivity, the alternative subjec
­tivity of the dissociative link. Thereafter driven to the witness position in the
 triangulated space in which she has been newly born, Lol will experience her
­self in the non-event of being-as-the-object-of-choice, of private love. Duras,
 or Lol, raises an impossible question, a doubt without answer: must private
 
love  
die for the Other, that is to say, for the sake of the social tie?
* * *
A woman and a man early in the evening. What kind of leap, and across what
 
kind of abyss, 
is
 needed to bring this man and this woman near? Even simply  
in space, materially close. When I think that this is impossible — it was at
 hand and so impossible for our main and our woman in the evening — I think
 about love.
On their way to the theater, he said: “You are already forming schools.”
 
The man had uttered the call; the woman understood. From there she, too,
 could watch Anne-Marie Stretter and her lover coming together. On the
 threshold of the theater she stepped forth. Uninventively, she said, “You could
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start your own school," submitting to that something between terror and bore
­
dom she had not asked to repeat this time. His voice rose at her back, from a
 larger distance now, “Yes....” Having for sure seen which direction the
 
woman  
would walk down the theater steps, the man went down the opposite way. He
 did not follow; he did not sit near. From that place one could watch and tell




Why can’t the institution speak of love? Would (an attempt to theorize) love
 
fold theory away? Would the institution have to learn of its own retreat? See
 itself as a grave from beyond which it speaks? And yet, to speak theoretically
 is, for me, my dearest, to speak lovingly, for when one speaks the truth one 
falls in love.
—Ewa Badowska, “Amuck”
To be welcomed into a School of Theory automatically means to attempt to
 
write about theory. And writing about theory after a School of Theory invites
 you in means entering a contract: to give to the institution the practice that
 exceeds its own institutionalization. If it is hard to make sense of the notion of
 theory, it is because this notion perhaps appears as theory writes, in unpre
­dictable turns. It would be easy to absolutize the institution and take writing
 outside a school — writing would be a pretext for the romance of madness, of
 the drift toward madness with which any institution tantalizes its outsiders.
 Being given theory by a school turns out to be 
a
 more complex affair.
In his essay on schizophrenia, “The Effort to Drive the Other Person
 Crazy,” Harold Searles recounts the story of a patient
 
who was a brilliant inter ­
preter: “She appeared to find some hidden meaning in almost every
 
word and  
even in almost every syllable, looking at me significantly, with 
a
 sarcastic smile,  
very frequently, as though convinced I was aware of the secret meanings which
 she found in all this” (274-5). The woman’s exegetical passion is so boundless,
 it puts beside the point interpretive boundaries and decorum. Where others
 stop at suspecting them, the woman draws the meanings out in the open of
 words. Searles may be “aware of the secret meanings” but it is the woman who
 “appeared to find” them. “What she was doing with me,” Searles concludes,
 “compares very closely with her mother’s taking her to movies, during her
 childhood, and repeatedly commanding her, ‘Now, think!’ which the patient
 took — correctly, I believe — as the mother’s command for the daughter to per
­ceive the same secret, special meanings in the course of the movie which the
 mother, an actively psychotic person throughout the girl’s upbringing, found in
 it” (275).
Searles’s anecdote gives an idea of the fantasy of symmetry to which the
 
members of the institution feel invited: to know how to read, as Searles’s
 patient demonstrates, at times means to answer a call — “Now, think!” — to
 match some secret, special meanings already found. Institutions may be con-
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strued by their own members as a bit like the schizophrenogenic mother who
 
has found the meanings and asks the daughter to think them. Or they may
 resemble 
a
 liberal father whose permission still governs even the most  
Dionysian, anarchic carnivalesque. The Digital Dnderground’s song
 
"
doowutchyalike " ends: “Daddy, can I go outside? / Gowhereyalike, kid.”  
Daddy still grants permission. In both cases —. the meaning-granting schizo
­phrenogenic mother and the anarchic father — what stands out is the institu
­tion’s self-questioning, evident in the gifts it exchanges with its acolytes:
 unlimited semiosis in the first case, disinhibition in the second. Thus,
 
what the  
institution gives the moment one comes into contact with it is an anxiety about
 its own training power: how can I not exclude what I cannot train?2
It would seem a contradiction in terms to think of an institution of theory
 
since theory initially emerged as a place from which to question traditional
 institutional practices of reading (and writing). To be given theory from its
 institution has a strange effect: one does not know whether to read the movie
 or do what one likes. While indecision lasts, one writes. But as one writes, the
 heady combination of schizophrenogenic power and the father’s yes that has
 come with the institution of theory assails one with a doubt: why does writing
 about theory seem to remain, even after a School, an improvisation? Why, even
 after the entitlement of an institution, does writing about theory seem to drift
 toward a minor plot? Why does it seem as if it were the tongue of a mind
 unproductive?
In Searles’s anecdote the woman’s exegetic passion is especially evocative of
 
a view of meaning commonly associated with theory — multiplicity and poly
­semy. And ambiguity, the offspring of proliferation of meaning that throws the
 very process — if not sense — of interpretation off.3 This vocation for dis
­banding meaning, this tendency to assail the reader “with feelings of confusion
 and unreality,” 
is
 proof that theory has a pressing story to tell.
Theory rose in the academy when the university began to throw its doors
 open to all sorts of historical subjectivities previously barred from its halls.
 Theory has functioned as both the pretext for this opening and a surveilling
 device of the entrance of the new subjects. Perhaps, it is owing to this dual
 work that theory, although synonymous with the self-critique of privilege and
 the consequent disbanding of the unified literary
 
canon, and despite its fortune,  
has not yet managed to dispel the suspicion of 
a
 phylogenetic  bond of word and  
blood. According to this suspicion, linguistic access (linguistic subjectivity)
 flows from socially inflected symbolic access.
If it has become popular because it wants to do away with any hereditary
 
right to language, theory is still sensitive to the classic charm of a familial,
 mimetic bond between language and society. Indeed, even structuralism, which
 for many, especially through its marriage to linguistics, anthropology, and
 Marxism, marked an initiation to theory as it came later to be known, might
 
be  
said to have been victim to such seductive closure. As Emile Benveniste has
 established, subjectivity is an effect of language: I am when I say I. But how
 do we know that, even when taken as a purely formal universe, language still
 does not mimic, in incurable servility, history with all its institutions — class,
 materiality (which means material disparities), and, not least, affects: envy,
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hatred, as well as love, etc. — whose origins get lost in the accidents of misfor
­
tune? If the signifying chain of differences is at once the chain of language and
 the circle of society, as an effect of language, subjectivity remains firmly plant
­ed in the terrain of justice — in the question of who can rise and who cant in
 the social circle. If we do not want to think of language in an exclusive way, as
 a faculty
 
that comes (or does not come) to us through family (therefore, nation,  
academy, class) blood, then it is necessary to separate the symbolic from the
 familial transmission of language. (The linguistic and symbolic existences of
 the subject may not be one and the same.) In order to do this, language, which
 in its public dimension is voice, must be installed neither through the father nor
 the mother; it must be given by another. Similarly it can also be taken away,
 scandalously, unjustly, when the other abandons us.
The abandonment leaves the subject to an unsymbolized impoverishment
 
that wanders through thought without aim; the withdrawal of the linguistic
 pass from another abandons the subject to an unjust and unhealed disparity.
 Correcting structuralism, "theory” says that the subject is neither born at birth
 nor in the mother tongue, but through a pass coming from another. Theory
 may be understood as the dialectical image of a contemporary tale difficult to
 bear: the tale about another giving you language or cutting you off from it,
 telling
 
you that  you can pass into it or taking the pass away. This and only this  
pass satisfactorily legitimizes the subject’s citizenship in the country of the
 Concept.
For so long language and class have been locked in the reciprocal panic of
 
a Hegelian dialectic: one, somehow, needed to kill the other in order to rise.
 Class has never meant linguistic entitlement or conceptual power; on the con
­trary, it has wandered through thought quietly withdrawn in the melancholic
 incorporation of the lost object of language, mourning a lost linguistic fluency.
 But in the tension between narrative and conceptuality, theory can disband the
 bond of blood and language; it can turn against a discriminatory
 
Law  that enti ­
tles, including or excluding, and thus permit the bond between class and lan
­guage to come to the fore. Theory is language’s belated mourning of 
"
class,” the  
name for an unjust and unhealed disparity — a discontent — at the heart of the
 social tie.
June 17
Sputiamo su Hegel (The ordinary)
Man has searched for the meaning of life beyond and against life itself. For a
 
woman, life and the meaning of life never cease to overlap.
—Carla Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel
The woman is at the School of Theory. She is expecting her birth. She wan
­
ders in the morning along
 
the outskirts of the  beautiful campus, where the front  
gardens are in bloom with the giant poppies she had not seen before, with
 peonies and irises; where the silent houses and the sloping lawns are supposed
 to consign to her something of the spirit of the place. "You are new,” some
10
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voice out of the landscape will say in a moment. But no wrinkle, no dehiscence;
 
only the muteness of an adherence, taking root inside, pulling outward — like
 destiny.
Back in her room, she gives in. “I realize,” the hand writes. This 
is
 what  
stoops down to kiss her eerily at
 
The School of Theory: not Kant, not Hegel,  
not Foucault. Like Kafka’s man before the law she is missing the last good
 chance to enter with support. “I realize,” the hand pulls on
 
without mercy, “the  
human tie.” The stark truth she could know really anywhere else, not here, not
 now but anywhere far and outside of the beautiful campus, had found
 
her again.  
The woman now regresses back and back to a place she confusedly calls her
 “origins.” Her mind tumbles down — zero degree of thought. Now, once
 again, she will fall flat in that region where any School would leave, where no
 one 
is
 and language does not improve. No matter  what it did before, the mind  
tumbles down in the swamp, reduced to feeling what the woman calls the banal
 pain of dialectics. The hand writes: “the possibility of someone else coming
 close brings immediately the pain of exclusion — one excludes as one comes
 close.” And she has no system against it. She had dreamed of acquiring the
 words of a truth beyond all reasons: a shared logos, like a vineyard with fruits
 for all, “whose only worth lies in being exposed ... as when a face lights up,
 opening” (Jean-Luc Nancy xxxviii). The Face-Logos. But how to think the
 shareable logos, which is neither project nor appropriation, without setting
 everyone on the axis of the ethical, always ceding to another, living for another
 and in another? Finally oblivious to self-consciousness through this ceding, all
 trembling on the same bough? “Are you a Concept human tie?” the woman
 screams.
Now the woman 
is
 unlocking the door of the building. She hears someone’s  
quick
 
footsteps. As she is opening the door, she turns and sees a young woman  
behind her. As the woman is opening the door, the young woman sweeps by
 into the building. She has a purpose and is holding onto it avidly, trying to be
 on her best behavior with others.
The woman goes up to her room and knows that time has changed her,
 
changed her mind. Thought no longer comes in surging motions. One wave
 after another after another. Now it comes in fits. She does not know
 
whether  
there is any desire attached to it now. It is more like a necessity: time and
 thought had come to coincide.
After the episode of the young woman, she looks at herself in the mirror.
 
She sees the change in her face. She sees her past. She sees her young lover
 turn and go. She is wearing her gifts 
as
 she turns — a leather jacket, the ruby  
stones. From the back she looks burdened, yet expectant. She is the younger.
 Was that when the intellect and the body had collapsed into each other never
 to split again? The woman and the lover had come together originally to
 assuage the violence of history, one in the name of the ethical, the other in the
 name of private love. For one of them the body had to step aside. Believing
 she was fighting the violence of history, all the while she had prolonged it by
 choosing a body that from birth had had to step aside. She had only been
 telling a family story. Fearing for her mind, wanting a mind, she had chosen a
 woman. But in doing so, she had only prolonged a family story.
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On her way to the theater she looked down at the gorge. “I realize,” the
 
hand writes. She was falling — back and back. She heard the monotonous
 noise of the water, and the two o’clock chimes. She remembered Quentin in
 The Sound and the Fury, shaving. She thought of the smell of death in the midst
 of life and of laughing at the days to come.
June 25
Language could carry
At one point language could carry. At the table of the café, the five people
 
jumped into verbal confrontation. It’s not that language carries immediately,
 even the most dexterous; we can carry our points more or less skillfully when
 we hear a comprehensible idiom. It follows that one can speak only after train
­ing, and less from accord. Does training at this café table disguise as accord?
It might feel like a problem of boundaries: how do I step into this circle?
 
Will I? Can I? The questions, which essentially reduce speech to a case of
 mustering power among others, however, appear as a misguided
 
plea  for the ful ­
fillment of a want one cannot decently thrust on strangers too soon. Will I?
 Can I? The personal labor required to attain a proposition and, thus, the ter
­ror of differential speech, are not discredited by the want behind them — a
 want for the event of thinking.
At this table, our voices taking turns, we allow one another to hear truths
 
we had already come to, though scattered in different places, perhaps mixed to
 what Gramsci
 
would take as signs of non-thought  —  "brilliant paradoxes, witty  
word games, verbal acrobatics” (25) — because, after all, the voice needs to find
 
its 
point d'appui, and so spectacularly, before it can step in and warm up for the  
dialogue. But the coldness with which the others in the circle meet our inter
­nal agitation, almost thrusting the voice back below the throat, should not be
 taken at its face value. The novelty of our group is that the voice meets the
 obligation to rise and move outward not for our ears, in a way, not to put on
 this table the individual truths we have labored at so devotedly, oftentimes in
 such bleak isolation, but to carry on the obligation to hear the other "asking you
 to find the words with which he’ll make you hear him” (Nancy and Smock
 311). Just for tonight, the Face-Logos with no project. We are in the vineyard,
 on the same bough.
June 27-28
Really
At the threshold of the theater, since their planets were revolving around each
 
other, they took themselves in opposite directions, in haste, without looking.
 He did not follow, their eyeballs fixed solely on the lights on the wooden stage
 and the podium, on the rows of red seats. She thought he was another who
 wanted her to watch Anne-Marie Stretter again, so she took her place among
 the others. She would clear the path and go into the soul. Even as she
12
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watched, her mind would be made strong by the speaker’s propositions. She
 
would know his ambition to make transparent the process of thinking as a
 squandering of his gift outward to many, many, and his self-destructive . . .
 social passion when thinking is on the verge of wanting to draw in things that
 cannot really be talked about, because how
 
could we carry them in speech with ­
out also wailing about coffee, about having a coffee or a coke alone or with
 someone, about a pang, a betrayal, a carnal fear, a falling for . .. tenderness, for
 the language of tenderness?
The man was drinking coffee in the square, sitting on the steps. He was
 
writing. The woman saw that he was watching
 
women. She went to where he  
was. He said "No,” and walked back with her over the bridge.
At 
11
 at night, he knocks on the door. He watches. Then he says, "So, can  
I kiss you?” The woman thinks, "let me give you a story.” "Do you want me to
 watch Anne-Marie Stretter?” it is saying. “Go to the many others and I’ll go
 to the soul,” it is saying. At the end of cruelty they kiss and kiss. It is as if the
 man let the woman kiss him.
June 29
Meditation on need
In Group Psychology, searching for an explanation of contagion, of "the mental
 
change which is experienced by an individual in a group” (88) and that makes
 him/her consent to things that, when alone he/she would not do, Freud comes
 up with the word "libido.” Much later, in Foucault this word would become
 "power” and by this name will expose itself as both the reason and limit of
 groups. But, originally, for Freud libido is the energy of love, cosmically under
­stood, and therefore not yet, as in Foucault, the mechanism of a public State
 that has perfectly infiltrated private souls. Freud writes:
Libido 
is
 an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by  
that name the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at
 present actually measurable), of those instincts which have to do with all
 that may be comprised under the word "love.” The nucleus of what we
 mean by love naturally consists (and this 
is
 what is commonly called love,  
and what the poets sing of) in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But
 we do not separate from this — what in any case has a share in the name
 "love” — on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and
 children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to
 concrete objects and to abstract ideas.
(90; emphasis added)
Extricated from the context of the couple, sexual love confuses itself with
 
humanitarian love; the sexual union prolongs the social love for family, friends,
 and humanity in general. Having lost its boundaries, "love” dissolves into the
 muddle of love. Freud’s indistinction between the social and the private spheres
 is here less reminiscent of a Foucauldian ideological continuum of individual
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and State apparatus and more of feminism. In this passage psychoanalysis and
 
feminism, especially that form of historical feminism that in the 1970s and
 early 1980s was called woman-identified feminism, seem to meet on common
 ground, arising both from a similar passion to experience in the choice of
 another social justice in action. (The feminist partners find their equal in the
 couple analyst/analysand). To a certain extent, feminism reproposed Freud
'
s 
muddle of love. Thriving on the juxtaposition of social and private love,
 woman-to-woman love (the politicized version of the lesbian relationship) per
­mits to assimilate to the sphere of intimacy the logic of reparation for the
 unfairness daily met by all the needs of others, an unfairness that the social is
 unable to repair.
Feminist love of the same celebrated synchronicity between the partners:
 
"Sleeping, turning in turn like planets / rotating in their midnight meadow”
 (Rich 82). The private couple, in turn,
 
became a fit metaphor for a better social  
tie admitting the possibility of equality. From this perspective, the feminist
 couple represents a position similar to what John Rawls calls "the veil of igno
­rance.” The essential premise of social
 
justice, the veil of ignorance, demands  
that we cede to the other’s right as if it were our right. We start as same and
 we see the need of
 
others. Out of restriction and in recognition of this need,  
one yields to the other’s part-taking. The problem with this position is that it
 conflates social justice and private love. From Freud to feminism to Rawls, it
 seems that a healed, just social tie would depend on this confusion.
* * *
Now that you are, the needs of others have become my numbness from you.
 
When you turn against me you save me from the crudeness of this split; you
 give me back to the social. Clad in a veil of ignorance, mindful of others’ fair
­ness to part-take of you, I have to give you.
Perhaps I was your social from the start. Did you kiss in me all the others’
 
need for justice? Did you repair with your kiss? Did you want to opt for the
 manageable and stop at night with the language of tenderness at least one of
 the million simultaneous cries, "Unfair to me”?
"There 
is
 no doubt,” Martin Stanton writes, "that Freud sternly admon ­
ished Ferenczi for what he termed 'the kissing technique’ (Kusstechnik), that is,
 the purported permission for patients to express physical affection to their ana
­lyst — as long, of course, as it did not drift into 
f
ull-scale sexual intercourse”  
(2). Freud thunders with disapproval of his pupil, who was taking the teacher’s
 psychoanalysis in an anarchic direction: "I see that the differences between us
 come to a head in a technical detail which is well worth discussing. You have
 not made a secret of the fact that you kiss your patients and let them kiss you;
 I had also heard that from a patient of my own” (quoted in Jones 174-5).
 Enraged, the master lashes out at the pupil, explaining the "new” kissing tech
­nique less with Ferenczi’s healing zeal and more with his self-serving desire to
 dethrone Freud himself in the eyes of future psychoanalytic adepts: "A number
 of independent thinkers in matters of technique will say to themselves: why
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which after all doesn
'
t make a  baby. And then bolder ones will come along who  
will go further to peeping and showing — and soon we shall have accepted in
 the technique of analysis the whole repertoire of demiviergerie and
 
petting-par ­
ties . . . and God the Father Ferenczi gazing at the lively scene he has created
 will perhaps say to himself: maybe after all I should have halted in my tech
­nique . . . before the kiss.”
Yet, despite Freud’s rage, Ferenczi may be viewed 
as
 Freud’s true disciple.  
He was acting out the muddle of love that the teacher himself— only an agent
 of history, as we all are registered in his thinking. "Psychoanalytic 'cure’ is
 in direct proportion to the cherishing love given by the psychoanalyst to the
 patient” (Ferenczi quoted in Stanton 139). To assuage the unfairness of their
 pain, to nurture and maybe heal his patients, it was said that Ferenczi, the prac





 fire: being sought, being written to — a kind of panic — coming  
into debt, indebted — "please forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who
 trespass against us” — debtor coming back to make you debtor with exhausted
 eyes.
July 9
Antigone (At the Thai restaurant)
As if you were my brother —
 
before you, this coarse uniform, as if you were my  
brother — no candle at our table because you are my brother. When you are
 my brother I outspeak the tyrant — gloriously — outside of the polis, anony
­mous, unfeminine in my coarse tunic, yet unique in my rebellion. Because you
 are my brother, the Law does not exist, this fragile thing invented
 
by the whims  
of hysterical men. Everybody can see that. Then why do so few speak? If
 women had brothers, they would speak more often. When you are my brother
 I am on my quest to find the law; there 
is
 no reason for its fixity, I have noth ­
ing to lose in knocking down tyrants, my uniform makes me strong. The tie
 snaps. I share nothing with the
 
polis. My comrades and I laugh at  the awe with  
which you hold yourselves subjected to the Symbolic. There is nothing sure
 about it; you invent your own chains and call them male eyes that see you in,
 inside your societies, giving you rights — be insiders inside. Power does not
 come through them. Unchain yourselves. If you were my brother I would not
 be endangered near the tyrant. Strong in my anonymous uniform, I would not
 be prevailed upon by such an anonymous force to dream of having my hair
 untied and perfume oil between my fingers since you’d be my brother.
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Now we are in the ringed wood with the wall round it. This is Elvedon. I have
 
seen signposts at the cross roads with one arm pointing "To Elvedon.” No one
 has been here. The ferns smell very strong, and there are red funguses grow
­ing beneath them. Now we wake the sleeping daws who have never seen a
 human form; now we tread on rotten oak apples, red with age and slippery.
 There is a ring of wall round this wood; nobody comes here. . .. That is Elve
­don. The lady sits between the two long windows, writing.
—Virginia Woolf, The Waves
Every reader of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves has fantasized about the mysteri
­
ous woman in Elvedon. Every reader has probably wanted to carry on with
 Bernard’s story about her. The woman sat writing in the empty house, tied to
 her desk, charmed in Elvedon. The spruce tree boughs fluttered through the
 window
 
pane, over the grey slates of the roof of the white garage. Through the  
night the windows were kept lit, and the woman wrote at her desk in Elvedon.
 Every reader of The Waves has wished Bernard had finally shown a text by this
 woman in Elvedon. What was she writing all the time?
If we read again, however, another, perhaps more pressing, question forms
 
in the mind: How might it feel to be in an enchanted place that has 
"
never seen  
a human form,” where “[n]o one has been,” and where the ripples of this unique
 absence have irradiated from the center outward, to the things in the landscape
 deep in sleep, to the oak apples “red with age.” The woman is in a heroic place,
 romantic to the outsider’s eye. Her unity with her writing 
is
 indeed unvan ­
quished: she 
is
 always the woman writing, the one designated by her exclusive  
activity. Thus she has passed into subjectivity to the eyes of those who stare at
 the scene: less a woman and more a writer, herself now a figure of speech in the
 race of her writing. This 
is
 why Bernard cannot show us any text of  hers; so  
wide has the distance had to be between the palpitations inflecting the woman’s
 orthography and the expectations raised by the scene of her tenacity, by the
 unchanging intensity with which she gives her existence between the two long
 windows lit through the night. One, like Bernard, wouldn’t look for anything
 less than an interminable text of the future. Yet, considering the place of the
 woman, it 
is
 sensible to imagine her in a moment of weakness. On her desk her  
notebook worn with use, she succumbs to a roughness of expression, lets the
 hand go after the ink, annotating. Those who have discovered Elvedon would
 not think of reading in the text they are awaiting from her perhaps a curse
 against the interminable human distance that — unaware to them — she con
­tinues to occupy.
July 15
Just for an hour
The woman crossed the lawn, reached the mansion, and lingered in the dining
 
room. As calm descended on her, she walked out into the garden, slowly. It
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was late afternoon in the summer. People were humming to each other in cou
­
ples and in groups, and her dress was billowing 
as
 if in a novel. She saw a cir ­
cle with an empty spot. She took her place there. She saw the friendly faces
 who took her in the circle. The air became very still. People were chatting
 around her, yet their talk was held still at a remove from her; she could not dis
­tinguish a syllable. She was at the far end of the pier looking on the stilled
 mainland.
After a while the man got up as she was trying to. He went to get her a
 
glass of wine; he got them both a glass of white wine. He came back and sat
 by her side. People’s eyes in the circle were on them; the woman and the man
 were being together. She did not know
 
what she was saying. She was talking  
about Foucault and how American he was, and going for the philosophical
 experience of the subject without ground, then about Foucault in the summer,
 lying in the scorching sun of the long strip of beach in Civitavecchia, discover
­ing Nietzsche for the first time. They saw an ant carrying her food in the grass.
 The man looked at the ant carrying the food approvingly, then he looked at the
 woman and asked her to go swimming. The woman was scared of crowds.
Everything stood extremely still. People held their plates. The man and
 
the woman finished the wine. He said to go. The woman stood up; a bell jar
 had fallen on the entire party; noises were numb. The moment had come; peo
­ple receded in the background. But before she took the first step her soul stum
­bled; she saw the scene again. Her lover had cut her tongue before all times,
 for all times. Her voice said, “I am positioned; you are positioning me now in
 the place left empty not long ago, and only for a while, by chance. I am arbi
­trarily in place of... ” “Your choice,” she said to the man, “moving of objects
 
as
 if, as if,” she stumbled. “Even in our most private motions  when we soar with  
Plato’s charioteer it is the violence of history that chooses, when we flutter,
 twitching and abandoned, under its blows and mistake that trembling for love.”
 She wanted to go mad and caress the horses and the animals in all cities. Her
 rage would have destroyed the world. Through the long window of the man
­sion’s dining room, S.’s eyes caught hers for the classic fraction of a second. He
 waited to see what she would do. Following the man, the woman stopped to
 throw her paper plate in the trash can. The man stopped to wait. Although
 someone else followed them, everyone knew the woman and the man were
 walking out together.
The man dived; the water kept them apart, a wide space in between. The
 
woman thought, “Will our minds meet? Are they meeting?” Keeping at bay
 the loss of a plot just when one could be begun, she enjoyed letting him be a
 stranger with the privilege of scrutiny — pondering decisions, weighing, bal
­ancing accounts in his mind while the watery space in between kept them still
 untied. She dreamed of questions which he bore as a beacon. He had reached
 the rocky ledge beside the falls, on the other shore of the gorge. He sat in the
 evening sun; she saw his shape in focus but removed at the other end. Perhaps
 their gazes met, but who knows for sure from afar, with the pool of water in
 between. She waved; he waved back, lit by sunset. She went down with her
 mouth into the water. “He 
is
 my brother,” she said to the water. She was in  
Virgil. She held to the rock on her side of the gorge.
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The stillness she had brought over from the party cracked; she woke up to
 
the presence of people around the circle of the gorge — the children, the moth
­ers and the fathers, men, women — they stirred, played, made noises. She
 thought of coming from overseas, from beyond her ultramarine sea and being
 in the book of paradise if only for an hour. She cut herself lose, untied from
 narrative. She thought, “I am positioned and he 
is
 not positioning me: I am  
the fullness of sunset on my brother to send him forth.” Only her eyes above
 the
 
water, her body in this water tinged with earth and tree reflections as if now  
it were in her ultramarine sea from beyond — no difference. On the surface of
 the well of the gorge — “just for an hour” he had said “to cool down” — con
­tingency, brotherhood, nature.
July 16
Ontology and the Symbolic
For politics does not happen when you act on behalf of your own damaged
 
good, but when you act, without guarantees, for the good of all-this is to take
 the risk of the universal interest. Politics in this sense requires representation,
 the critique of representation, and the critique of the critique of representation.
—Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law
The Symbolic 
is
 the circle of the gorge. If the woman were to follow the man  
she would be lost to ontology. If she swam to him, the love-object would be
 made to consent to being the object of choice. Then, from him an infinite gain
 would come, resembling the touch of universality. In the convergence of the
 erotic and the intellectual, desire for the Concept consents to the ontologizing
 confusion of individual self-interest and the interest of the other. One’s gain
is made to become the other’s.
Martin Heidegger met Hannah Arendt and gained Being and Time from
 
her. In turn, she received intellectual empowerment. In his presence she
 received the indelible birthmark of the kin of philosophy and of philosophers.
 Love was installed, a love that meant
 




 different, so young, so sexual, so Jewishmerry and melancholy  
at the same time — this woman, half his age and so knowledgeable ... he
 wasn’t used to that, was entranced, 
as
 was she. What female student, 18  
and willing to listen, open to the spirit and tone of the lecture room and
 male character and male tongues, would want to resist? Nor did she want
 to resist, she wanted to love what she heard, and did so.
(Theweleit 28)
Entranced by the unresisting consent of another that needs our need, our sense
 
of locality and of limits dissipates. For Heidegger, Arendt was “the inspiration
 for his work in those years, the impetus to his passionate thinking” (Theweleit
 28). In a European hut, removed in a nature away from the city and the hub of
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modernity, and not despite the body, but precisely because his ontic body was
 
sustained by an unresisting love-object, Heidegger could theorize the world.
 The Heidegger/Arendt relationship is exemplary because in this case theoriz
­ing the world, that is, the authority of the Concept, presumes the male body’s
 kinship with a giving maternal breast. Heidegger gave to the young, to an
 Arendt “willing” and “open ... to male character and male tongues” what the
 young will not be easily weaned from — the milk of thought . . . la filosofia.
 From her erotic tie to Heidegger she gained a universal tongue, a tongue that
 one speaks as easily as one can draw milk from a generous breast. At the con
­junction of the erotic and the intellectual, Arendt thus received the pass to phi
­losophy. The erotic alone could not give her the pass; it could come to her if
 Heidegger functioned simultaneously as male love-object and yielding breast,
 nourishing the young with the milk of thought.5 Thus her pass came to Arendt
 from a “mother” beyond the Father, both beyond the father figure that the older
 Heidegger was to his young pupil, and beyond the Freudian sense of the male
 child’s identification with the father as a necessary event in the child’s develop
­ment, which ultimately
 




have nothing to do with gender. In fact, the presumed  
necessity to think through the gender binary (sexed thought) might be a nega
­tion of that primary attestation of her kinship to philosophy that a woman
 intellectual gains from the convergence of the erotic and the intellectual situa
­tions. Though entitling, this convergence begs a question: if for women intel
­lectuals identification with the father means gaining the milk of thought and
 becoming fluent in the Concept, can one think without a Master?
If from her identification with the Father — which is more complex than
 
it appears because it also sends us to a maternal source — Arendt gained intel
­lectual entitlement, Heidegger, in his turn, did not learn anything from
 Arendt’s difference — as a Jew, as young, as woman, as listener. What was at
 stake was Heidegger’s milk-philosophia, its absolute essentiality as it made the
 listener willing, yielding from the very youth, giving up the possession of her
 difference (the Symbolic) in exchange for that which the thing she heard would
 bring. She was in a love-debt: “open to the spirit and tone of male character
 and male tongues, who would want to resist?” (Theweleit 28).
Through his willing Jewish pupil, Heidegger had renewed proof
 
that this  
milk could feed the aggressor and the betrayed equally. And as he gave and
 betrayed, Heidegger became hypnotized into the fundamental disengagement
 of
 
thought and the State. This disengagement is another name for ontology.  
Like politics, ontology “take[s] the risk of the universal interest” (G. Rose 62):
 in the name of, on behalf of, for,
 
with, on  the side. Like politics, ontology takes  
the risk that if I speak for you, you will submit, breast-feeding as it betrays oth
­ers but lending them the milk. “It requires representation,” a primary castra
­tion: no withdrawal is possible from the potlatch of love-debt. Gender must
 be left out for the milk-philosophia to run from the breast of the modern world
 (Theweleit 59).
Exchanged for the pass to universality that comes with the milk, gender, an
 
initial and long-lasting sacrifice, must ultimately remain before thought, an
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abyss in which thought risks to fall. The problem is who can and would want
 
to resist this pass? If the pass is so difficult to resist, gender will never inter
­rupt the intimate, seductive, and exclusive whispering flowing directly from
 thought to State. (With 
a
 “Heidegger-lord” [Theweleit 59] catatonic to the  
good or evil of the universal interest that his children loved to hear when they
 loved his milk, we have the Nazi Heidegger.)
July 16
 
Euryalus and Nisus, the poem of force
The
 
woman and the man returned to the gorge, in full daylight. The bustle was  
carrying on: the young men, the children at play, and the women. The man
 watched. There were two people between them, but the stillness from the pre
­vious day had caught up with them. The man and the womans gazes never
 met. They were called, would be called even before death, elsewhere, each
 responding to that magnetic instance just passing by the presence of the other.
 They destroyed each other’s presence. The woman thought she and the man
 were making love in the stillness, across from the presence of the two people
 between.
The man came out from the water for the second time to lie in the after
­
noon sun. His hair was dripping; his eyes elsewhere, after the magnet. They
 were in Virgil, where a difference so discouraging to the Concept must be
 forced through the brotherly
 
tie. The  woman lived, wrote, had time — and the  
letter, and what
 
was the point of the letter? “Your body is so fragile, my Love!”
[...]
July 17-18
“So, can I kiss you?”
[A]ny society — is essentially political, since it is wholly dependent on the fig
­
ure of the Chief.... But we must go on to 
say
 that society, any society, is fun ­
damentally totalitarian — not, I hasten to add, because state coercion or tyran
­nical violence are somehow essential to this conception; these traits are in no
 way exclusive to totalitarian societies, and Freud clearly said that the reign of
 the Führer rests above all on the fiction of his love. Rather, if society for Freud
 is totalitarian in the strictest sense, it 
is
 because it presents itself as an inte ­
grally political totality, a totale Staat, knowing no divisions except the one —
 minimal, and solely intended to relate the social body to itself— between the
 beloved Chief and his loving subjects.
—Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional 




 private human relation, with this glitch that nevertheless requires reckon ­
ing in our rightful search for an alternative sociality? You turn. As both moth-
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er tongue and language slip, you turn away;
 
you turn your back and this is good.  
As you turn, you interrupt the totality. I can then hesitate: should I swim into
 you, should I not. If I know you will turn just as my mind slips toward you, if
 I know you will follow someone else’s back, I will also know in you a crack in
 the totality. I will be “beyond,” more toward the ethical, less stuck in the polit
­ical. “In the name of what do we need to imagine an alternative sociality?”6 My
 rope is cut loose; I float; I regress to the integral totality —
 
your loving subject,  
my beloved chief. There is nothing ethical about private love; only religion
 could restrain its extremist political vocation, or you — when you turn away.
 The greatest welling up of absence of private love gives rise to fascism. Now




No man is 
an 
Hand, intire of itselfe; every man a peece of the Continent, a part  
of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well
 as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor
 
of thy friends, or of thine owne  






Parataxis is a figure of accretion, it heaps words on, using them more than
 
choosing them. It departs from calculation for lack of time, and from exegesis
 for the same reason, because the writer 
is
 in a hurry, “so inspired by his theme,  
it fills him so completely, and the desire to communicate himself and to be
 understood is so overwhelming” (Auerbach 166).
If lyric dreams of an “absolute inseparation” (Derrida 229) of body and let
­
ter, parataxis lives this desire in the light of day — acting out one’s being, mak
­ing a scene, graphic and therefore comprehensible to all, striking at “the crucial
 spot” in the heart, dissolving its memorized lines into haziness — “it arouses
 emotion, it staggers” (Auerbach 168).
An affront to the sovereignty of language, paratactic expression — “hurried,
 
awkward, uncalculated” (166), constantly driving itself into public display —
 lives on language’s raw material. The hurried writer loses one figure of speech
 after the other to the urgency of the acting-out of being — “to communicate
 himself.”
Parataxis gains conviction when details can no longer mislead, when, no
 
longer a question of symbolic investiture, language becomes rudiment, occasion
at the unilateral service of expression. An arresting exaggeration? A sec
­ond-hand possession, that is not given, not by the mother, not with the moth
­er tongue, a secondariness that, therefore, no munificent giver could ever give.
 Therefore not even a law, benign — that is, inviting — or otherwise castrating.
 The writer so filled with the gripping theme, with the aim of such “unilaterary
 directness of expression” (167), arrives at the scene.
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Concealing shame sabotages intimacy.
—Adam Phillips, Terrors and Experts
In the classic philosophy of Plato the ascent toward wisdom begins in love.
 
Philosophical and linguistic power, figured by the upward movement of the
 soul, coincide with erotic attraction. As
 
Julia Kristeva discusses it, the episode  
of the charioteer in Phaedrus illustrates the interdependence of soul and eros
 and, by extension, the dependence of the philosopher on “the surge of empath
­ic desire” (66) that unfolds in a violent “sadomasochistic psychodrama” (64):
Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love, and has his whole soul
 
warmed through sense, and is full of pricklings and ticklings of desire, the
 obedient steed, then as always under the government of shame, refrains
 from leaping on the beloved; but
 
the other, heedless of the pricks and of the  
blows of the whip, plunges and runs away, giving all manner of trouble to
 his companion and the charioteer, whom he forces to approach the beloved
 and to remember the joys of love. They at first indignantly oppose him and
 will not be urged on to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but at last, when he
 persists in plaguing them, they yield and agree to do as he bids them.
(Plato, Phaedras, quoted in Kristeva 65)
The bildung of the philosopher relies on the struggle with possession-love to
 
the extent that, 
as
 Kristeva comments, “phallic domination is elevated and  
metamorphosed into apprenticeship of the Good and the True” (67). Quite a
 different version of love can be found in Platos Symposium. There, Diotima
 bears the tale of an ideal love that constructs in view of the supreme good and
 of immortality. The knot of desire and intellectual empowerment seems less
 significant than the choice of the Good, a choice that unites the lover and the
 philosopher. In Diotima’s tale the philosopher/lover is the one who can stand
 midway between ignorance and wisdom, the position of
 
tempered desire. As  
far as the reader can tell, in the case of a woman
 
— Diotima’s — occupying this  
position of wisdom does not make her an entitled philosopher: though erudite,
 Diotima 
is
 not present at the banquet of the dialecticians. In Plato’s text she is 
a removed presence, and her theorizing is reported secondhand by Socrates.
* * *
Now imagine the woman again, and a room. Imagine the night in which the
 
lover has come within the reach of the object of
 
Beauty that had been before  
forever out of sight, lost, merely a shadow crumbling to the touch in the cave
 of imagos. Imagine the path ahead of which the object of Beauty now leads the
 lover; the lover’s hand extended and the path. From a point on, the beloved fol
­lows, his hand too reaching to heal, taking
 
the language of tenderness out of the  
room and in the roads and over the bridge almost imperceptibly for the lover
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— his hand falling lightly over the hip of the lover, healing, already a healer’s
 
hand in place of the beloved’
s,
 then already again quickly out of sight as it was  
before, ahead of the path. Imagine the path leading up to the room and the
 lover once more having covered the distance up to the point of beholding the
 object of Beauty.
Imagine the room, the lover and the beloved locked into the embrace in
 
which the lover can no longer let go of the beloved. If in the classic philoso
­phy of Plato the dialectician and the philosopher begin in love, if knowledge
 plants itself primarily in 
a
 tie of love, for  the woman in the room, who has come  
within the reach of Beauty, knowledge remains a drama of
 
perpetual suspen ­
sion. Positioned between the winged pair, with the prickling of desire that
 demands the narrativization of erotic aggression and domination, and Diotima’s
 ideal concept of love, how will the woman choose the path of wisdom? What
 will make of her the philosopher, the dialectician — which she knows she will
 be — with any sense of conviction? The beloved’s embrace locks her between
 an empowering subjection and an unreachable object of Beauty, two as yet
 uninitiated, unresolved paths. When will philosophy
 
begin?
Imagine the room, the brightness of the lights, the knotted bodies sus
­pended between the act-predicated narrative of the sadomasochistic drama of
 the charioteer and Diotima’s path which if taken, the woman now thinks, is
 bound for elliptical narrative, for the loss of the Concept. What will the
 woman do?
For the woman locked in the embrace, bidden by the presence of the
 
beloved, her soul born through the pricklings of sense, divided between the
 horror at the beloved’s flight and her own undecidability, wisdom (metaphysics)
 lies in the trauma of an in-between. The solution of the kiss, while reestab
­lishing an accord, a mutuality without violence, comes 
as
 the pass into a sec ­
ondary form of metaphysics. The kiss returns her to the poverty of an originary
 suspension, a figure of reciprocity and yet of secondary thought. Does the
 metaphysical
 
power  passed with a  kiss that stops before possession-love amount  
to boring theories? Does it risk itself as a subplot of the universal? A local,
 sexed thought, forever an image, a representation, a death-in-life?
Styles of kissing can be seen but not easily described, as though kissing
 
resists verbal representation. It is striking that, unlike other forms of sexu
­ality, there 
is
 little synonymy of kissing. It has generated no familiar slang,  
acquired virtually no language in which it can be redescribed. . . . Appar
­ently for the sake of interest stories often ignore, in a way films do not, the
 fact that the kiss itself is a story in miniature, a subplot.
(Phillips, On Kissing 95-6)
Imagine the room. The two locked in the embrace, kissing. The woman
 
thought of the beloved’s hair as he led, ahead on the path, before approaching.
 She thought he got the book, read it, and went swimming because he had
 become the charioteer feeling. She saw him swimming in the gorge, and his
 slender body, as he kissed her in the room. The beloved lifts the lover and car
­ries the lover until the end of the bright light, near the lit candle. Both are now
 suspended in a kissing that neither eradicates her from language nor sends
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through her the birth of conceptuality. Until before the beloved’s boredom.
 
Even as the beloved is telling what he loves, almost
 
beginning the narrative, the  
kiss reunites the two and returns them to human mutuality, freezing their
 shapes into the paradigm for the good social tie — a brotherly tie. It was as if
 the man let the woman kiss him: only the network of metaphors of healing
 could describe the kiss. This terminable, almost session-long kissing, out of
 need.
Arrived at on the way to a dialogue with his patient, Hungarian psychoan
­
alyst Sandor Ferenczi’s healing tenderness would seem the logical outcome of a
 psychoanalysis understood as a philosophy in practice, almost as a “vitafilosofi-
 ca.” Ferenczi’s tenderness revisits the classic scenario of the knot of knowledge
 and love, the dialogue of Socrates and Phaedrus by the plane tree and the
 spring. In the passage from philosophy to psychoanalysis, however, the philo
­sophical dialogue is no longer complicitous with possession-love. The “mater
­nal friendliness” (Stanton 135) of Ferenczi’s kiss displaces the power of the
 Concept with the quest for a healing social tie. While in the charioteer story
 conceptual power was indivisible from the eroticized traumatic transit of the
 initiated, Ferenczi’s tenderness — with a touch of utopian impatience, perhaps
 — rephrases for all of us the Concept as the question of an ethical beyond, of 
a better, more vigilant intersubjective tie: “Ferenczi wanted the psychoanalytic
 relationship to be the paradigm for social relations” (Phillips, Terrors 28). Tak
­ing its cue from the modern urban spectacle — so well portrayed by Marx and
 Engels — of strangers brutally, arbitrarily, thrown into a sudden intimacy, Fer
­enczi’s psychoanalysis concerns itself with “the greatest need.”7 But in trying to
 heal from this historical trauma, it also necessarily awakens the originary par




The third position is a familiar theme in Duras’s writing. The story of  
Anne-Marie Stretter and her lover appears again in The Vice-consul, and one of
 Duras’s last works, Yann Andrea Steiner, returns to this theme through the con
­siderable age difference separating the woman protagonist (Duras) and her
 young lover. In the love-making scene the old woman must put herself in the
 position of a child to bridge in her mind the scandalous gap between herself
 and her lover, half her age.
2.
 
This is the question Jacqueline Rose asks in her page for the SCT Sym ­
posium, in Postcards from the Edge.
3.
 
In her essay on Henry James’s “The Turn of the Screw,” Shoshana Fel-  
man asks: “Is it at all
 
possible to read and to interpret ambiguity without reduc ­
ing it in the very process of interpretation? Are reading and ambiguity in any
 way compatible?” (Writing and Madness 165).
4.
 
Title of a 1967 essay by Vargas Llosa and included in Making Waves.
5.
 
For the exigencies of this fiction, the relationship between Heidegger  
and her pupil has been simplified. For a more articulate discussion on the light
 that this relationship might shed on the question of love and the transmission
 of ideas, see my more academic, unpublished version of “Theoretical Effects.”
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“If we keep our cool, educational attitude, even vis-à-vis an opisthotonic  
patient [that is, one whose body is tensed up with anxiety], we tear to shreds
 the last thread that connects him to us. The patient gone off into his trance 
is a child indeed who no longer reacts to intellectual explanations, only perhaps to
 maternal friendliness; without it, he feels lonely and abandoned in his greatest
 need” (Ferenczi quoted in Stanton 135).
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Over the past ten years, Nella Larsen
'
s 1929 novel  
Passing has become an important reference within
 contemporary debates over the status of racial differ-
 ence, especially those debates carried out by critics
 whose work interrogates the thresholds of biology
 and culture. For many of these readers, the novel
 contains strong suggestions that Larsen herself
 viewed "race” as an ontologically bankrupt term.
 Samira Kawash, for instance, regards passing narra
­tives such as Larsen
'
s as part of the project of “dislo ­
cating the color line,” insofar as the forms of social
 encounter these narratives enact — in which geno
­typically “black” characters are able to move freely
 through otherwise restrictive social spaces by virtue
 of their phenotypically “white” characteristics —
 “makes impossible and irrelevant appeals to authen
­ticity as a signal of ethnicity” (149). “Difference,”
 Kawash explains, “refers not to some reality... but
 
to  
positionality,” a fact that Passing should underscore.
 Working along a similar vein of thought, Robyn
 Wiegman points out that Passing enacts a “visible
 negation of
 
‘blackness’” and thus unsettles the “visible  
epistemology of black skin” to which traditional par
­adigms of American racism have been anchored.
 Larsen
'
s literary project, then, takes up an overt polit ­
ical agenda for such readers, since as Wiegman goes
 on to explain, “[t]o interrupt this equation [“between
 the idea of ‘race’ and the ‘black’ body”] is crucial to
 the political articulation of antiracist cultural cri
­tique” (21-2). At the very
 
least, Passing raises persis-
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tent questions concerning the efficacy of racial difference inasmuch as the nar
­
rative consistently returns to question the premises that ground our knowledge
 of such difference. When Larsen’s protagonist, Irene Redfield, 
is
asked to  
explain “the trick” of
 
distinguishing an “authentic” Caucasian from an individ ­
ual who merely passes as one — when, in short, she is asked to locate and give
 a name to that thing that makes all the difference between two phenotypically
 similar individuals — she can offer little more than the dubious reply: “There
 are ways. But they’re not definite or tangible” (Larsen 206). Pushed further,
 she adds, “Just — just something. A thing that couldn’t be registered.”
It is, of course, a statement that tends to mystify matters of racial differ
­
ence, and yet such mystification is what Passing cannot avoid, what Larsen
 seems forced to engage in a novel that removes “race” from the level of the phe
­notypical, the corporeal, the visible. Irene’s comment might in this sense seem
 to offer us a glimpse at Larsen’s true hand in Passing: doesn’t “a thing that
 couldn’t be registered,” the ambiguous “something” that purports to substanti
­ate racial difference, indicate that 
as
 soon as we begin to speak of racial ontol ­
ogy, we are already knee-deep in pure fantasy, pure projection — that, in short,
 the differences between whites and blacks are the differences they themselves
 inscribe and maintain? For her part, Kawash follows up on these possibilities
 when she suggests that Irene’s remark figures “race” as more “nothing” than
 “something,” more a cultural phantasm (like the mysterious “drop of black
 blood” that ostensibly condenses the world of difference between blacks and
 whites) than a substantive component of biological reality (155).
Such readings of Passing as a narrative project that disturbs essentialist for
­
mulations of racial difference, and hence challenges the racist economies these
 formulations authorize, draw upon a nuanced association between the pleasures
 of parody and the political effects of performance. In this sense, Judith Butler’s
 reading of Passing deserves special attention, since it was Butler’s earlier Gender
 Trouble that first articulated, in ways that resonated
 
widely among Anglophone  
cultural critics, the subversive properties of parodic performance. Butler con
­tends that parodic performances are inherently disruptive of the norms they
 mimic and, more particularly, that the disruptions at issue here disperse them
­selves through the vehicle of laughter. “The loss of the sense of ‘the normal,”’
 Butler explains, “can be its own occasion for laughter, especially when ‘the nor
­mal,’ ‘the original’ is revealed to be a copy, and an inevitably failed one, an ideal
 that no one can embody. In this sense, laughter emerges in the realization that
 all along the original was derived” (138-9). For Butler, parody and the laugh
­ter it incites tend to undermine the matrix of prescribed norms we typically
 experience as reality itself, inflicting a form of category crisis that is all
 
the more  
powerful because grounded in our sensation of unregulated pleasure.
This model of parodic subversion asserts itself throughout Butler’s later
 
reading of Passing, especially insofar as this reading
 
finds the tension of Larsen’s  
narrative at precisely that point where an understanding of “race” as a biologi
­cally sustained and impermeable boundary gives way to the performative
 process of passing, the effect of which 
is
 to submit every absolute racial demar ­
cation to the prospect of its own contingency and flux. In her reading of
 Larsen, Butler explains that “the uncertain border between black and white” —
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the very uncertain, Du Boisian 
"
color line” upon  which Irene fails to lay  hold as  
she gropes for this “thing that couldn’t be registered” — 
is
 precisely what racist  
essentialism must specify in order to maintain its fantasies of racial purity and
 hierarchy. For this reason, Butler suggests that passing’s implicit challenge to
 naturalistic categories of difference — more specifically, its displacement of
 such naturalistic categories with performative simulacra of these categories —
 presents a profound threat to racial essentialism and hence racism itself; for the
 latter, as Butler explains, it 
is
 “the spectre of a racial ambiguity that must be  
conquered,” that must be refused and effaced in order for the white-suprema
­cist mind to retain its own epistemological footing (Bodies 172). Thus, the risky
 pleasures to which passing yields access become strictly subordinate to the plea
­sures inherent to the form of passing itself, a form in which we witness the col
­lapse of “original” into "copy,” of “white” into “black.” In Larsen’s novel, Butler
 would suggest, racial ontology itself becomes 
a
 kind of joke, since Passing  
inspires laughter at the expense of those who cling to such an ontology, dis
­crediting
 
those particular criteria of corporeal difference to which  larger notions  
of racial differentiation are often attached.




into the racially  segregated Drayton tearoom, finds herself the  
object of an anonymous, apparently Caucasian gaze — when she succumbs to
 the fear that a nearby
 
Caucasian onlooker has discerned her legally marginalized  
racial status — her growing sense of dread is tempered by her sense of the
 ridiculousness of the situation. “Absurd!” she muses. “White people were so
 stupid about such things for all that they
 
usually asserted that they were able to  
tell; and by the most ridiculous means, finger-nails, palms of hands, shapes of
 ears, teeth, and other equally silly rot” (150). The prospect of discovery 
is
 dead ­
ly serious for Irene, and yet the whole sequence underlines the “absurd,” laugh
­able possibility that, precisely through its myopic fixation upon corporeal
 details that actually mean nothing whatsoever, the anonymous Caucasian gaze
 has effectively mistaken Irene for what she is. Thus, Larsen tells us, “Irene
 laughed softly, but her eyes flashed” (150). That the truth may sometimes arise
 from a misrecognition would be funny in itself, if not for Irene’s fear of being
 discovered and hence ejected from the Drayton tearoom, but the overriding
 joke and its implicit punch line become clear once the anonymous observer
 steps forward to introduce herself as Irene’s long-lost childhood friend and fel
­low “Negro,” Clare Kendry.
This early moment of revelation typifies Larsen’s narrative technique in
 
Passing, which often appears at pains to emphasize a dissonance between the
 “surface” layer of intersubjective encounter and its underlying substratum of
 “authentic” subjective experience. In this first passing encounter of Passing, it
 is the passer herself (Irene) who has succumbed
 
to the “absurd” set of racial/cor-  
poreal equations that usually lead “white people” to dupe themselves, and that
 have now led Irene herself to mistake Clare Kandry for a Caucasian. It 
is
 also,  
however, a critical moment for any approach to Larsen that seeks out Passings
 attitude toward racial substance, for after the renewal of acquaintances that
 takes place during this sequence, Irene find herself confronted with a vexed
 ontological question: in what sense, she now wonders, 
is
 Clare actually a
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"Negro,” especially when all of her visible, corporeal qualities — her "ivory” skin
 
and "golden hair,” for instance — seem to bespeak "whiteness,” so much so that
 Irene had never doubted Clare’s Caucasian status even throughout a close visu
­al scrutiny of her? Finding herself at a loss to explain precisely
 
how or why the  
phenotypically "Caucasian” Clare actually qualifies 
as
 "black,” Irene finally  
decides that the elusive moment of racial essence resides within the depths of
 Clare’s gaze: 
"Ah!
 Surely! They were Negro eyes! mysterious and concealing,”  
Irene concludes, but even here, the eyes of the Negro are not configured with
­in the anatomical geometries Irene considers little more than "silly rot” but are
 instead mystified, sublimated as that place from which racial difference, Clare’s
 secret inheritance from "her grandmother and later her mother and father,” the
 "thing that couldn’t be registered” in mere corporeal terms, somehow emanates
 (161).
It is also, therefore, a moment that places definite limits upon the subver
­
sive effects of parodic imitation, since it is the very seamlessness of Clare’s pass
­ing performance, the mimetic flawlessness of her simulation of a
 
white woman,  
that prompts Irene not to abandon "race” 
as
 a legitimate differential term but  
rather to re-locate it on a mysterious plane beyond that of the merely corpore
­al. Inasmuch as it locates a kernel of raw, unmediated racial alterity within the
 sanctum of Clare’s gaze, the sequence in the Drayton anticipates another mise-
 en-scene of performance and misrecognition, one that similarly pokes quiet fun
 at what Wiegman calls the "visible epistemology of black skin,” though this
 time, the butt of the joke appears in the form of Clare’s husband, the openly
 racist John Bellew. Larsen presents Bellew as the dupe, the racist fool who fails
 to realize that his own wife 
is
 among the very  "black scrimy devils” he impugns  
through his frequent diatribes. When asked to explain his apparently affec
­tionate pet name for his wife (usually, we discover, Bellew greets Clare as
 "Nig”), he offers Clare and Irene what he clearly considers a clever witticism.
 "When we were first married,” he explains, "she was as white as — as — well
 
as
 white as a lily. But I declare she’s gettin ' darker and darker. I tell her if she  
don’t look out, she’ll wake up one of these days and find she’s turned into a nig
­ger” (171). At this, of
 
course, Bellew "roar[s] with laughter,” and his laughter  
is reciprocated by the women surrounding him. But though it might appear to
 affirm Bellew’s bad joke, the laughter of Clare and Irene actually stems from a
 surreptitious comedic source, since both passing women are laughing at Bellew
 rather than with him, are laughing at the racist’s ridiculous blindness and truly
 laughable assumptions rather than alongside those assumptions. Availing
 themselves of that outlet Freud describes in Jokes and Their Relation to the
 Unconscious, Clare and Irene laugh as a way of
 
striking a blow at an adversary  
they are otherwise powerless to assail; Irene, Larsen tells us, "had a leaping
 desire to shout at the man beside her, And you’re sitting here surrounded by
 three black devils, drinking tea’” (172), but instead of denouncing Bellew open
­ly, Irene savors the hidden comedy through her unconcealed laughter.
So in a definite sense, Irene’s laughter during this sequence also qualifies as
 
a form of Butlerian, parodic laughter: part of the comedy to which her laugh
­ter responds lies in the fact that the ostensibly "Caucasian” women surrounding
 Bellew are in fact "copies,” the very "black scrimy devils” from which he imag
­
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ines himself safely distanced. But even if Irenes laughter finds its source in the
 
very forms of parody and imitation Butler describes in Gender Trouble, this
 laughter fails to deliver the liberating, denaturalizing effects Butler forecasts —
 quite the opposite, in fact. Larsens description of Irenes laughter draws it out,
 stretches it to conspicuous dimensions, so that while the laughter indicates 
a certain furtive pleasure with Bellew’s catastrophic mistake, the pleasure itself
 now appears 
as
 if situated along a Mobius strip, now verging upon its reversal  
into anguish: “Irene, who had been sitting with lips tightly compressed, cried
 out, ‘That’s good!’ and gave way to gales of laughter. She laughed and laughed
 and laughed. Tears ran down her cheeks. Her sides ached. Her throat hurt.
 She laughed on and on and on, long after the others had subsided” (171). It 
is while in the midst of this vertigo of laughter, Larsen tells us, that Irene, sud
­denly glancing into the eyes of Clare, “encountered her peculiar eyes fixed on
 her with an expression so dark and deep and unfathomable that she had for a
 short moment the sensation of gazing into the eyes of some creature utterly
 strange and apart” (172). Momentarily, Irene sees Clare as a
 
“creature,” a mon ­
ster of some kind, and in this sense, Irene sees Clare as Bellew sees all African
 Americans: even if not precisely as “black scrimy devils,” certainly as “unfath
­omable” and “utterly strange and apart.” As in the earlier sequence in the Dray
­ton, the gaze of Clare contains something “dark and deep,” something as
 “unfathomable” as race itself, the “thing that couldn’t be registered” otherwise.
So even if readers such as Kawash, Wiegman, and Butler are fundamental
­
ly correct when they suggest that Passing turns 
a
 suspicious eye toward tradi ­
tional notions of racial difference, and even if they are correct when they insist
 that the novel works to undermine those connections between corporeality and
 “race” that have most usually been taken for granted in American culture, why
 then do such moments from Passing seem to invest racial difference with a
 phantasmic power that perseveres despite the ontological deficiencies of “race
”
?  
The first contention I want to make here is that Passings paradoxical fixation
 with racial difference (ontologically bankrupt on the one hand yet irreducibly
 charged on the other) should remind us of what Jaques Lacan aims at in his
 deliberations over another category of difference — sexual difference — and
 especially in his insistence that sexual difference 
is
 real. By referring to sexual  
difference 
as
 real, Lacan does not mean that sexual difference pertains to some  
level of immutable, biologically fixed “reality” that stands apart from our dis
­cursive or epistemological renditions of sex but rather that sexual difference
 belongs to what he terms the order
 
of the real, precisely as that which cannot be  
enclosed in either the symbolic register (which 
is
 to say, in language itself) or  
what Lacan refers to as the imaginary (the visual world of corporeal images by
 means of which the subject may liken or differentiate herself from others).
 “Real,” for Lacan, 
is
 what perturbs both the imaginary and the symbolic, what  
exceeds the conceptual limits of either domain, and in Passing, racial difference
 — like sexual difference as described by Lacan — appears as “the essential
 object
 
which isn’t an object any longer, but this something faced  with which all  
words cease and all categories fail, the object of
 
anxiety par excellence” (Semi ­
nar II 164). Passing, in other words, denies racial difference both its symbolic
 and its imaginary support: in this novel, there is no phrase that can answer the
32
Journal X, Vol. 5 [2020], No. 1, Art. 14
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14
28 Journal x
question, "What is racial difference?” (we have seen, for instance, how a version
 
of this question leaves Irene Redfield with nothing meaningful to say), and nei
­ther does there seem to be any corporeal quality or set of qualities that can reli
­ably distinguish members of putatively distinct racial groups (all such efforts at
 the corporeal specification of race, 
as
 Irene rightly muses, are little more than  
"silly rot”). But the symbolic and imaginary bankruptcy of "race” as the term
 functions or dysfunctions in Passing should not lead us to conclude that Larsen
 dismisses the term 
as
 a mere social illusion — a mere "nothing” that twentieth ­
century subjects continue wrongly to invest 
as
 "something.” Instead, Larsens  
treatments of racial difference aim at its impossibly charged status, the sense in
 which racial difference, beyond the fact of its imaginary or symbolic deficien
­cies, 
is
 replete with its own real symptomatology. Another  way to put this is to  
say that regardless of Larsens purpose the effect of her narrative is to reverse
 the sort of historicist premise that informs so many approaches to her novel
 today: the point about Passing is not simply that racial difference is an histor
­ically contingent notion, that certain twentieth-century American subjects cre
­ated or inscribed racial difference for the purposes of post-reconstruction
 racism. The point, rather, is something like the opposite, that racial difference
 is in a way
 




 to suggest that the sort of antiracist cultural critique for which Wieg-  
man calls (and which she also enacts in sophisticated and illuminating ways),
 the fundamental aim of which is to interrupt the axis "between the idea of
 
‘race’  
and the ‘black’ body,” falls somewhat short of the challenge Larsen poses in
 Passing. For if the racist economies Larsen unveils persist even in the apparent
 absence of such a connection, this would imply that the cultural force of "race”
 is conceptually resistant to any critical
 
tactic that focuses strictly upon the dubi ­
ousness of its corporeal transfigurations.
What exactly 
is
 meant by "race” as the word is used and contested in Pass ­
ing? Responding to his wife’s self-assured remark ("What would it matter if
 ... I were one or two percent coloured?”), Bellew exclaims, "Oh, no, Nig. [. ..]
 Nothing like that with me. I know you’re no nigger, so it’s all right. You can
 get as black as you please as far as I’m concerned, since I know you’re no nig
­ger” (171). It is an intriguing formulation. Bellew’s statement would imply
 that "nigger” is something that is irreducible to a set of positive physical char
­acteristics, though these very characteristics are at the same time what demar
­cate whites from blacks. (Again: "I declare she’s gettin’ darker and darker. I
 tell her if she don’t look out, she’ll wake up one of these days and find she’s
 turned into a nigger.”) That is, one "can get as black as [one] please[s],” as far
 as Bellew is concerned, without actually qualifying as "black”; blackness thus
 designates a kind of uncanny surplus,
 
what is "in the subject more than the sub ­
ject itself,” to borrow
 
the Lacanian phrase; and in Passing, racial substance most  
often resides here, a kernel of alterity that exceeds the literal characteristics that
 designate alterity itself. If one may embody all of the physical qualities associ-
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ated with blackness without actually being black, this means that “black” 
is
 that  
which bypasses the level of imaginary identification (the level of specularizable
 difference by means of which one may liken or differentiate oneself), penetrat
­ing to the level of the real, the supposed inner stratum of the subject in his or
 her raw authenticity. So when Bellew explains that Clare may become as dark
­ly colored 
as
 she pleases without actually becoming “coloured,” the corollary of  
this logic is that one may appear as “Bly” white as whites themselves without
 actually
 
being  white. The matrix of corporeal qualities (skin, nose, hair, and so  
on) that ostensibly separates whites from blacks functions strictly as pretext
 here: what matters for the white-supremacist mentality that Bellew incarnates
 and Passing exposes is the phantasmic moment of difference that, since it can
 never be confined to a finite set of terms, can never be dispelled.
Such a prospect of an immaterial and yet substantial kernel of racial alteri
­
ty allows us to see how passing, far from undermining the apparently rigid sys
­tem of partitions that appears on the surface level of racist fantasy (in which the
 divisions that separate whites from blacks are presented as absolute and imper
­meable), actually provides the necessary exception that grounds the white
­supremacist logic. If, as Bellew believes, African Americans are not only the
 bearers of a particular class of physical characteristics but also the embodiment
 and source of a deep social malignancy (as he informs the passing women in his
 home, “I read in the papers about them. Always robbing and killing people”
 [172]),
 
what, may we imagine, would be Bellew’s response to an African Amer ­
ican who did not rob and kill? To Bellew’s paranoiac vision of “all blacks” as
 those who rob and kill, we may of
 
course add a list of traditional stereotypes:  
all blacks are lazy, all blacks are unintelligent, all blacks are possessed of an
 excessive sexual drive for which their unhappy social predicament may be
 blamed, and so on. The point here is that such lists are, like the physical char
­acteristics Clare may display without “really” being black, pure pretext; the log
­ical formulae, “Because they steal,” “Because they are lazy,” and “Because they
 cannot control their
 
urges” all serve to obscure the fundamental logic: “Because  
they are black
 
— because there is a universal something in them that overrides  
its own particular expression in theft, violence, or indigence.” If we are to
 imagine Bellew — or someone like Bellew — faced with a black subject who
 does not exhibit any of
 
these supposedly constant, particular qualities, we can  
also easily imagine how he would explain such a phenomenon without relin
­quishing his understanding of what blackness entails. His refrain would go
 something like this: “Do you see how clever they are? Here we have one who
 carefully refrains from criminal activity, who manages to keep his sexual urges
 in check, who has learned to sound intelligent. ... In short, here we have a
 black
 
who has learned to pass as white!”
It is this paradox of an exception to the universal law, the exception that
 rather than undermining actually grounds the law as universally effective, that
 Lacan articulated in his mathemes of sexual difference contained in the twen
­tieth seminar, Encore. If, as Lacan suggests, all subjects are subject to the uni
­versal condition of castration, this maxim nevertheless provides space for “at
 least one” subject that is not castrated (what Lacan calls the Name-of-the-
 Father, the master signifier against which all other signifiers appear as lacking
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or "castrated”), so that the universal rule requires some particular instance that
 
escapes its function.1 Intrinsic to the white-supremacist logic according to
 which "all blacks” are x, according to which all black subjects fall under the
 dominion of some universal rule or set of rules, is the
 
proviso that "some blacks”  
may not exhibit x traits; in order to maintain its epistemological footing in the
 face of clear evidence that many blacks are not the embodiment of x, the
 
white ­
supremacist mindset we are describing must have recourse to a conceptual
 frame within which "some blacks” may appear to escape the universal rule con
­cerning "all blacks” that defines white supremacy itself. The key point here is
 that passing in no way constitutes a threat to racist-essentialist thinking, not
 even insofar as it allegedly "deconstructs” the rigidly binarist logic of
 white/black; on the contrary, it is only through reference to the possibility of
 passing itself that racists can maintain their essentialist convictions in the face
 of black subjects who do not fit their paradigm of what "all blacks” must be.
Of definite interest here, moreover, is the way
 
in which this sleight of hand  
by means of which the prospect of racial essence is preserved, even once bereft
 of its imaginary or symbolic support, is played out within much of the criticism
 Larsen’s novel has generated over the past few decades. According to readers
 such as Cheryl Wall and Mary Mabel Youman, Passing presents a pair of
 women, Irene and Clare, who have paid for their upper-middle class existence
 by severing what Irene at one point refers to as "the bonds of race.” 1920s
 upper-middle-class affluence is thus diametrically opposed not only to solidar
­ity with other African Americans (Irene’s orchestration of tea parties for vari
­ous racial uplift organizations does in fact seem hypocritically distanced from
 actual political involvement) but also more troublingly to the self-acceptance of
 "blackness” itself. Even Deborah McDowell, whose pathbreaking work with
 the queer dimensions of Larsen’s narrative distinguishes itself from the more
 racially focused readings of other scholars, argues that Larsen "parodies the
 manners and morals of the black middle class” with her "descriptions of the
 endless tea and cocktail parties, and charity balls [that] capture the sterility and
 banality of the bourgeoisie” (xxv). The manners and morals at issue here are
 codified as "white” manners and morals, so that Irene’s comfortable lifestyle
 may
 
be treated as the index of her alienation — or, as McDowell puts it, of the  
problem of "racial identity and loyalty” raised by Irene’s genteel existence
 (xxvii).2 A sequence from Larsen’s 1928 novel Quicksand provides another case
 study for this tendency in Larsen scholarship. When the (also) mulatta, (also)
 bourgeois Helga Crane attends a Harlem cabaret in which, Larsen tells us, "the
 essence of life seemed bodily motion” (59), her involvement and fascination
 with the scene is somehow tinged with a sense of displacement, so that "when
 suddenly the music died, [Helga] dragged herself back to the present with 
a conscious effort; and a shameful certainty that not only had she been in the jun
­gle, but that she had enjoyed it, began to taunt her.” For Cheryl Wall, the
 severe sense of disjointedness to which Helga succumbs during this sequence
 comes about 
as
 a result of her close encounter with the ethnic Thing she strives  
to repress throughout the rest of the novel. For such readers, the repression of
 one’s own racial identity becomes the dominant leitmotif of Larsen’s work, as in
 Youman
'
s explanation that “Passing, in my opinion, is a novel  which shows that
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What deserves attention in such readings of Larsen, which formulate 
a
 sort  
of repressive hypothesis concerning upper-middle-class, African-American
 subjects who appear detached from the set of desires that are even today often
 taken as somehow fundamental to the "authentic” African-American subjective
 experience, is the supposition these readings necessarily
 
entail: strictly by virtue  
of their racial status — albeit a racial status that is comprised neither by "black”
 physical characteristics (since these are a priori ""invisible” in passing novels) nor
 allegedly ""black” proclivities (since it is the absence of
 
such proclivities that is 
itself remarked upon as conspicuous) — African-American subjects are by def
­inition "out of joint” within the staid milieu of the bourgeoisie. This supposi
­tion carries with it an implicit injunction: in order to ""be black” (that is, in
 order to show solidarity with other African Americans, in order to attain the
 ideal of self-realization, in order to be ""comfortable with who I am,” and so on),
 African-American subjects must not only make certain choices (for instance,
 they must choose the cabaret over the tea-party), they must also go the further
 step of actually enjoying the "correct” choice. It is not enough simply to go
 through one
'
s social ritual in a mechanical, dutiful fashion, since one may  
attend the cabaret without really embracing it; rather, one must take the addi
­tional step of actually, "really” preferring
 
this cultural ritual over  that one. If one  
cannot make this psychic turn — if, in spite of going through all of the outward
 motions that should signal one’s willingness to embrace some sense of ethnic
 belonging, one 
is
 nevertheless unable to close one’s sense of distance — this  
failure points to the fact that one 
is
 "still passing”; the inability to enjoy  the rit ­
ual wholeheartedly is indicative of a fundamental betrayal.3
It should come as no surprise that this formula for racial essentialism, one
 
that draws explicitly upon wider suppositions about the modes of pleasure and
 preference proper to racially distinct individuals, extends beyond Larsen’s work
 to infiltrate many levels of contemporary culture. Perhaps the most striking
 recent instance of the demand that African Americans organize their desires in
 particular ways appears as the central trope of George Tillman’s 1997 film Soul
 Food, where ethnic cuisine 
is
 used as the fundamental test of the subject’s self ­
acceptance. The particular pairing of words that makes up this film’s title is of
 course related to the Lacanian motif of sublimation, whereby a random, arbi
­trary object ("food”) is elevated to the status of the formless, ineffable Thing
 that is the subject as such ("soul”). That is, the degree to which one loves one
­self and one’s family 
as
 African American is precisely commensurate, in Till ­
man’s film, with one’s desire for "soul food”; only by renouncing other culinary
 styles, or at least subordinating one’s taste for these styles, can the subject prove
 his or her solidarity and self-acceptance. Another version of this problematic
 is well-known to African-American literary scholars who choose to specialize
 in, for example, Victorian or Chaucerian Studies 
as
 opposed to (again for  
instance) the nineteenth-century slave narrative or postcolonial theory. Often
 such scholars may be regarded as unusual exceptions to the universal rule that
 all black scholars are postcolonial theorists of the slave narrative, so that the
 very existence of such individuals seems to betray a form of deep "identity
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struggle” on their behalf: does not the very fact that here is an African-Amer
­
ican intellectual who does not show any interest in such areas of inquiry point
 to the fact that this individual has already been interpellated into the white
­supremacist mindset that privileges George Eliot over Harriet Jacobs? Does
 not the fact that this individual has failed not only to choose Jacobs over Eliot
 but to do so freely, to prefer wholeheartedly Jacobs to Eliot, indicate the sad
 truth that this individual is really ‘passing” — not only to other academics but,
 more tragically, to him- or herself?
3.
So — to return to our earlier concern — while Butler’s tendency is to invest
 
pleasure, and especially the sort of spontaneous pleasure she associates with par
­odic laughter, 
as
 a form of unregulated affect that provides our surest resistance  
against the normative prescriptions of race, gender, and so on, I
 
would point out  
that in many cases, the very “authentic” pleasure of the subject who would resist
 his or her normative, paradigmatic role is already the projection par excellence
 of this role, already well within the horizon of the normative paradigm to which
 this subject is already submitted. On the view I offer, we cannot extract the
 subject in his or her authenticity through reference to this subject’s apparently
 genuine experience of pleasure because even at this innermost level of the sub
­ject’s self-experience, the subject’s psychic interiority is already co-opted and
 reduced by external socio-symbolic forces. This, moreover, is what Lacan aims
 at with his insistence that “Desire is desire of the Other” (Seminar XI
 
235): the  
same internal, private desire to which we might appeal in order to extract the
 subject from his or her suffocating, publicly induced, socio-symbolic role 
is
 in  
fact already the extenuation of this role, such that the opposition of surface and
 depth that seems to inform so much of the criticism Passing generates finally
 becomes impossible to maintain.
This is to say that the public level of socio-symbolic exchange and
 
encounter intrudes upon the psychic interiority of the subject of Passing, and to
 such an extent that this intrusion provides the fundamental scheme for the
 novel’s narrative process. Toward the end of Passing, the collapse of boundaries
 between private desire and public happenstance follows a pattern of wish-ful
­fillment, wherein Irene’s internal drives are realized through the activities of
 others, actuated in the public space — but apparently without her explicit con
­sent. After arriving at the conclusion that Clare has been carrying on an affair
 with Irene’s husband, Brian, Irene suddenly realizes “how easily she could put
 Clare out of her fife! She had only to tell John Bellew — No. Not that!” If
 Bellew were to stumble upon the fact that Clare is in fact a passing “Negro,”
 Irene concludes, “[i]t would be enough to rid her forever of Clare Kendry”
 (225). Irene, however, immediately abandons this plan, unable to muster the
 resolve necessary to inform Bellew of Clare’s secret
 
identity — but sure enough,  
“[a]s if in answer to her wish,” Larsen tells us, the very next scene of Passing
 brings Irene face to face with John Bellew, whom she meets in a chance
 encounter on the streets of downtown Manhattan. During this second meet
­
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ing with Bellew, Irene is literally “linked,” arm in arm, with her friend Felise
 
Freeland, an African American whose skin 
is
 too dark to allow her to pass, and  
so Irene does not have to say a word in order for Bellew to conclude that his
 wife, as well as Irene Redfield, consorts with “Negroes” and hence (according to
 the string of associations that apparently structures Bellew’s logic) may well be
 black herself.
Since her earlier hopes are now reached through an unplanned encounter,
 
and further, since they are realized not by Irene herself but chiefly by virtue of
the paranoid associations of Bellew (who apparently
 
believes that mere contact  
with African Americans indicates one’s identification with African Americans),
 Irene is spared having to confront the fact that she herself has been psychically
 complicit in this disclosure of Clare’s secret; she 
is
 able, in other words, to dis ­
avow her own previous desire for such a meeting with Bellew, since she herself
 did nothing to orchestrate this meeting. The denouement of Passing, moreover,
 follows a similar trajectory of disavowal and wish-fulfillment. After realizing
 that Bellew’s discovery of Clare’s identity will probably cause him simply to
 divorce his
 
wife (as in the contemporaneous case of “Kip” Rhinelander, who  was  
granted a divorce in New York State after the revelation of his wife’s African-
 American status) and hence free the latter to pursue a relationship with Brian,
 Irene now concludes she would be happiest if Clare would simply die. Once
 again, Irene immediately represses this traumatic wish (“Oh, it was vile!” she
 thinks, “To think, yes, to wish that!” [228]), and once again, the disavowal of
 the wish immediately precedes the wish’s chance realization; in the closing
 pages of the novel, Clare falls from a sixth-story window, apparently in response
 to her husband’s denunciation of her as “a nigger, a damned dirty nigger!”
 (238).4
All of this is not simply intended as an digression into the question of
 
Irene’s level of responsibility for Clare’s social and literal downfall, for the ques
­tions of accountability at play in both of these mysterious sequences finally
 intersect with the problems of identity and agency intrinsic to passing itself.
 Who, after all, passes in Passing? When Clare or Irene passes, she never does
 so by means of a direct proclamation of whiteness; rather, it is the network of
 communally held, socially circulated assumptions, assumptions grounded in a
 model of Caucasian normativity, that does the passing for both women, that
 generates the fiction that each woman then only inhabits — into which she
 simply passes. Is passing equivalent to lying? If so, it is the sort of
 
lie from  
which the subject retains a definite distance, a “lie” that initiates and sustains
 itself quite apart from the passing subject’s overt efforts at deception. In this
 sense, passing 
is
 of a piece with the sort of lie at issue in Freud’s famous joke  
concerning the two Jews — First Jew: “I’m going to Cracow.” Second Jew:
 “Liar! Why do you tell me you’re going to Cracow so that I’ll think you’re
 going to Lvov? You, in fact, are going to Cracow!” (Jokes 115; see also Lacan,
 Écrits 173).
The lesson Lacan extrapolates from Freud’s joke 
is
 that while many animals  
can deceive, human beings are the animals that can lie by telling the truth, who
 can formulate “lies” strictly in light of the Other’s unwillingness to see the truth
 even and perhaps especially when it 
is
 hidden in plain sight. Larsen’s acute
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understanding of the logic behind Freud’s joke imbues every page of Passing,
 
where passing mainly occurs at the level of the Other’s myopic failure to see
 blackness except as an aberration of norms. It is in the spirit of this joke, more
­over, that Larsen invites us to laugh alongside Irene and Clare as the latter asks
 her husband, “My goodness, Jack! What difference would it make if, after all
 these years, you were to find out that I was one or two percent coloured?”
To speak of this dynamic 
as
 a form of subversive performance obscures the  
sense in which passing only acquires its performative status against the back-
 drop of primarily repressive presuppositions and prerogatives; the day-to-day
 activities of a subject only become a form of passing once enclosed within a
 conceptual space that overdetermines these activities as inherently transgres
­sive. This 
is
 why Irene, who later admits to occasional passing “for the sake of  
convenience” (227) and whom we witness in the act of passing on at least two
 occasions, nevertheless distances herself from the act itself. “Tell me, honest
­ly,” Clare asks, “haven’t you ever thought of passing’?” Irene responds, “No.
 Why should I?” (160). Irene’s response does not, as we might initially think,
 twist the truth so very far indeed, since one need not premeditate or even think
 of one’s own passing in order actually to pass; passing, rather, occurs by its own
 volition, is already underway prior to the passing subject’s apprehension. “It’s
 funny about passing,”’ Irene later comments. “We disapprove of it and at the
 same time condone it. It excites our contempt and
 
yet we rather admire it. We  
shy away from it with an odd kind of revulsion, but we protect it” (186). Like
 racial difference itself, passing extends from a point beyond the words the sub
­ject speaks, prior to the images he or she embodies, emerges from a place past
 the reaches of these considerations, where contempt, revulsion, and fascination




See Lacan, Seminar XX  78-80: “through the phallic function . . . man  
as a whole acquires his inscription, with the proviso that this function is limit
­ed due to the existence of an x by means of which the function Φx [Lacan’s
 matheme for castration] is negated” (79).
2.
 
Other readers who follow the trajectory I describe here, by means of  
which Irene and/or Clare are viewed 
as
 subjects who actively efface some extant  
dimension of racial/ethnic “identity” through the cultural alignments they
 assume, include Davis, whose critical biography of Larsen explains that Irene’s
 attraction for Clare should be read 
as
 an “aesthetic attraction to whiteness” that  
we should understand as a “logical extension of her bourgeoisie lifestyle and
 ideology” (306), and Sullivan, who contends that “Irene passes’ not by adopt
­ing a white identity 
as
 Clare does, but by adopting white values, including  
white standards of beauty” (374). Last, I might mention that by interrogating
 the formal logic these readings seem to embrace, I do not mean to deny the
 possibility that Irene is indeed invested in some form of racial distancing
 throughout Passing. Rather, what I am trying to underline here is simply that
 signifiers of affluence and blackness need not exist in an antithetical relation
­ship.
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The implicit injunction at issue here is thus a version of  what Lacan  
refers to as the superegoic demand. As Lacan stressed over and over again,
 superego and law are not equivalent, since while the law insists that the subject
 must curtail his or her enjoyment (and thus tacitly incites transgression), the
 superego issues the very opposite commandment: “Enjoy!” Superego, Lacan
 explains, emerges out of the blind spots of the law, the places at which “the law
 is entirely reduced to something, which cannot even be expressed, like the You
 must, which is speech deprived of all its meaning” (Seminar I 102). In the con
­ceptual framework of Larsen
'
s novels, we can see how the superegotistical  
injunction to enjoy can be infinitely more oppressive than mere prohibition.
 How, after all, can the subject obey such a demand? Often, he or she simply
 cannot; for Helga Crane, who cannot unproblematically enjoy herself at the
 cabaret, the failure to respond correctly to stimuli that “should” (according to
 readers such as Wall and Youman) provide pleasure and satisfaction produces a
 very particular, poisonous form of guilt, the guilt of a subject
 
whose very  failure  
to enjoy must indicate a deeper loathing of the values that supposedly comprise
 his or her core being as subject. On the superegotistical injunction to enjoy, see
 Lacan, Ecrits 256. For more detailed analyses of the split between law and
 superego, see Žižek, Metastases 54-85 and Plague 113-7.
4.
 
Almost all Larsen scholars have focused upon this final sequence in an  
attempt to solve the plot-level mystery it seems to present. Irene herself, after
 all, 
is
 standing closest to Clare when the latter falls, and so the narrative raises  
the possibility that Irene, and not Bellew or Clare herself, is the actual agent
 behind this catastrophe. Indeed, Irene herself appears on the verge of such a
 conclusion in the novel’s final moments; apparently suffering from a form of
 amnesia as she tries to sort through the events immediately prior to Clare’s
 death, Irene nevertheless recalls “the image of her hand on Irene’s arm” (239),
 a memory that costs her the realization that she herself may have pushed Clare
 from the open window. But since the novel simply does not supply its reader
 with the factual information required to reach this conclusion, it is helpful here
 to refer, once again, to Lacan’s distinction
 
between reality and the real. Accord ­
ing to Lacan, even when a husband who suffers from the delusion that his wife
 
is
 unfaithful discovers that his wife has indeed been carrying on a series of  
affairs, the reality of his wife’s indiscretions in no way changes the fact that the
 husband is a paranoid delusional. In such an instance, Lacan tells us, “reality”
 renders itself as 
a
 projection or symptom of the real, the real as condensed in  
the husband’s paranoid delusions of his cheating wife (which, we can well
 imagine, would persist even if his wife were utterly faithful). For this reason,
 Lacan stipulates in his eleventh seminar that “the unconscious is outside”; the
 unconscious, in other words, does not end at the periphery of internal, purely
 psychic associations and fixations. Rather, it is bound up with the material
 
real ­
ity of the world that surrounds us, infiltrating the sphere of social relations
 itself. Mutatis mutandis, our final assessments of Irene’s role during this scene
 should not depend upon whether or not she herself actually pushes Clare from
 the sixth-story
 
window, for the fact is that, whoever initiated Clare’s fall, Irene  
herself is responsible for having desired this fall; the entire sequence, like the
 earlier sequence during which Bellew accidentally discovers his wife’s African-
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American status, should be read as the public rendition of Irene’s private
 
desires, and hence as an illustration of reality’s symptomatic relation to the real.
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"White was a colored man,” or so claims a Jewish
 
pawnbroker in the late-nineteeenth-century novel As
 It Was Written: A Jewish Musician
'
s Story (1885), in  
which the colored man named White never actually
 appears (176). The pawnbroker even implies that
 White’s name and address may be falsified. Howev
­
er,
 White is instrumental in enabling the highly com ­
plex plot to unfold plausibly. In a crucial
 extradiegetic event, White hocks the legacy of the
 novel’s protagonist, Ernest Neuman. This legacy, a
 miniature portrait and an ornamented wooden box
 with a secret compartment containing a message
 from Neuman’s dead father, is later recovered by
 Neuman and his gentile friend Merivale through a
 circuitous series of apparently fortuitous occurrences.
 The message contains a gruesome curse forbidding
 Neuman to marry and commanding him to murder
 his father’s former best friend in retribution for hav
­ing defiled Neuman’s late mother. This leads Neu
­man to discover the horrifying truth about his
 fiancée’s murder, which has occurred earlier in the
 narrative.
White’s offstage yet instrumental anonymity in
 
this novel is comparable to his creator’s position in
both traditional and revisionist accounts of American
 literary history. Henry Harland wrote As It Was
 Written under the Jewish pseudonym of Sidney
 Luska. He would write several other novels under
 this pseudonym before moving to England and join
­ing fin-de-siècle bohemian culture as founding editor
 of The Yellow Book. He spent the final years of his
 short life living off the royalties of his highly popular
42





s Snuffbox, which, like all his later novels, substitutes Euro ­
pean aristocracy for American Jewry
.
 By this time he had become crankily anti-  
Semitic, and before his death he converted to Roman Catholicism.
Clearly Harland was never quite comfortable with who he was; standard
 
biographical sources on him all conflict. Who
's
 Who 1899 has his birthplace as  
St. Peter burg, Russia; the Dictionary of
 
National Biography claims he was born  
in New York City; The Oxford Companion to American Literature has him born
 in Russia to American parents; and Louis Harap, in his study of The Image of
 the Jew in American Literature, says Harland was born in Norwich, Connecticut
 (455). Harland once claimed he was the illegitimate son of Emperor Franz
 Josef; he also tried to attain an English baronetcy by tracing his lineage to the
 Harlands of Sprague Hall. One must agree with Leslie Fiedler’s appraisal:
Henry Harland was above all else an inveterate poseur, a liar who lied for
 
his soul’s sake, and the ordinary biographical sources are likely to contain
 whatever fabrication suited his view of himself at the moment he was asked
 for information.
(24)
Though he concedes that Harland’s life was “a success story in the end: from
 
Rags to Riches, from Ethical Culture on the East Side to Roman Catholicism
 on the Riviera,” Fiedler affirms that Harland’s origins were “to his everlasting
 regret, more prosaic than he could tolerate.”
Judging by the pattern of Harland’s lies, we can see that “prosaic” here
 
means without heritage, aristocratic or ethnic, and it is the great irony of Har
­land’s career that this need for a past would make him something of
 
a forgot ­
ten father of American ethnic literature. This literary historical joke is not lost
 on Fiedler, who feels that “there is an appropriate irony in the fact that the first
 Jewish-American novelist was not a Jew at all, or that, more precisely, he was a
 creation of his own fiction, an imaginary
 
Jew” (24). Yet Fiedler maintains “a  
vestigial doubt. .. that Luska/Harland may, after all, have been a Jew pretend
­ing to be a Gentile pretending to be a Jew.” Is Fiedler really relishing this “best
 joke of all,” a final subterfuge to sabotage all attempts at fixing authorial iden
­tity, or 
is
 he masking a secret hope that, after all, the author of the first Jewish-  
American novel really was an American Jew?
Fiedler’s ambivalent appraisal registers a contradiction at the very heart of
 
the modern concept of ethnicity that is foregrounded by figures such as
 Luska/Harland. On the one hand, ethnic transvestism would seem to confirm
 the permeable boundaries and social constructedness of American ethnic iden
­tity. Thus Fiedler can celebrate Harland’s charade as a paradigmatic expression
 of the American Dream. On the other hand, some sort of palpable descent
 relation seems necessary if the ethnic category is to have any viability at all.
 Thus Fiedler concludes his discussion with a doubt (or a hope) that Harland
 really was a Jew. Ethnic transvestism would seem to render Werner Sollors’
 dramatic conflict between “consent and descent” as a logical contradiction at the very core of American ethnic identity.1
Significantly, Harland never appears in what is possibly the most promi
­
nent recent discussion of ethnic literary transvestism in the United States,
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Henry Louis Gates’s 1991 article, “Authenticity/ or the Lesson of Little Tree.”
 
Claiming that “our literary judgements . . . remain hostage to the ideology of
 authenticity,” Gates accuses us of identifying authorial legitimacy
 
with biolog ­
ical identity in our struggles over the literary canon (1). In a move reminiscent
 of Sollors, Gates prods his readers to acknowledge the “distasteful truth . . .
 [that], like it or not, all writers are cultural impersonators’”; in fact, “even real
 people . . . are never quite real” (28).
The category of the literary allows Gates to make the logical
 
leap from Lit ­
tle Tree to literally everyone. The figure of the writer provides him with the
 mediating mechanism whereby he can
 
generalize from an extremely small social  
group — American writers who masquerade as members of
 
ethnic communi ­
ties — to the entire human population of “real people.” By such a logic, liter
­ary impersonation is liberatory:
[O]ur histories, individual and collective, do affect what we wish to write
 
and what we are able to write. But that relation is never one of fixed deter
­minism. No human culture is inaccessible to someone who makes the
 effort to understand, to learn, to inhabit another world.
(30)
For Gates, writing literally enables us to wrest a realm of freedom from a realm
 
of necessity. If you make the effort, you can, through writing, be anyone you
 want to be.
Gates’s rhetoric in this piece references a
 
lengthy tradition in  American cul ­
tural and political thought that envisions writing and print in liberatory terms.
 From the Enlightenment ideal of democratic access to a public sphere of print,
 to the drama of literacy and liberation in the nineteenth-century African-
 American slave narrative, to the centrality of higher education and literary
 vocation in twentieth-century narratives of immigrant mobility, mastering
 written language and getting into print have remained both avenues to and
 signs of the achievement of America’s many political promises. And although
 Gates himself has been a key player in recent efforts to complicate and chal
­lenge these literary-political equations — which are so much more frequently
 honored in the breach than in the observance — his investments 
as
 an acade ­
mic scholar and public intellectual reveal their continuing appeal.2
As It Was Written, as its title implies, constructs a relation
 
between literature  
and liberation that runs completely counter to the tradition that Gates’s article
 references, and I offer it as documenting the historical repressed of his claims.
 This novel, written by a compulsive cultural impersonator, nevertheless repre
­sents writing and creative endeavor 
as
 the conduit through which “our histories”  
exert a tyrannical power
 
over the present. If Harland’s choice of an ethnic pseu ­
donym seems to support Gates’s claims for authorial freedom, the role of artis
­tic production in As It Was Written contradicts these claims. In its persistent
 staging of creative automatism, psychic possession, and prophetic fiat, the novel
 refigures authorial agency as a form of enslavement and thus reveals some of the
 historical necessities that haunt the ideology of literary freedom under Ameri
­can capitalism.
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On the surface, then, As It Was Written exhibits a contradictory relation
 
between text and context: the novel’s plot figures ethnic identity in terms of
 unalterable descent relations, whereas its authorship reveals ethnic identity as a
 matter of choice. In the following analysis, I will identify correspondences
 between the novel’s structure and its marketplace that render this contradiction
 historically intelligible. These correspondences reveal that it 
is
 not a coinci ­
dence that the ethnic American narrative emerges in the same era as what pub
­lisher Henry Holt famously called “the commercialization of literature.” The
 dilemmas of agency, subjectivity, and identity staged within the narrative of As
 It Was Written closely mirror contemporary anxieties about the fate of reading
 and writing in the emergent mass marketplace. These correspondences
 between the drama of
 
identity as it is represented in the ethnic narrative and  
the drama of author/audience relations forming the historical context of that
 narrative reveal more broadly that ethnicity as a literary formation in America
 must be understood in dialectical relation to the conditions of the print mar
­ketplace at the time of its emergence.
Mediums and Melodramas
The formidable complexity of this novel’s plot requires some initial exposition.
 
As It Was Written is narrated by its protagonist, Ernest Neuman, a German-
 Jewish musician living in New York City. At the opening of the novel, Neu
­man falls in love with and becomes engaged to Veronica Pathzuol, a Jewish
 singer. Before they
 
can be married, Veronika is brutally  murdered and Neuman  
is charged with the crime. Since no motive can be determined, Neuman 
is acquitted, after which he gives up his musical career and becomes a waiter. He
 then meets a young gentile named Daniel Merivale, with whom he discovers
 the written legacy from Neuman’s father that explains Veronika’s murder. Neu
­man’s father
 
writes that his entire family  line is under a curse forcing each hus ­
band to murder his unfaithful wife, and that Neuman’s own mother had been
 unfaithful with Veronika’s father. In the end, Neuman discovers that he did
 himself murder his fiancée while under psychic possession by the ghost of his
 father.
Thus we see that, in As It Was Written, the artist is always in thrall to some
 
agency beyond his control. Furthermore, the medium of artistic expression
 becomes a conduit through which this agency exercises its dominion. The
 novel 
is
 subtitled A Jewish Musician 's Story, and the relationship of the musician  
to his music repeatedly figures for the relationship between the narrator and his
 narrative and between the individual and his past. Neuman meets his fiancée
 through music, when he hears her singing 
as
 he strolls the streets of New York  
City. She and her uncle invite him in, immediately recognize him 
as
 a Jewish  
musician like themselves, and demand that he play the violin for
 
them. Already  
half in love with Veronika, Neuman nervously acquiesces:
I played as best I could. Rather, the music played itself. With a violin
 
under my chin, I lapse into semi-consciousness, lose my identity. Another
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spirit impels my arm, pouring itself out through the voice of my instru
­
ment. Not until silence is restored do I realize that I have been the per
­former. While the music is going on my personality is annihilated.
(9)
Music plays itself through the passive medium of Neumans body. The almost
 
awkwardly foregrounded shifts in predication grammatically signal this mediu-
 mistic relations centrality to the narrative. The deceptively simple inversion of
 “I played” to “the music played itself” immediately gets complicated by the
 equivocations and qualifications of the passage that follows, in
 
which pronouns,  
instruments, body parts, and spirits vie for position as subject and object of the
 ambiguous performance.




agency relative to writing partly because of the functional dif ­
ferences between the musical score and the verbal narrative. Audiences at
 musical performances don’t normally read the musical score; classical musicians
 usually don’t compose the music they play. With writing, particularly with
 blood-and-thunder thrillers such as
 
As It Was Written, these relations seem less  
obliquely mediated: we read the same words the author wrote and there is no
 “performer” wedged in between. On the other hand, music, in its apparent
 transcendence of linguistic difference and in its immediate communication at
 the moment of performance, can figure as the “purer” medium. Thus Neuman
 makes the conventional claim that music is superior to words when it comes to
 representing love:
I am not accustomed to expressing such matters in
 
words, but with my vio ­
lin I should have no sort of difficulty. If I wanted to give utterance to my
 idea of Veronika, all
 
I should have to do  would  be to take my violin and play  
this heavenly melody from Chopin’s Impromptu in C-sharp minor.
(21)
The very choice of an “Impromptu” — a piece composed to sound improvised
 
— indicates once again problems of agency and intention. And the actual score
 of the piece follows, illustrating both the disjunctions and the overlaps between
 literary and musical notation and expression in the novel.3
Harland’s use of different media to foreground problems of authorial
 
agency frames how the relation
 
between inherited and acquired experience con ­
stitutes ethnic identity in As It Was Written. Directly after printing the musical
 score in order to compensate for his inability to describe his betrothed in words,
 Neuman describes her anyway:
A mystery that would neither be defined nor penetrated nor ignored,
 
brooded over her, as the perfume broods over the rose. I doubt whether an
 American woman can be like this unless she is older and has had certain
 experiences of her own. Veronika had not had sufficient experience of her
 own to account for what I have described; but she was a Jewess, and all the
 experience of the Jewish race, all
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The convenient paradox of maintaining innocence through the generational
 
transmission of certain experiences” parallels the drama of creative agency in
 this text; the sources of Veronika’s sexuality are as attenuated as the agency
 behind Neumans musicianship. Both characters are “possessed.”
Thus it 
is
 not surprising that they become obsessed  with the agency behind  
their betrothal:
“I do believe God’s hand was in it! I do believe it was all pre-ordained in
 
heaven. I believe our Guardian Angel prompted me to speak and you to
 answer. It can’t be that we, who were made for each other, were left to find
 out by a mere perilous chance — it isn’t credible.”
(36)
Here the ambiguities of aesthetic agency and ethnic identity in the novel are
 
framed in the broadest cosmological terms: “God’s hand” versus “perilous
 chance.” However, Neuman’s faith in his love’s preordination gets put to the
 test by Veronika’s unexpected murder, the memory of which dictates the the
­matic anxieties and formal peculiarities of the novel. Chapter two ends with
 the following paragraph: “While writing the above I had almost forgotten.
 Now I remember. I must stop for a space
 
to get used  to remembering again that  
she 
is
 dead” (30). And chapter three provocatively opens:
Yes, she is dead. That is the truth. If truth is good, 
as
 men proclaim it to  
be, then goodness 
is
 intrinsically cruel. That Veronika is dead is the truth  
which lies like a hot coal upon my consciousness, and goads me along as I
 tell this tale. And the manner of
 
her death and the speediness of it — I  
must tell all.
(31)
Thus the entire novel has a compulsive confessional structure that lends dra
­
matic force to the eventual discovery of Neuman’s enthrallment to his past.
When Neuman is arrested and indicted 
as
 Veronika’s murderer, he goes  
through the motions of his trial “
as
 passively as an automaton” (52). His  
automatism hasn’t affected his memory, however, since “stolid, indifferent, and
 inattentive as I was, every detail of the trial is stamped upon my memory in
 indelible hues. Here is the story of it” (58). Ceding his agency this time to the
 law, Neuman himself becomes the conduit through
 
which the trial comes to us.  
Thus the trial again stages his thralldom,
 
which ironically vindicates him in the  
end since the prosecution is unable to establish a motive for the crime. His
 lawyer, Epstein, confirms that “his defense must necessarily be of a passive, not
 of an active, kind” (74).




life as a waiter in a German wine-shop. It is at this shop two  
years later that Merivale, a chain-smoking aesthete clearly based on Harland
 himself, enters Neuman’s life. And it is Merivale who, upon meeting Neuman,
 preaches the novel’s assimilationist creed:
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“There is no American people — or rather there are twenty peoples — the
 
Irish, the German, the
 
Jewish, the English, and the Negro elements — all  
existing independently at the same time, and each 
as
 truly American as any  
of the others. Good! But in the future, after emigration has ceased, these
 elements will begin to amalgamate. A single people of homogenous blood
 will be the consequence.... [I]t is the Jewish element which
 
will leaven the  
whole lump — color the whole mixture. The English element alone is, so
 to speak, one portion of pure water; the German element, one portion of
 eau sucrée; now add the Jewish — it is a dose of strong red wine. It will
 give fire and flavor to the decoction. The future Americans, thanks to the
 Jew in them, will have passions, enthusiasms. They will paint great pic




Thus Harland anticipates Zangwill’s “melting pot” with his own alimentary
 
metaphor, juxtaposing figurative bread and wine with literal works of great art.
 Merivale’s prophecy raises the stakes of the plot, as Neumans own aesthetic
 vocation takes on national significance.
Merivale’s peculiar metaphor also registers a link between aesthetics and
 
intoxication, as the “strong wine” of Jewish blood translates into American pic
­tures, music, and poems. His erotically charged relationship to Neuman con
­firms this association. When Merivale doesn’t show up at the shop, Neuman
 feels “like an opium eater deprived of his daily portion”; when Merivale does
 arrive, “he consumed cigarette after cigarette and read his paper through to the
 very advertisements on the last page” (108). Chemical dependency and erotic
 infatuation rhetorically inform the friendship, and when Merivale persuades
 Neuman to play the violin for the first time since before Veronika’s death, he
 acts as both seducer and pusher. Neuman resists, but then feels “an irresistible
 temptation to continue.” Once again he loses “possession” of himself, claiming,
 “I had no power to restrain the motion of my arm and lay the violin aside”
 (120). He then performs maniacally, listening “to the music precisely as though
 it had been played by another person” (121). Deeply moved by the perfor
­mance, Merivale promptly insists that Neuman move in as his private secretary,
 since his own unfortunate combination of “scrivener’s palsy and gout” prevents
 him from writing down his poetry. Thus Neuman again cedes his creative
 agency, this time as Merivale’s amanuensis.
In fact, Merivale completely dictates the events that follow. He tells the
 
wine-shop proprietor that Neuman won’t be returning to work. He then
 maneuvers a position for him as soloist in a prestigious orchestra and badgers
 him into taking it against his protestations. This brief career opportunity 
is shattered when Neuman sees Veronika’s uncle, Mr. Tikulski, in the orchestra
 and faints in the middle of his solo. It is Tikulski who directs Neuman to the
 pawnshop, where Merivale negotiates with the Jewish pawnbroker for the lega
­cy, hocked many years ago by the colored man named White, that apparently
 will clear up the mysteries of Neuman’s past.
The episode of the legacy’s retrieval relates Neuman’s problems with agency
 
to correlative ambiguities around the status of objects in the text. Tikulski
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sends Neuman a “miniature painted on ivory, the likeness of a man,” but Neu
­
man does not recognize the portrait, or understand why Tikulksi, who found it
 at a pawnshop, would consider it his “family memento” (159). It is only when
 Merivale holds up the miniature next to a pocket mirror that Neuman realizes
 that, “as closely 
as
 it is possible for one human countenance to resemble anoth ­
er, the face of the picture resembled my reflection in the glass” (161). The
 return of the legacy stages the uncanniness of objects in the narrative; the pro
­found resemblance between the portrait and the reflection legitimates Tikuls-
 ki’s return of the lost object and inaugurates the return of Neuman’s repressed
 past. And this return will also clear up the mystery of the murder that inaugu
­rated the entire narrative.
Merivale and Neuman go to the pawnshop where Tikulski acquired the
 
miniature portrait, and there discover the box with the hidden compartment to
which I have alluded earlier. Neuman, an orphan, has been told of such a box
 by the rabbi who raised him, but he is at first unconvinced of the box’s authen
­ticity, avowing that it could not be “the box” associated with his past since, as
 Merivale, who paid five dollars for it, apparently affirms, it “appears to have
 been designed 
as
 a cheapish jewel-case, now in the last stages of  decrepitude”  
(181). But Merivale is only baiting Neuman; he promptly avers that he has
 seen “the very duplicate” of this box in France, and that it is “a specimen of
 cinque-cento” (182). Thus what at first appeared to be an arbitrary object of
 little value ends up being the box, and well worth five dollars. And this abrupt




Neuman’s own Old-World past is concealed in the box’s secret compart
­
ment, which Merivale also reveals. The compartment contains the note from
 Neuman’s father. Ernest Neuman, Sr. begins by ceding to God the power to
 insure that the letter is delivered, and confirms his Jewish faith through using
 the Hebrew abbreviation (") for the Deity’s name:




will guide this to you, even as He guides the river to the sea,  
the star to the zenith. Blessed be the name of " forever.
(188)
The letter continues in an exalted Old Testament register of prophecy, prohibi
­
tion, and punishment:
In the fourth generation back of me our ancestor was betrayed by the wife
 
of his choice. So great was his hatred of her on
 
this account, that he wished  
his seed, contaminated as it was by having taken root in her womb, to
 become extinct. Therefore he forbade his son to marry. And to this prohi
­bition he attached a penalty. If, in defiance of his wish, his son should take
 unto himself a woman, then should he too taste the bitterness of infidelity
 within the household, then should he too be betrayed and dishonored by
 his wife. And this penalty he made to extend to the seventh and eighth
 generations. Whosoever of his progeny should enter into the wedded state
 should enter by the same step into the antechamber of hell.
(190-1)
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The prophecy somewhat paradoxically depends upon the violation of the pro
­
hibition, since only the matrimony that 
is
 forbidden by the curse can carry the  
family into the “seventh and eighth generations” that include Neuman himself.
 The cross purposes of the father’s rhetoric generate a sort of
 
accelerating hys ­
teria, as he gradually moves from sententiousness to sensationalism:
Find my enemy out and put him to death.... Do not strike him down with
 
one blow. Torture him to death, pluck his flesh from his bones shred by
 shred. . . . [V]isit the penalty of his sin upon his children and his childrens
 children. For has not ” decreed that the sins of the fathers shall be visited
 upon the children even unto the third and fourth generations. . . . [T]he
 race of Nicholas must be exterminated, obliterated from the face of the
 earth. . . . Empty his blood upon the sand as you would the blood of a
 swine.... And think ... “At each thrust of my
 
knife into our enemy’s flesh,  
the heart of my father leaps with satisfaction. At each scream that escapes
 from our enemy’s throat, the voice of my father waxes great with joy.”
(204-5)
The letter proceeds at such a frantic pace that the father even admonishes his
 
son to “pause for a space and pray that the breath of God may make strong your
 heart” (203).
Neuman Sr. seals his grisly command with the threat that “[i]f you hesitate
 
. . . my spirit will possess your body and do what must be done in spite of your
 hesitation” (207). Below the signature appears 
a
 postscript that the dying father  
wrote after rereading his letter: “I have omitted to mention his [Nicholas’] foil
 name. His name is Nicholas Pathzuol” (208). Thus Neuman finally discovers
 that his fiancée was the daughter of his mother’s defiler, and the letter’s con
­trived withholding of this fact, along with its frenzied pace, replicates the
 emplotment of the entire narrative, which insistently both defers and hurries
 toward explaining the murder with which it opens.
But Neuman still can’t quite figure it out. He admits to Merivale that “this
 
strange combination of facts must have some awful meaning,”
 
but this meaning  
continuously “escapes and eludes” him (215). According to Merivale, this is
 because “your problem has no solution, none because it is not a true problem,
 but merely a fortuitous arrangement of circumstances which chances to bear a
 superficial resemblance to one.” Thus Merivale succinctly states the philo
­sophical problem posed by the novel. Is Neuman’s fate sealed from the begin
­ning by. the ineradicable force of an Old World, Old Testament prophecy, or
 has he just stumbled upon a random set of circumstances that maddeningly
 resemble predestination but are actually mutable and escapable? Is ethnicity
 determined by blood ties that cannot be severed or by contingent socio-histor-
 ical conditions that can be changed or avoided? And finally, are narratives
 channeled through authors by mysterious supernatural agencies, or are they
 freely composed by autonomous artists?
The answer to the last question provides the answer to the first two, as
 
Neuman finally puts the pieces together through automatic writing. He plays
 his violin for Merivale and once again enters into a trance-like state, perform-
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ing an extended and emotionally overwrought piece that neither can identify.
 
Neuman sits down to write out the score, gradually becoming “so much inter
­ested in what I was doing that my hand sped across the paper like a machine
 performing the regular function for which it was contrived” (240). He finds
 that
 
his “hand was forging along  faster  than my thought could dictate, in appar ­
ent obedience to an independent will of its own” (241). When he finishes, the
 two men discover that “the last half dozen pages were covered with written
 words — blotted, scrawling, scarcely decipherable, but unmistakably written
 words” (243). The final chapter consists of these written words, which narrate
 how Neuman murdered his fiancée while in a trance, apparently possessed by
 the spirit of
 
his father. With this recovered memory, the novel completes its  
detective-story circuit, revealing the event in the past whose concealment has
 pushed the narrative forward into the future.
Choosing the Past
Henry Harland decided to publish
 
As It Was Written under the pseudonym of  
Sidney Luska in order to secure a market for his unusual creation. Harland
 wrote to his mentor, Wall Street banker and literary dilettante Edmund
 Clarence Stedman, that “with a
 
Jewish name on the title page, the sale of the  
book would be vastly increased. I believe lots of Jews would buy
 
it for that rea ­
son, if for no other
 
— for the sake of seeing what New York can produce in the  
way of a truly Jewish story” (quoted in Beckson 28).4 Harland significantly
 neglects to consider the content of his narrative in this note. Rather, he for
­mulates the pseudonym as a promotional device, correlatively situating New
 York’s Jewish population 
as
 an untapped reservoir of consumers.
And the promotion worked. The Jewish Messenger applauded the novel,
 affirming that “to Sidney Luska we owe a debt of gratitude for charming us
 with a powerfill story, and at the same time contributing more powerfully than
 could sermons and editorials to the better appreciation of the genius of
 Judaism” (5). This “debt” translated into sales of 50,000 copies, a considerable
 success for a first novel at
 
that  time (Beckson  25). Luska was so successfill  that,  
when his true identity was discovered, Harland’s novels for a time continued to
 include the pseudonym in parentheses in order to boost sales.
However, if Harland managed to get away with his authorial impersonation
 
with As It Was Written (although the reviewer for The New York Times admitted
 some suspicion), he was less successful in selfing the originality of the novel
 itself. A number of reviewers felt
 
that he had  borrowed  his style and ideas from  
Hugh Conway’s highly popular earlier novel, Called Back. The Dial was thus
 backhanded in its praise:




the impossible solution of its mystery is delayed until the  
very close, or until the reader’s interest is folly awakened by legitimate
 means. Then comes the strictly illegitimate explanation, and the reader is
 justly indignant at being made the victim of so miserable a trick — unless,
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indeed, the general tone of
 
what has gone before has led him to suspect  
something of the sort. It need not be said that this sort of stuff is unde
­serving of the name of literature.
(182)
To deny a novel “the name of literature” is to relegate it to the realm of genre
 
fiction and mass culture, and this reviewer’s account of his reading experience
 in fact mirrors other reports of As It Was Written's frenzied pace, as well 
as
 its  
peculiarly contrived combination of mystery and predictability. The suspicion
 that Luska/Harland was imitating a prior pulp novel reinforces this cultural
 distinction, since genre fiction is assumed to consist in the quasi-mechanical
 repetition of formulaic tropes and plot devices.
Thus both the formulaic structure and the pseudonymous authorship of As
 
It Was Written can be understood in terms of market exigencies. In fact, it 
isworth noting that As It Was Written appeared on the eve of a “revolution” in
 publishing that Henry Holt would dub “the commercialization of literature.”
 As publishing historians Charles Madison and John Tebbel both affirm, during
 the decades surrounding the turn of the century, the forces of corporate finance
 capital increasingly penetrated the genteel American publishing industry. This
 penetration would have two consequences that are pertinent to As
 
It Was Writ ­
ten. On one hand, the promotion of authorial personality became closely inte
­grated into the marketing of books. Public authorial readings and interviews
 became established institutions during these years, and a star system of Amer
­ican authors gradually emerged as part of the growing literary marketplace. As
 Daniel Borus affirms, “[b]ook advertising, literary gossip columns, publicity
 tours, and interviews all pointed toward the creation of a glamorous person, 
a person whose life had aspects that were admirable or capable of being envied”
 (118). Borus contends that such promotional strategies were designed to foster
 a species of “brand-name loyalty among
 
readers” in the increasingly  competitive  
American literary marketplace. Harland’s invention of a Jewish pseudonym as
 a sales ploy clearly coincides with this increasing concern for the advertisement
 value of authorial personality more generally.
On the other hand, custodians of culture became increasingly anxious about
 
what Henry Dwight Sedgewick called “The Mob Spirit in Literature,” the ten
­dency for readers to display a “haste to get at the plot, to assimilate experience,
 to devour the story, the irritation of suspense” (11). This was also the era when,
 as Lawrence Levine has shown, a cleavage emerged between highbrow and
 lowbrow literature and culture, and it 
is
 clear from the reviews that Harland’s  
novel was unanimously understood to appeal to lowbrow tastes. Its sensation
­al subject matter and suspenseful structure both marked its appeal to this “mob
 spirit.”
Within the context of these emergent transformations in the structure of
 
the American literary marketplace, As It Was Written stages the drama of ethnic
 identity as a dialectic between writerly agency and readerly thrall, and it 
is within the terms of this dialectic that ethnic transvestism as an authorial strat
­egy in modern America becomes historically intelligible. As Gates affirms,
 such imposture does represent a species of freedom, but it 
is
 an authorial free-
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dom that functions 
as
 an exception to the rule of readerly enslavement. Or,  
more broadly stated, the ability of the discrete individual to manufacture his
 own past is only possible insofar as the vast majority of persons are determined
 by theirs. Harland’s transvestism would make no sense if there weren’t a group
 of 
"
real” Jews for him to imitate.
Thus if we choose to celebrate such impostures as critiques of the “ideolo
­gy of authenticity,” we fail to realize the intimate interdependence between the
 imposture and the ideology. And, in failing to recognize this interdependence,
 we also mask a deeper, and more symptomatic, ideology of individualism that
 undergirds such freedom. Ethnic transvestism, after all, is rare; most people
 find themselves in ascribed group identities. It is, of course, in the American
 tradition to promote the token success as a sign of the essential justness of the
 free-market society. However, 
as
 critics of this society, we recognize such suc ­
cesses as the exceptions that prove the rule. A similar recognition is necessary
 with Harland. His ability to choose his past only proves that most Americans




Sollors celebrates Harland — and ethnic transvestites generally — for  
“undercutting the image of a presumably stable relationship between in-group
 and out-group” (252). Nevertheless, ethnic tranvestism gets only two pages in
 Sollors’ encyclopedic study, which is, of course, primarily devoted to “authen
­tic” members of American ethnic groups.
2.
 
It would be impossible to summarize the fruitfully complex and occa ­
sionally contradictory relationship between poststructuralism and theories of
 race and ethnicity
 
that I am thumbnailing here. Gates’s considerable contribu ­
tion includes Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the “Racial” Self, The Signifying
 Monkey: A
 
Theory of  African American  Literary Criticism, and his edited volume,  
“Race,” Writing and Difference, I dwell on Gates here because I feel that his
 career conveniently
 
illustrates the persistence of Enlightenment epistemologies  
and aspirations across two decades of poststructuralist scrutiny.
3.
 
For a discussion of the role of music in the novel see Aronson, who  
claims that “the temptation to find in music a universal criterion for all sense
 impressions was particularly hard to resist whenever a writer’s surrender to
 physical sensations became an end in itself” (11-12). Pierre Bourdieu reveals
 the class inflection of this “temptation”: “Music represents the most radical and
 most absolute form of the negation of... the social world,
 
which the bourgeois  
ethos tends to demand of all forms of art” (19). As It Was Written exploits this
 understanding of music 
as
 in some way universal and absolute, while simulta ­
neously staging its repeated failure in practice.
4.
 
Stedman was Henry Harland’s mentor for much of his life. In fact, it  
was Stedman
 
who came up with the title As It Was Written, after rejecting From  
Generation to Generation and Mated and Fated, His theories of creative genius
 clearly influenced Harland’s own understanding of
 
writing. In “Genius,” for  
instance, Stedman claims that “genius lies in the doing of
 
one thing, or many  
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things, through power resulting from the unconscious action of the free intel
­
lect, in a manner unattainable by the conscious effort of ordinary men” (24). It
 
is
 fortuitous for my argument that Stedman was both a literary scholar and a  
successful Wall Street broker.
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In his chapter “Of Virginity” in The Instruction of a
 
Christian Woman (1529), Spanish humanist Juan Luis
 Vives insists on the pricelessness of female chastity,
 locating it beyond the reach of calculated exchange
 values: “I pray thee understand thine own goodness,
 maid, thy price cannot be estimated” (104). While
 scholars of early modern England have analyzed how
 the subject of female chastity is taken up with partic
­ular intensity in the period,1 insufficient attention
 has been paid to how the discourses of female chasti
­ty are inflected by the early modern preoccupation
 with the instability of value in ever-widening net
­works of commodity exchange. Given this preoccu
­pation, the effort to keep personal relations beyond
 the reach of commodity exchange, within an ideal
­ized sphere of the gift, adds special urgency to the
 construction of female chastity. At the same time,
 however, the uneasy status of female sexuality
 
and the  
contradictory constructions of its “value” — even, or
 especially, within marriage — unsettles the cultural
 efforts to construct a strict division between gift and
 commodity.
I want to continue recent discussions of early
 
modern culture’s obsessive concern with what
 William Carroll calls “the fetishized commodity that
 
is
 and is not” (296) by turning to two plays that par ­
ticipate in that fetishizing. Both Thomas Heywood’s
 A Woman Killed with Kindness — first performed in
 March 1603 — and William Shakespeare’s Measure
 for Measure — performed in December 1604, perhaps
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for the first time — offer plots that explicitly position a woman s chastity as an
 
object of exchange, but in so doing they enact the conceptual slippage that this
 positioning entails. By setting these two plays in dialogue, we open a window
 onto how women and womens chastity overlap the two systems of exchange,
 slide between them, or escape them.2 This slippage is a problem for a culture
 interested in drawing strict boundaries between gift and commodity exchange
 — a culture facing a radical reworking of how value is constituted. The plays
 become problems when they expose the contradictions entailed in the effort to
 position women as gifts, commodities, or currency, when the resolution of plots
 relies on women used in these ways, or on women who refuse to be used in
 these
 
ways, raising questions about what constitutes women's value. Measure  for  
Measure and A Woman Killed with Kindness, both of which enjoy critical histo
­ries as problem cases,3 reveal that marriage itself can exacerbate the contradic
­tory status of female chastity
 
and the confusion entailed in the effort to keep its  
value beyond estimation.
If for Vives the price of maiden chastity "cannot be estimated,” for Seneca
 
in De Beneficiis (1578)4 — a manual for good giving which insistently distin
­guishes "benefiting” from "merchandizing,” or ordinary bargains and loans —
 "the estimation of so noble a thing should perish if we make a merchandise of
 benefits” (sig. I2V). The treatise focuses on the proper methods and motives for
 giving, receiving, and requiting benefits, methods and motives which, when
 abused or misunderstood, are seen to threaten the distinction Seneca 
so
 insists  
on: "In debts it 
is
 a most upright speech ... to say, Pay that thou owest.- But it  
is the foulest word that can be in benefiting, to say, Pay.” Like the effort to
 purify chastity of the taint of calculation, Seneca eschews those who would
 "reckon” their gifts: "It is a vile Usury to keep a reckoning of benefits, as of
 expenses” (sig. A2V). Those who wish to bestow a benefit "must tread profit
 underfoot” (sig. M2V). Unlike ordinary merchandizing, the motive for
 exchanging benefits is not to profit, but to establish perpetual bonds of fellow
­ship:
[T]o him that lends me money, I must pay no more than I have taken; and
 
when I have paid it, I am free and discharged. But unto the other [one who
 gives a benefit] I must pay more; and when I have requited him, yet never
­theless I am still beholden to him. For when I have requited I must begin
 new again, & friendship warneth me to admit no unworthy person. So 
is the Law of benefits a most holy law, wheroutof springeth friendship.
(sig. E4; emphasis added)
Here we see that the debt of gratitude is not only unmeasurable and "priceless”
 
but it also extends beyond an immediate transaction or set of transactions. The
 thing given, whether it is money, a material object, or a favor, is merely the
 "badge” of the giver’s "good will” (sig. B2); the essence of the benefit
 is
 the bond  
of friendship and obligation between transactors which the thing given signi
­fies. Further, benefits are the very source of friendship; for Seneca, they not
 only affirm social links but are the wellspring of them.
This view of gift exchange as the foundation of social life is precisely the
 
formulation offered in Marcel Mauss’s The Gift, a formulation that Levi-
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Strauss extends to the laws of marriage, moving from the exchange of material
 
goods like food or manufactured objects to “that most precious category of
 goods, women” (61). In Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm, woman is “the supreme gift
 among those that can only be obtained in the form of reciprocal gifts” (65).
 Combined with
 
the incest taboo, the exchange of women creates kinship, which  
is, for anthropologists, the founding organizational structure of human society.
 According to Gayle Rubin, the concept implies
a distinction between gift and giver. If women are the gifts, then it 
is
 men  
who are the exchange partners. And it is the partners, not the presents,
 upon whom reciprocal exchange confers its quasi-mystical power of social
 linkage. The relations of such a system are such that women are in no posi
­tion to realize the benefits of their own circulation. As long as the relations
 specify that men exchange women, it is men who are
 
the  beneficiaries of the  
product of such exchange — social organization.
(174)
Rubin continues with 
a
 thorough discussion of the potential limits, from an  
anthropological perspective, of the “traffic in women” concept.5 Despite her
 discussion of the concept’s limits, it is her influential essay — combined with
 Lawrence Stone’s theses about arranged marriages and the patriarchal family
 
in  
Family, Sex, and Marriage in England — which has prompted many literary
 critics to import Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm uncritically into early modern Eng
­land. Part of my goal in reading the representation of female chastity and mar
­riage in Heywood and Shakespeare is to refute the wholesale application of the
 “traffic in women” paradigm to early modern drama and culture.6
2.
A number of relationships and institutions in early modern England are con
­
ceptualized by means of the imaginative systems of gift and commodity
 exchange. As market forces began to cast a wider net across the economy at
 large, bonds of loyalty or allegiance between patron and artist or courtier, mas
­ter and apprentice, master and servant, local landowner and tenant could be
 subordinated to the desire for individual gain, structured by the commodity
 logic that emphasizes the primacy of profit and codified contracts over the
 desire for “gift-debtors.” Relations between friends, mothers and children, hus
­bands and wives are often signified in terms of idealized gift exchange. The
 marital bond often bears the weight of cultural questions about what consti
­tutes and ratifies relations of exchange in the early modern social order more
 generally. Despite efforts such as Seneca’s to keep gift and commodity sepa
­rate, the period's discourses of marriage, like those of many other social rela
­tions and institutions, incorporate elements of the symbolic economies of both
 gift and commodity for its conceptual articulation. Thinking through the “eco
­nomics of love, Richard Horwich argues that many Jacobean comedies
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employ the institution of marriage itself as a testing ground for many
 
of the  
new economic ideas which were surfacing at the time. The marital rela
­tionship is often seen through an economic prism, so that human transac
­tions, as well as mercantile ones, come to seem matters of debit and credit,
 profit and loss.
(256)
He argues that the plays often oppose the bond of constancy in marriage to the
 
“hustle of the marketplace” (259) and the circulation of money. Although Hor
­wich offers helpful readings of commercial and monetary imagery in the plays
 he discusses, his notion of the “economic” is too general, especially given the
 multiple forms of exchange available in the period. Not only does Horwich’s
 argument that marriage 
is
 a “testing ground” for newer economic ideas rely on  
a totalized and imprecise notion of the
 
“economic” but it also assumes that mar ­
riage itself is stable and knowable “ground.” The bond of marriage can be con
­ceived as a gift relation, as a mutual
 
bestowing of selves. It can be a trust-based  
and insoluble personal bond; in the words of the “Homily of the State of Mat
­rimony,” marriage allows its partners to live in “perpetual friendly fellowship”
 (“Homily” 13), a phrase resembling Seneca’s descriptions of the insoluble bonds
 forged in benefiting. Marriage is a religious sacrament that 
is
 a “singular gift  
of God”; those who enter the state of matrimony “must acknowledge this ben
­efit of God with pure and thankful minds” (14). At the same time, however,
 marriage 
is
 a legal, contractual, and economic arrangement that ensures the  
legitimate transfer of property. The giving of selves among the propertied 
is accompanied by the transfer of dowry, jointure, and rights of access to proper
­ty, transfers which are formally contracted, quantified, and legally regulated.
 Given the legal status of wives, it is difficult
 
to consider  these transfers as mutu ­
al exchanges.7 The marital relation straddles the competing symbolic
 economies of gift and commodity. Both as trust-based and legally binding, as
 a mutual bestowing of selves and a hierarchy in which women have no
 autonomous legal status, and as an insoluble personal bond and a contract
 accompanied by the transfer of money and property, marriage reveals the diffi
­culties of purifying personal relations of the taint of calculation and contractu
­al obligation.
There are difficulties, moreover, in establishing what exactly comprises true
 
matrimony. Henry Swinburne’s treatise Of Spousals (1686) begins by catalogu
­ing the competing definitions of spousals, and goes on to develop how compet
­ing legal codes not only differ in defining this term but also in identifying what
 constitutes matrimony itself.8 Although he describes several mitigating condi
­tions, Swinburne basically maintains that public solemnization, the giving of
 portions of goods, and even carnal copulation do not supersede the insoluble
 bond created by the free consent offered in spousals de praesenti:
A present & perfect Consent. . . alone maketh Matrimony, without either
 
Publick Solemnization or Carnal Copulation; for neither is the one, nor the
 other of the Essence of Matrimony, but Consent only.... Spousals de prae-
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senti, though not consummate, be in truth and substance very Matrimony,
 
and therefore perpetually indissoluble.
(14-15)9
Swinburne repeatedly refers to the love tokens and gifts that commonly sym
­
bolize the exchange of consent in spousals, but like Seneca’s benefits — in
 which objects exchanged are the “mere badge” of good will between transactors
 — these tokens are merely the expression, not the essence, of the bond between
 transactors. Thus, in defining the essence of matrimony, conscience and inten
­tion figure more prominently than the exchange of material objects, even if the
 “objects” exchanged are bodies in intercourse. Swinburne’s definition therefore
 positions the marital relation as a bond, like that forged by means of benefit
­ing, in the sphere of the gift.
Despite the mitigating conditions and the competition in Swinburne’s trea
­
tise between several potential ratifying acts or objects — “effects” such as the
 kiss, taking of hands, or gifts; “subarration”; public solemnization; and consum
­mation — he nonetheless adheres to the position that present consent alone
 constitutes the essence of matrimony. The exchange of trust-based vows that is
 the spousal, rather than more external and publicly regulated practices, consti
­tutes the essence of
 
matrimony. Swinburne’s response to questions about the  
relationship between public ratification and intention offers an ideal that is dif
­ficult to achieve in practice, because the intentions of marital “transactors” are
 often difficult, if not impossible, to verify in a court of law. Yet the ideal per
­sists — even in a legal treatise. Concerned as they are with exploring what
 makes relations of exchange binding,
 
A Woman Killed with Kindness and Mea ­
sure for Measure exert tremendous pressure on this ideal, exposing the contra
­dictory function of female chastity and how it can preclude the happy union of
 gift and commodity in the institution of marriage. Because they slide between
 the competing imaginative economies, female chastity and marriage reveal the
 contradictions entailed in the effort to purify personal relations of the taint of
 calculation and contractual obligation.
3.
In the final scene of Measure for Measure, Angelo trivializes his and Mariana’s
 
original spousals — a trust-based vow of constancy — calling them “some
 speech of marriage” (5.1.222). Calculated considerations weigh more heavily
 for him than his verbal promises: Mariana’s “promised proportions / Came
 short of composition” (224-5). These justifications, along with Angelo’s spe
­cious claim that Mariana’s “reputation was disvalued” (226), might at first be
 seen as the best illustration of how the institution of marriage straddles the
 economies of gift and commodity, and might tempt us to see Angelo as the sole
 figure of a commodity mentality that disrupts an ideal of marriage of true
 minds. But Angelo’s deceitful self-defenses are not the only impediments to
 this ideal. After Mariana unmasks, she explains that “this is the body / That
 took away the match from Isabel, / And did supply thee at thy garden-house /
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In her imagin’d person” (214-17). When the duke asks Angelo, “know you this
 
woman?”, Lucio puns, “Carnally, she says” (217-18). Mariana goes even further
 than Lucio, however, claiming Angelo “knew me 
as
 a wife” (235); her claim that  
Angelo knew her as wife even though he “imagined” she was Isabel implies that
 carnal exchange alone is sufficient to make them husband and wife. For Swin
­burne, this is “not true Matrimony in conscience.” It isn’t just that Mariana has
 not read her Swinburne, for the duke-as-friar makes this claim 
as
 well  when he  
justifies the bed trick to her (4.1.71-4), elevating the “rules and precepts of law”
 over trust-based intention. The whole play shares in the nervousness of Mari
­ana’s statement that “I am affianc’d as strongly / As words could make up vows”
 (232-3). Couched in this assertion is a question: just how strongly can words
 make up vows? Mariana’s “could” indicates a distrust of verbal promises that
 the entire play shares. In Shakespeare’s Vienna, promises are unreliable and
 there 
is
 no guarantee that  people, including the duke,  will not say one thing and  
mean another.
Seneca’s treatise on gift-giving rejects recourse to the law as the means of
 
enforcing the bonds of fellowship created by
 
benefits. Seneca insists on “mens’  
consciences” rather than “surety” to guarantee obligation:
Thou stainest [benefits], if
 
thou make them a matter of Law. . . . Would  
God that no surety might be taken of the purchaser by the seller, nor bar
­gains and covenants be made under hand & seal: but rather, that the per





 Seneca calls for trust rather than “surety” — a legal bond or piece of  
property used to guarantee fulfillment of an obligation — as the binding force
 of exchange, duke
 
Vincentio, disguised as the friar, condemns  “security,” or con ­
tractual obligations, as the solvent of trust-based fellowship:
There is scarce truth enough alive to make societies secure, but security
 
enough to make fellowships accurs’d. Much upon this riddle runs the wis
­dom of the world.
(3.2.221-4)
Although the duke’s opposition here between contractual obligation and trust
­
based transactions parallels the Senecan view of what binds men in fellowship,
 the duke’s assertion
 
remains an empty aphorism, for  the logic of exchange oper ­
ating in Measure belies the duke’s aphoristic wisdom. Despite his repeated
 invocation of the language of the benefit to justify the bed trick, the duke
 betrays the calculated, and calculating, understanding underpinning his plan.
 He tells Isabella that “the satisfaction
 
I would require is likewise your own ben ­
efit” (3.1.154-5) and that “I do make myself believe that you may most upright-
 eously do a poor wrong’d lady a merited benefit” (197-9). Claiming that the
 bed trick and Mariana’s pregnancy “may compel [Angelo] to her recompense”
 (3.1.250), the duke corrupts the language of idealized benefiting
 
with the taint  
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of deceit and coercion. (He also assumes that the one-night stand will result in
 
conception, the confirmation of sexual exchange.) The coercion and deceit the
 duke’s benefits entail align them with the debased forms of exchange against
 which Seneca posits the economy of the benefit. In the duke’s alliterative jus
­tification of deceit — “the doubleness of the benefit defends the deceit from
 reproof” (254-6) — he quantifies gains, undermining the Senecan notion that
 it is “a foul shame ... a
 
vile Usury to keep a reckoning of benefits, as of expens ­
es” (sig. A2V). Further, the duke relies on rather than rejects “security” when he
 rationalizes the deceit of the bed trick to Mariana:
He is your husband on a pre-contract;
 
To bring you thus together, ’tis no sin,
 Sith that the justice of your title to him
 Doth flourish the deceit.
(4.1.71-4)10
Likening his plan to a speculative agrarian enterprise, the duke again betrays
 
the commodified imagination underlying the “benefits” he doles out to his sub
­jects: “Our corn’s to reap, for yet our tithe’s to sow” (75). The impersonal sex
­ual exchange of the bed trick 
is
 likened to sowing grain to pay  tithe dues; doing  
this will lead to the harvest, the contractually enforced marital union.
The duke further reveals a calculating, “measured” understanding of mar
­
riage and social exchange by positing an economy of craft, vice, and deceit that
 is necessary in order to “exact” the “performance” of the “old contracting”
 between Mariana and Claudio:
Craft against vice I must apply.
With Angelo tonight shall he
His old betrothed but despised;
So disguise shall, by th’ disguised,
 
Pay with falsehood false exacting,
 And perform an old contracting.
(3.2.270-5)
Victoria Hayne suggests that this passage “crown[s] the developing intimacy
 
between the audience and the Duke-friar,” inviting the audience’s complicity in
 the opposition to vice that the disguised duke enacts (26). The plodding
 tetrameter of the duke’s lines emphasizes the measure-for-measure logic that
 
he  
follows, a logic that underlies the complicated exchanges and substitutions that
 generate the play’s final marriages. In addition to presenting the duke 
as
 a  
“kind of inverted Vice figure,” the play presents him as constructing 
a
 kind of  
inverted gift economy, one that draws on the rhetoric of benefits. Rather than
 inviting the audience’s complicity in the opposition to vice, the play invites its
 complicity in the deceit and contractual vision of marriage and social relations
 that the duke “performs.”
For the duke, virtue itself functions like currency. In order to have value,
 
he claims, Angelo’s virtue must circulate. Vincentio calls nature a “creditor” to
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him. Rather than hoarded in  the convent, Isabella’s chastity must be  put  
into circulation as well, the controlled circulation of marriage.11 After present
­ing his “offer” of marriage in imperative form, “Give me your hand and say you
 will be mine” (5.1.497), the duke corrects himself in order to make his propos
­al more suited to the staged princely magnanimity of his final pardons: “I have
 a motion much imports your good, / Whereto if you’ll a willing ear incline, /
 What’s mine 
is
 yours and what is yours is mine” (540-2).12
The parodic “good turns” between Pompey and Abhorson approximate the
 Senecan ideal of benefits more closely than any other exchanges we see in the
 play:
ABHORSON Come on, bawd. I will instruct thee in my trade; follow.
POMPEY I do desire to learn, sir; and I hope, if you have occasion to use me
 
for your own turn, you shall find me yare. For truly, sir, for your kindness
 I owe you a good turn.
(4.2.54-9)
The jocular goodwill between
 
the bawd and hangman  — a  parodic rendering of  
the relation between master and apprentice — is set in re
l
ief against the shady  
“good turns” between the duke and the Provost in the same scene: the duke
 asks for a “dangerous courtesy” (162), and has much ado to convince the fear
­ful Provost to grant his suit. Except for the parodic good turns between Pom
­pey and Abhorson, the closest we come to a gift ethos in Measure for Measure
 emerges in the final scene, as the duke requites his subjects with pardons, mer
­ciful punishments, and marriage offers. However, the play exposes the machi
­nation and calculation that
 
buttress the duke’s display of sovereign clemency, as  
well 
as
 exposing how his pose as the liberal gift-giver at the end of the play  
relies on the very antithesis of the gift, the “security” that he earlier decries.
 The play’s project therefore diverges starkly from one of its probable sources,
 Whetstone’s Right Excellent and Famous History of Promos and Cassandra
 (1578), which aims to show “the perfect magnanimitye of a noble kinge, in
 checking Vice and
 
favouringe  Vertue: Wherein is showne, the Ruyne and over-  
throwe, of dishonest practices, the advauncement of upright dealing” (tide
 page). Rather than “upright dealing” and “perfect magnanimitye,” the duke
 himself engages in deceitful substitutions and “dishonest practices.” Despite
 Vincentio’s (largely ineffective) efforts to interrogate and reform his subjects’
 consciences, Measure reveals the extent to which sovereign power enforces con
­tracts as a way of regulating sexual desire.13 Sexual desire, including marital
 sexuality, 
is
 subordinated in the play to a contractual, commodified logic that  
barely acknowledges the personal bonds of
 
constancy associated with the gift.  
While Angelo enforces legal bonds he tries to evade them himself, the duke, as
 we have seen, relies on legally enforceable contractual obligations even as he
 condemns them.
The duke and Angelo are not alone in Vienna, of course, in adopting a
 
commodified perspective of sexual relations. The bawds most frankly
 
acknowl ­
edge, and profit from, the fink between sexuality and commodity exchange.
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Pompey, for example, envisions the ramifications of the new law against forni
­
cation for the housing market: "If this law hold in Vienna ten year, I’ll rent the
 fairest
 
house in it after threepence a bay” (2.1.239-41).14 He conflates the "two  
usuries,” money-lending and procuring for fornication, pointing to the capri
­ciousness of the law that condemns one while allowing the "worser” (3.2.6-8).
 Even the chastened Claudio betrays a commodified understanding of virtue
 when he claims that Authority
 
"make[s] us pay down for our offense by weight  
/ The words of heaven” (1.2.121-2). Lucio jestingly responds that he would
 send for his creditors if he were so eloquent under arrest (133). Here Lucio,
 like Pompey, conflates sexual and financial crimes, as does Angelo when he
 describes fornication as "coining heaven’s image in stamps that are forbid”
 (2.4.45-6). Behind the conflation of bastardizing and counterfeiting lurks the
 assumption that producing legitimate children is like minting coins.15 Unlike
 bastard children, legitimate ones are authorized by the "stamp” of public
 authority, or "outward order” (1.2.149), as Claudio calls it when vouching for
 the legitimacy of his marriage to, "mutual” sexual commerce with, and "posses
­sion of” Juliet: 
Thus stands it with me: upon a true contract
I got possession of Julietta’s bed.
You know the lady; she is fast my wife,
 
Save that we do the denunciation lack
 Of outward order. This we came not to,
 Only for propagation of a dow’r
 Remaining in the coffer of her friends,
 From whom we thought it meet to hide our love
 Till time had made them for us. But it chances
 The stealth of our most mutual entertainment
 With character too gross is writ on Juliet.
(145-51)
While waiting publicly to solemnize their marriage in the hopes of "propagat
­
ing” a dowry —
 
wresting the wealth of Juliet’s "friends” out of their coffers and  
into circulation — Juliet and Claudio "unhappily” (157) propagate 
a
 child.  
These confusions between sexual desire, procreation, and legally-based finan
­cial exchanges even infiltrate the insulated world of the moated grange where
 Mariana resides; just
 
before the duke arrives, the boy’s song images kisses as the  
"seals of love” that are "seal’d in vain” (4.1.5-6).
Hence, the play does not merely elide illicit sexual exchange with commod
­
ity exchange and the circulation of money. The pervasiveness of substitution in
 Measure for Measure16 reveals how female chastity can be made to function like
 currency in the enforcement of "true” marriage contracts. As long as she 
is chaste — a difficult "fact” to determine — one woman can stand in for anoth
­er; their very interchangeability renders them equivalent,17 precluding the pos
­sibility of personal bonds that are the definitive feature of a gift transaction.
 This impersonal exchangeability is even more clear in the case of the duke’s
 machinations than in the case of prostitution; the bawds trade bodies for money,
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whereas in the bed trick, as Marc Shell points out (125), Isabellas and Mari
­
ana’s chaste bodies function like money. In his efforts to close the deal that will
 force Isabella to yield up what she calls the “gift of my chaste body” (5.1.102),
 Angelo simply makes explicit how the “most holy law” of the benefit is a staged
 affair, based on substitutions, legitimated by the logic of the commodity. Words
 alone cannot create the faithful intentions that should make up vows, but nei
­ther can formal contracts alone. The play exposes the need for staged sovereign
 liberality the pretense of a gift economy — to supplement strict legal
 enforcement on the one hand18 and conscience on the other, both of which, on
 their own, fail to bind men, and men and women, in fellowship. Through its
 treatment of female chastity, the play shows how the pretense of sovereign lib
­erality actually reinforces the measured, commodified basis of social relations.
The duke’s argument that Angelo owes nature “use,” or interest, for the
 
virtue she has loaned to him parallels Aristotelian arguments about money
 appealed to in the defense of usury. Based on the idea that usury 
is
 a crime of  
intent, rather than a factual, contractual matter, Du Moulin argues that usurers
 create “a relationship between those who have money and those who need
 money. Without them money would
 
be nearly useless. Moreover, money is the  
most useful when it is most used, and usurers see to it that it is kept in use”
 (quoted in Jones 17). Money is only productive when it is kept in circulation,
 not hoarded. Keeping female sexuality out of circulation likewise curtails its
 productivity, a line of argument familiar from Parolles’s speeches on
 
virginity in  
All's Well that Ends Well:
It 
is
 not politic in the commonwealth of nature to preserve virginity. Loss  
of virginity 
is
 rational increase, and there was never virgin got till virginity  
was first lost.... Keep it not; you cannot choose but lose by’t. Out
 
with’t!  
Within t’ one year it will make itself two, which is a goodly increase, and
 the principal itself not much the worse. Away with’t! . . . ’Tis a commodi
­ty will lose the gloss with lying; the longer kept, the less worth. Off with’t
 while ’tis vendible; answer the time of request.
(1.1.128-31,147-50,154-6)
Although Helena’s own socially-based transacting with the King of France and
 
the Florentine women in All's Well come to complicate this notion of how
 
vir ­
ginity acquires its value in the
 
“commonwealth of nature,”  Parolles offers a clear,  
if facetious, sense of how arguments about the relation between use, exchange,
 and value can easily be appropriated to discuss women’s sexuality. Female sex
­uality does indeed gain cultural value by circulating, but it is often circulation
 controlled by authorities other than young women themselves.19
We can thus see how these texts’ figurations of female chastity jostle
 
against the ideological strategies in Seneca’s De Beneficiis, and in the wider cul
­tural discourses of exchange, for keeping the forces of commodification at bay.
 Golding’s Seneca offers a moral economy of the benefit that purifies personal
 relations from the taint of commerce by keeping them distinct from traffic in
 quantifiable, alienable objects that rely on formal contract and the law as the
 guarantors of honest dealing. Like Seneca’s “benefits,” the construction of
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female chastity is, in part, an ideological strategy for keeping sexual relations
 
distinct from commodity relations. The obsession
 
with  womens chastity in the  
period is an elaborate defense against how, in some contexts, a chaste woman
 can be made to function as a kind of currency — an arbitrarily authorized unit
 of measure with no use-value of its own — to ensure the legitimacy of a system
 of private property.20 Barbara Baines asserts that chastity is a theologically pre
­scribed virtue that is “appropriated as the standard upon which the economy of
 secular power 
is
 based” (284).21 A market economy depends on just such a set  
standard by which the values of commodities can be measured. The construc
­tion of women s sexuality through the moral virtue chastity in plays, homilies,
 conduct books, is an effort to keep it priceless, a matter of conscience :— as
 Vives implores, “I pray thee, understand thine own goodness, maid, thy price
 cannot be estimated” (104) — out of the reaches of a system of exchange gov
­erned by calculated exchange values. Although it does so less directly than
 Parolles’s witty speech, Measure exposes such a system as that which often
 determines the “value” of female chastity. The complex, calculating negotia
­tions that generate the play’s marriages expose that the gift ethos is a ruse —
 albeit a necessary one — that both relies on and buttresses the logic and
 motives of the commodity.
4.
If in Measure for
 
Measure, female chastity helps to expose the economy of the  
gift 
as
 a necessary fuse, in Thomas Heywood’s A Woman Killed with Kindness  
— another play with a critical history as a problem case — marital chastity
 exposes the limits of 
a
 conscious gift ethos. Unlike the pervasive commodity  
mentality of Vienna, Heywood’s gentry have an acute sense of the gift ethic,
 even among those such as Wendoll and the usurer Shafton who violate it. The
 play opens with the celebration of John and Anne Frankford’s marriage.
 Although Heywood does not stage the precise moment at which the couple
 exchanges “present consent” (as Swinburne would call it), its definitive elements
 — the exchange of vows and the taking of hands — are scattered throughout
 the opening scene and the play generally, indicating some nervousness over
 trust-based marital vows. Francis Acton, Anne Frankford’s brother, “borrows”
 her hand to dance: “By
 
your leave, sister — by your husband’s leave /  I should  
have said — the hand that but this day
 
/ Was given you in the church, I’ll bor ­
row” (1.6-8). Anne Frankford’s hand is her husband’s hand, but her husband’s
 itself was “given” to her. Acton and Charles Mountford clasp hands in a friend
­ly wager (“here’s my hand” [101]), as do their followers Cranwell and Wendoll
 (“What, clap you hands? / Or is’t not bargain?” “Yes, and stake them down”
 (106-7)). When Charles Mountford is first freed’ from prison for murdering
 one of Acton’s followers during a hunt, Shafton soon reveals that his friendly
 offers of money and hands — “Sir Charles, a hand, a hand — at liberty!” (5.21)
 — are disingenuous: “If I can fasten but one finger on him, / With my full
 hand I’ll grip him to the heart. / ’Tis not for love I proffered him this coin, /
 But for my gain and pleasure” (50-3). In all cases, the moment of promise or
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friendly wager — rendered physically in the taking of hands — modulates to
 
antagonism, violence or the betrayal of trust, or, in the case of Shafton, was
 insincere to begin with.22 Anne will be borrowed from Frankford by Wendoll;
 the hunting competition between Acton and Charles quickly escalates to vio-.
 lence that culminates in Charles committing murder; and Charles’s loan (with
 interest, of course) from Shafton leads to his second arrest and ultimate
 bondage to vengeful Acton who pays his debts. The play’s anxiety over the
 nuptial spousal manifests itself first by the dispersal of the moment of promise
 throughout the opening scene, and then through the eruption of violence or
 betrayal in the scenes that follow. Heywood’s play shares in the fear of Shake
­speare’s Vienna that words cannot “make up vows” and the concomitant fear
 that perhaps it is only formal legal regulation (the “bond”) that can bind men,




the play’s characters, Shafton is certainly the least compelling and the  
least “developed” or “motivated”; in fact, he disappears from the play complete
­ly after having Charles arrested for debt in scene seven, making him seem like
 a gratuitous plot device. But his function is central: he plays out the logic by
 which competing forms of exchange can only be articulated relationally.23 His
 repeated references to and delight in litigation (5.35-8; 7.29-30, 57-62, 70-1)
 counter the appeals to conscience throughout the play, thus serving as the
 antithesis to the gift ethic.24 Willfully disregarding the knowledge that “love”
 should be what motivates his offers, the bad giver Shafton serves as the neces
­sary foil to the disinterested liberality of
 
Frankford, which erupts inexplicably  
in the scene immediately preceding Shafton’s equally inexplicable usurious
 offers.
It is in this scene that we finally witness John Frankford taking vows — not
 
with his wife Anne, but with Wendoll.25 Here, John offers all at his disposal in
 order to forge a friendship with him:
Frankford I will allow
 
you, sir,
Your man, your gelding, and your table,
 All at my own charge. Be my companion.
WENDOLL Master Frankford, I have oft been bound to you
By many favours; this exceeds them all
 
That I shall never merit your least favour.
 But when your last remembrance I forget,
Heaven at my soul exact that weighty debt.
FRANKFORD There needs no protestation, for I know you
 
Virtuous, and therefore grateful. Prithee Nan,
 Use him with all thy loving’st courtesy.
ANNE As far 
as
 modesty may well extend,  
It is my duty to receive your friend.
FRANKFORD To dinner, come sir; from this present day,
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Except for the lines between John and Anne, this interchange could be read as
 
a staging of De Beneficiis: John creates perpetual companionship by liberal giv
­ing (“Welcome to me forever”), and Wendoll is conscious that he is bound by
 the “weighty debt” of gratitude, gratitude that Frankford elides with virtue and
 sees as its logical result (“I know you / Virtuous, and therefore grateful”). As
 with the earlier examples, this moment of promise will be violated; Wendoll
 seduces Anne and 
is
 “profuse in Frankford’s richest treasure [that is, Anne]”  
(11.116). But the problem at the heart of this plot and of the play 
is
 not adul ­
tery, but rather how an ethic of absolute generosity expressed in gift-giving
 conflicts with the control of
 
wifely chastity as a privately owned, semi-com-  
modified object. The scene in which this interchange occurs opens with John’s
 catalogue of his treasured possessions, “chief / Of all” being his “fair” and
 “chaste” wife (4.1-14). John wants to share all his stuff with Wendoll, but
 unlike his other possessions — table, purse, horses, servants — Anne has to be
 proper to him, and can’t be given. Her response to John’s command to “use”
 Wendoll suggests that she 
is
 aware of the limits her “modesty” places on John’s  
ability to be a liberal giver. Rather than viewing friendship with Wendoll 
as
 a  
gift freely given, Anne views Wendoll as one whom it is a contractual “duty to
 receive” (82). John cannot say without qualification to
 
Wendoll “what’s mine is 
yours,” because Anne is proper to him; unlike all other property in a commod
­ity economy, however, she 
is
 not alienable, she can’t be transferred or loaned to  
another “owner.”26
In Wendoll’s prolonged soliloquy before the seduction scene (6.1-52) — a
 
dramatized struggle with conscience — he acknowledges
 
John’s generosity, the  
bond it creates, as well as the consequences of
 
being ungrateful to his liberal  
donor. In his witting violation of the gift ethic, the play clearly constructs
 Wendoll’s crime not as adultery
 
with Anne but as ingratitude to her husband:
He doth maintain me; he allows me largely
 
Money to spend—
My gelding and my man.
This kindness grows of no alliance ’twixt us
I never bound him to me by desert;
He cannot eat without me,
Nor laugh without me; I am to his body
 
As necessary as his digestion,
And equally do make him whole or sick.
And shall I wrong this man? Base man! Ingrate!
 
Hast thou the power straight with thy gory hands
 To rip thy image from his bleeding heart?
... or rend his heart
To whom thy heart was joined and knit together?
(6.27-28, 31, 33, 35, 40-46, 49-50)
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When Anne relays Johns message that Wendoll is to “be a present Frankford
 
in his absence” (6.78), we discover that the problem is not only that Anne is a
 possession that cannot be given but that John cannot fully fuse with his “com
­panion” Wendoll. Although the gift-generated bond between the two men 
is so strong that it makes their desire for the same woman seem almost inevitable,
 their loss of the “proper” self should not extend to Johns relationship with
 Anne. During the seduction scene, Anne reiterates what Wendoll has already
 articulated, that John “esteems” Wendoll “even 
as
 his [own] brain, his eye-ball,  
or his he rt” (6.113-14). The two hearts “joined and knit together” are torn
 asunder by the disruptive force of heterosexual desire, a force that cannot be
 contained by the ethic of the gift, an ethic of which Wendoll is wholly aware.
 Wendoll’s repeated willingness to “hazard all” (129,137) in order to have Anne
 reveals that conflicting social and sexual relations can entail the kinds of risks
 associated with commodity exchange. However, the play pointedly constructs
 Wendoll’s crime as a breach of the gift ethic. Just 
as
 Golding’s Seneca argues  
that one finds “an unthankful person” beneath all social vices (sig. B3V), Wen-
 doll’s ingratitude to John is presented as the root of the marital and social dis
­order in Woman Killed. For him, adultery is an incidental crime. He plans to
 wander on the continent “where the report of my ingratitude / Cannot be
 heard,” and then to return once this crime, not adultery, is forgotten so that he
 can seek honor and praise at court (16.129-37).27 
Honor, of course, 
is
 not gender neutral, and in Anne’s case adultery is not  
an incidental crime. Upon his servant’s disclosure of Wendoll and Anne’s
 actions, John’s thoughts immediately turn to her birth, education, repute, car
­riage, and demeanor, 
a
ll of which previously indicated that she was “modest,  
chaste, and godly. / Is all this seeming gold plain copper?” (8.99-105). John’s
 reaction and question points to the fragility of the usual means by which the
 value and “surety” of wifely chastity is constructed. Anne’s homiletic address to
 the women in the audience once her crime has been discovered suggests that
 unchaste wives debase something other than their own value:
O women, women, you that have yet kept
Your holy matrimonial vow unstained,
Make me your instance: when you tread awry,
 
Your sins like mine will on your conscience lie.
(13.142-5)
Anne’s “yet” hints at the tenuousness of that holy vow, as if the women she
 
addresses were just on the
 
verge of doing some staining. Significantly, the mat ­
rimonial vow is what would be stained, not the womens’
 
value or reputation, or  
even their bodies. Like Swinburne, who posits the exchange of vows as the
 essence of matrimony, Anne’s address to her female audience suggests that the
 exchange of faithful vows outweighs the giving of bodies in intercourse in mak
­ing a true marriage. It is her sin of “staining” not her chaste body but this trust
­based vow that lies on Anne’s conscience after John discovers her.
Illustrating how liberal giving can be used to express enmity, John keeps
 
offering gifts and courtesies as he plots to entrap Anne and Wendoll (11.38-40,
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48-9, 63-4). His novel form of punishment of Anne for committing adultery
 
— the titular “kindness” and Heywood’s innovation in the revenge plot — 
is appropriate because it reveals Johns effort to keep his relationship to Wendoll
 and to Anne in the sphere of the gift. Rather than taking legal action, taking
 their lives, or physically punishing them (as Anne begs him to do just before
 addressing the women in the audience), he lets them contemplate their viola
­tion of the “most holy law” of the gift; he tells Wendoll:
When thou record st my many courtesies
And shalt compare them with they treacherous heart,
Lay them together, weigh them equally,
’Twill be revenge enough.
(13.72-5)
This weighing and calculating takes place within the sphere of
 
the gift, since  
conscience, rather than the law, is to serve as the agent of punishment. John
 doles out to Anne a “judgment” that is even more “liberal”:
Woman, hear thy judgment:
Go, make thee ready in thy best attire,
Take with thee all thy gowns, all thy apparel;




whose sight being left here in the house  
I may remember such 
a
 woman by.
Choose thee a bed and hangings for a chamber;
Take with thee everything that hath thy mark,
 
And get thee to my manor seven mile off,
 Where live. ’Tis thine; I freely give it thee.
 My tenants by shall furnish thee with wains
 To carry all thy stuff, within two hours,
 No longer, will I limit thee my sight.
Choose which of all my servants thou likest best,
 
And they are thine to attend thee.
(158-72)
In “freely” giving Anne all this “stuff,” John uses the same acts of generosity by
 
which he had tried to establish his friendship with Wendoll to “torment
 [Anne’s] soul” (156) and to mark his estrangement from her.28 “It was thy
 hand,” he tells her, “cut two hearts out of one” (186). The heart joined in mat
­rimony is not the only “one” that has been sundered, since the two hearts of
 John and Wendoll were also “joined and knit together”; as Wendoll addressed
 himself before seducing Anne: “Ingrate! / Hast thou the power straight with
 thy gory
 
hands / To rip thy image from his bleeding heart? ... or rend his heart  
/ To whom thy heart was joined and knit together?” (6.44-6, 49-50)
In the final scene of Measure for Measure, I have argued, the friar-duke has
 
to use the pretense of
 
princely magnanimity to supplement his earlier unsuc ­
cessful efforts to shape and interrogate his subjects’ consciences rather than
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enforce the law against fornication. In staging that magnanimity he relies on
 
the commodity logic that is usually seen as its antithesis. When the law against
 adultery and ingratitude has been violated in John Frankford’s “little common
­wealth,” his liberal, gift-driven punishment of Anne allows her to repent on her
 own so that John is able to shape the consciences of his subjects as Duke Vin-
 centio could not. John deploys the same generosity by which he had forged a
 bond with Wendoll to force Anne to repent. Repentance is itself
 
an internal ­
ized process centered on the individual subject’s conscience, so that John’s
 enabling of it through his “kindness,” unlike external punishments or execution,
 resides
 
within the sphere of the gift.29 His gift-based punishment allows Anne  
herself to repent her crimes, but only on the condition that her connection with
 her husband and his children is broken:
But, as thou hopest for heaven, as thou believest
 
Thy name’s recorded in the book of life,
 I charge thee never after this sad day
 To see me, or to meet me, or to send
 By word, or writing, gift, or otherwise
 To move me, by thyself, or by thy friends,
 Nor challenge any part in my two children.
(13.173-9)
As John’s prohibitions here indicate, Anne’s estrangement from him is signified
 
by her inability to approach him as a gift-giver. Anne proceeds to repent with
 a vengeance, symbolized when she bids Nick to break her beloved lute, which
 John, wishing to remove all material traces of Anne, has sent after her. Anne
 wishes to break the lute “not as my husband’s gift, but my farewell / To all
 earth’s joy” (16.74-5). She does not reject the gift that constitutes part of his
 punishment but rather renounces the material and sensual pleasures that the
 instrument signifies; with them she renounces life itself, as she proceeds to
 starve herself to death. Anne’s death finally allows John to forgive her —
 “Though thy rash offence / Divorced our bodies, thy repentant
 
tears / Unite our  
souls” (17.107-9) — and to restore them to their married state, the “singular
 gift of God,” 
as
 the Homily of Matrimony calls it.30
No matter how successfully Frankford keeps his “judgment” and forgive
­ness of Anne in the sphere of the gift, however, it is the status of
 
her marital  
chastity partially outside of this sphere that gets them in trouble in the first
 place. Having been given in marriage, Anne’s chastity is out of circulation.
 Unlike the other possessions which he offers to Wendoll, her chaste body can
­not serve as a “badge” of Frankford’s good will; it cannot be given or shared, and
 therefore cannot help cement the relationship between the two men as John’s
 other gifts do. The following exhortation from Vives is therefore only partial
­ly accurate:
And know thou this, woman, that the chastity and honesty which thou hast
 
is not thine, but committed and betaken unto thy keeping by thine hus
­
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band. Wherefore thou dost the more wrong to give away that thing
 
which  
is  another body’s, without the owner’s license.
(113)
If, as Vives cautions, a woman’s chastity 
is
 not hers to give — or if, as Ruth  
Kelso states, it 
is
 the "greatest gift to her husband” (97) she brings in marriage  
— once the marriage transaction takes place, a woman’s chastity
 
is not her hus ­
band’s to give either. Anne’s value as a wife derives from her being the private
 and inalienable property of John. Neither gift nor commodity (since the defin
­itive feature of a commodity is its exchangeability), the ambiguous status of
 wifely chastity conflicts with the ethic of open generosity and loss of proper
 identity
 
which constitutes  John’s friendship with Wendoll.
5.
In Heywood’s play, we encounter another plot in which a woman’s chastity
 
(again a sister’s as in Measure for Measure) is figured as an object of exchange.31
 Like Isabella, Susan Mountford faces the choice between preserving her chasti
­ty and preserving her brother. Unlike Claudio, however, Charles Mountford’s
 life 
is
 not at stake. Rather, Susan is called on to save his honor, an honor that  
is wholly constituted by adhering to an ethic of the gift. When Susan fears that
 Acton will pursue legal action, Charles responds that "my conscience is become
 my enemy / And will pursue me more than Acton can” (3.70-3). Like a good
 Senecan (and not unlike the Frankfords) he recognizes the binding power of
 conscience over that of legal enforcement. Charles is later imprisoned a second
 time because he refuses to sell his ancestral home to the usurer Shafton to
 whom he owes money. He refuses, in short, to acknowledge the commodifica
­tion of his ancient home; he figures the sale as a defloration, calling the title to
 the house a "virgin title never yet deflowered” (7.23). Because he resists
 Shafton’s seductive offers to buy the estate, Charles goes to prison owing the
 principal and the "use.” Literalizing the metaphor of defloration by which he
 figured the sale of the family home, he calls on Susan to offer her chastity to
 repay his debt to Acton, who has freed him from prison. Charles’s metaphor
 — and the subsequent actions (and transactions) that explore this metaphor’s
 explanatory power — draw the connection between a crucial cluster of proper
­ties that have to be passed on and transferred in order to have value, but that
 have to be kept in controlled circulation by being cautiously given as gifts or
 traded as "terminal commodities”: female chastity, the family name and estate,
 and the sense of personal honor that derives from them.32
In a double movement that illustrates the relationality of gift and com
­
modity, the play juxtaposes an idealized gift ethic with rigorous scrutiny of its
 material and calculable consequences. This attention to materiality is especial
­ly true in the Mountford plot. Charles’s refusal to capitulate to commodity
 exchange, and the play’s excessive emphasis on the Mountford’s refusal to sell
 their remaining land, is accompanied by great specificity in what they lose,
 2,500 pounds a year in patrimony, and what they retain, 500 pounds and a sum-
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mer house. This careful bookkeeping combines with explicit attention to the
 
Mountfords’ changing relation to the means of production; Cranwell reports
 that Charles has “turned a plain countryman” (5.7), indicating that he is no
 longer a landlord. The play continues to emphasize the labor this new relation
 to the land entails, zeroing in on its bodily effects. In order to sustain them
­selves, Charles 
is
 “enforced to follow husbandry” and Susan to “milk” (7.3-4).  
Charles points to “this palm” roughened by labor (39) and “her silver brow”
 blasted by the elements (40-1). Susan tells Shafton, “we feed sparing and we
 labour hard, / We lie uneasy, to reserve to us / And our succession this small
 plot of ground” (44-6). Through Charles’s efforts to adhere to an idealized gift
 ethic, the Mountford plot, contrary to the Senecan vision of benefits which
 effaces the material domain, reinstates the material 
as
 a locus of value.
In the very materiality of its unrelenting attention to the consequences of
 Charles and Susan’s efforts to “keep this poor house we have left unsold” (7.2),
 the play virtually idealizes their downward mobility. As he tries to dissuade
 Shafton from his efforts to buy, Charles tells him how the “crisis of the landed
 gentry” feels:
I have so bent my thoughts to husbandry
That I protest I scarcely can remember
What a new fashion is, how silk or satin
Feels in my hand; why, pride is grown to us
 
A mere, mere stranger. I have quite forgot
 The names of all that ever waited on me;
I cannot name ye any of my hounds,
Once from whose echoing mouths I heard all the music
That e’er my heart desired. What should I say?
To keep this place I have changed myself away.
(47-65)
Here, Charles recounts a series of alienations and forgettings, both material and
 
immaterial, from the feel of rich fabrics and the sounds of barking hounds, to
 the names of servants. Charles personifies pride in order to express his alien
­ation from it. This series of losses culminates in Charles’s alienation from his
 former self: “I have changed myself away.” He endures all these losses in order
 to hold on to his last vestige of the old order, the ancestral land. These para
­doxically ennobling losses cause Charles to bend his thoughts to husbandry, so
 that he becomes a most devoted husband to the land, refusing to let it pass out
­side of the family.
But the honorable exchange of “good turns” that
 
ideally expresses the  bonds  
between family members is obstructed when Charles’s kinfolk reject his suit for
 help to get out of debtor’s prison. When Susan seeks assistance from their kin
 and friends, they not only refuse to offer help but also refuse to recognize their
 former ties to Charles. His uncle rejects the bond of
 
kinship, saying Charles  
“lost my
 
kindred  when he fell to need” (9.17); Sandy rejects friendship, “I knew  
you ere your brother sold his land” (22); and Cousin Tydy claims, “I am no
 cousin unto them that borrow” (36). Sandy, a former tenant whom Charles
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gave a farm “rent-free” (27), refuses to requite the favor. With the rebuff from
 
family and friends to help free Charles from prison, the whole range of
 
social  
and personal relations' — family/kin, friend, tenant — dissolves, a dissolution
 that is expressed by their refusals to grant good turns. When he discovers the
 refusal of his kin, Charles laments the fetters of disgrace that their ingratitude
 brings to the family name: “Unthankful kinsmen! Mountfords all too base! /
 To let thy name lie fettered in disgrace!” (10.5-6). Familial ingratitude, like
 deflowering the virgin title to the land, is a violation of the gift ethic; both are
 seen, therefore, to disgrace the family name.
Upon the news that it is the bounty of Acton and not of his kin that frees
 
him from prison, Charles reveals that the accrued debt of honor diminishes his
 sense of self. Ever true to the gift ethic, Charles believes physical imprison
­ment would be less onerous than the weighty debt of honor to Acton. He
 expresses great distress and identity confusion upon the news that Acton freed
 him from prison:
By Acton freed! Not all thy manacles
Could fetter so my heels as this one word
Hath thralled my heart, and it must now he bound
 
In more strict prison than thy stony gaol.
Had this proceeded from my friends, or [father]
 
From them this action had deserved my life,
 And from a stranger more, because from such
 There is less execution of good deeds.
But he, nor father, nor ally, nor friend,
 
More than a stranger, both remote in blood
 And in his heart opposed my enemy,
 O there I lose myself. What should I say?
 What think? what do, his bounty to repay?
  
(10.92-5,109-18)
If before, Charles “changed [him] self away” in bending his thoughts to hus
­
bandry, here, his debt to a gift-giving enemy causes him to “lose [him]self.” He
 plans to use Susan as a semi-commodified return gift to Acton in order to
 redeem himself: “Though poor, my heart is set / In one rich gift to pay back
 all my debt” (123-4). Refusing to deflower the virgin title to the family home
 retains the honor of the family name; now that that name “lies fettered in dis
­grace” due to familial ingratitude, Charles offers the defloration of Susan to
 retain his sense of personal honor.
Susan wavers uncontrollably in Charles’s language between gift, commodi
­
ty, currency, and fellow transactor 
as
 he tells her why he has “tricked [her] like  
a bride” (14.1). By claiming that she should “stand / In joint-bond bound to
 satisfy the debt” (74-5), he situates her as a
 
potential transactor in the deal. But  
by referring to Susan as “such a present, such an acquittance for the knight to
 seal” (94-5), he positions her both as a gift and 
as
 the legal document dis ­
charging his debt which Acton’s “seal” would formalize. Charles also figures
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 currency when he values her "rich jewel” (48) at 500 pounds plus “inter ­
est” (46), ignoring Vives’ pleas to chaste maids: “I pray thee, understand thine
 own goodness, maid, thy price cannot be estimated” (104). Finally, he offers
 Susan to Acton as a “pawn” in absence of “ready coin” (14.105-6). Susan’s vac
­illating figuration as gift, money and potential transactor contributes to rather
 than allays anxieties about the distinctions between personal and legal
 exchanges, and those between gift and commodity.
Because he is freed from the burden of redeeming his family’s name,
 
Charles can enlist the riches of Susan to save him from incurring “the world’s
 disgrace” (14.12) by dying indebted to his enemy. When he tells Susan,
 “tricked . . . like a bride” (1), “It lies in thee ... to acquit me free, / And all my
 debt I may outstrip by thee” (16-17), she responds much as does Isabella,
 “tricked” like a novice nun, to Lucio’s suggestion that she might “assay what
 pow’r you have” to help Claudio (Measure 1.4.76). Isabella’s halting questions
 — “Alas, what poor / Ability’s in me to do him good? . . . My power? Alas, I
 doubt —” (74-5, 77) — parallel those of Susan, who stammers: “By me? Why
 I have nothing, nothing ... I am not worth —” (14.18-20). Charles interrupts
 her faltering questions:
O sister, say not so.
It lies in you my downcast state to raise,
To make me stand on even points with the world.
Come, sister, you are rich! Indeed you are!
And in your power you have, without delay,
 
Acton’s five hundred pound back to repay.
(20-5)
Like Charles, Lucio interrupts Isabella’s “Alas, I doubt —”:
Our doubts are traitors,
And makes us lose the good we oft might win,
By fearing to attempt. Go to Lord Angelo,
And let him learn to know, when maidens sue,
Men give like gods.
(1.4.77-81)
Both sisters have to put the power of the virtue that lies “in” them into circula
­
tion in order for its value to be realized. Both might therefore seem to be fig
­ured merely as ransom money or gift-bribes, since both sisters, unbeknownst to
 themselves, are brides-(and bribes)-to-be. However, both are also themselves
 transactors. Just as Charles positions Susan as a transactor “in joint-bond
 bound,” Lucio positions Isabella as a suitor (“when maidens sue / Men give like
 gods”). Susan, moreover, has repeatedly refused the gifts Acton has offered in
 his efforts to woo her (“He dotes on me, and oft hath sent me gifts, / Letters,.
 and tokens: I refused them all” [10.121-2]). Because of this continual slippage, we cannot assert that either Susan or Isabella is merely a medium or object of
 exchange, whether gift, commodity, or money.
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To understand how Susan does not function merely as an object of
 
exchange, a commodity or currency
 
without value unless put in circulation, we  
must attend to her interactions/transactions with Acton before Charles
 becomes aware of them. Recalling that Charles has a sister, Acton plans to use
 her defloration as a means of revenge, and bribing Susan with gifts is to be the
 means for executing this plan: "I'll proffer largely, but the deed being done /
 I’ll smile to see her base confusion” (7.83-4). When Acton first sees Susan,
 however, sudden desire for her disrupts this original plan,33 as she becomes
 invested with value for him independent of the relationship with Charles.
 Actons sudden desire for Susan means that she is no longer an empty means of
 revenge, but a desirable thing with a kind of use-value, 
as
 well as a means of  
representing the personal enmity between Charles and Acton. Like Euphues,
 courted by “sundry devices” of flatterers, Susan has to resist participating in a
 corrupted form of exchange. She is therefore not only a desirable thing with a
 use-value but a transactor, a position that enables her to refuse Actons gifts:
 
“
See, I spurn his gold; / My honour never shall for gain be sold” (9.53-4).  
Acton laments that he cannot “woo her with gifts” since she refuses them (62-





/ As shall o’ercome her hate and conquer it” (66-7). The “kindness”  
Acton plans to “fasten” on Susan links this plot to Johns liberal “judgment.”
 Combined with Actons assertion that “In her I’ll bury my hate of him” (72),
 Actons new plan to secure Susans indebtedness by using Charles illustrates
 that Charles serves as a medium to solidify the relationship between Susan and
 Acton as much 
as
 Susan serves to eradicate the antagonism between the two  
men.34
We can also understand the obsession with female chastity, then, as a
 
defense against how, in some contexts, a womans desirability for heterosexual
 men can incite efforts to bribe her with gifts, not just use her as a semi-com
­modified gift; heterosexual male desire becomes a problem because it encour
­ages the use of corrupt gifts and turns women not only into sullied objects of
 exchange but into potentially corrupted transactors.35




wrested courtesy” (14.121), suddenly relents, recognizing  
that his former desire for revenge cannot be weighed against the debt of grati




Was ever known in any former age
Such honorable wrested courtesy?
Lands, honors, lives, and all the world forgo
Rather than stand engaged to such a foe.
(14.118,120-3)
Despite his former efforts to bribe and exact revenge, Acton is finally forcibly
 
converted to the gift ethic. Although he offers marriage almost as unexpected
­ly as Duke Vincentio, Acton does so as part of a competitive display of liberal-
76
Journal X, Vol. 5 [2020], No. 1, Art. 14
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14
72 Journal x
ity and gratitude between himself and the Mountfords. Unlike the duke, who
 
had to emend his proposal from a command to a generous offer, Acton has
 quickly internalized the ethic of
 
the gift. Acton’s proposal comes as both an  
acceptance Your metamorphised foe receives your
 
gift /  In satisfaction of all  





 Angelo refuses Isabella’s prayers, which she calls a “bribe” (2.2.150)  
whose value is above the 
"
fond " rate (154) of the market, the “metamorphised  
foe Acton receives Charles's gift.” Both sisters are spared from yielding up
 their chastity. Rather than the bed trick substitutions and pretense of liberali
­ty that spare Isabella from Angelo in Measure for Measure, Susan is spared by
 the tortured ethos of the gift operating in the play, an ethos strained almost to
 the breaking
 
point by the  logic of contractual, calculated debts, and  by the mal ­
leable status of Susan
'
s chastity as it slides between gift, commodity, and cur ­
rency. In its very insistence on refusing commodity exchange, the subplot
 enacts the collapse of the imaginative economies of gift and commodity. The
 language of calculated debts commingles with that of debts of honor which are
 beyond calculation. I therefore disagree
 
with Nancy Gutierrez when she argues  
that Susan’s use 
as
 repayment makes “all too explicit the patriarchy’s attitude  
that a woman’s chastity, in spite of the idealized descriptions of its value as a
 sign of worthiness and character, is a mere commodity, to be bought and sold
 at male discretion” (280). Despite its centrality in “burying” the antagonism
 between Acton and Charles, the status of Susan’s chastity is far too unstable to
 be conceived 
as
 a “mere commodity.” Seeing it as such discounts the way in  
which Susan, refusing Acton’s bribes, acts as a willful non-transactor, not an
 object of exchange. Moreover, as we have seen, the inability of a husband to
 buy, sell, or give his wife’s chastity at his discretion drives the main plot of the
 play. In fact, the way in which Susan’s chastity can be maneuvered in the sub
­plot — the way it combines use and exchange value — brings into relief how
 brittle the means for determining the value of a wife’s chastity is. Although the
 language and logic at work most centrally in the subplot once Acton is “meta
­morphised” figures Susan as a gift, the movement back to alliance has been
 enabled by the figurative malleability and maneuverability of her maiden




volatility of Susan’s status in Woman Killed belies Gutierrez’s assertion that  
“Lévi-Strauss’s thesis that the exchange of woman is the basis of culture is
 applicable to early modern England” (272). In addition to discounting the
 complexity of Susan’s representation, the claim that Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm is
 “applicable to early modern England” assumes that
 
kinship is the  primary orga ­
nizational structure of this culture, since, 
as
 Rubin points out, the exchange of  
women functions 
as
 the basis of the social order in those cultures based pri ­
marily on kinship as an organizational structure, in the absence of other gov
­erning institutions, such as the law or the state. England in the sixteenth and
 early seventeenth centuries was not devoid of other governing institutions;
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moreover, several historians object to grounding social analysis, including
 
analysis of the construction of gender, in kinship. Joan Scott, for example,
 argues that
 
historical analysis must aim to discover  the struggle that leads to the  
“appearance of timeless permanence in binary gender representation” (43).
 Scott critiques scholarship that focuses exclusively, or even primarily, on kinship
 as the domain where gender is constructed for helping to efface such struggle:
Some scholars, notably anthropologists, have restricted the use of gender to
 
the kinship system (focusing on household and family as the basis for social
 organization). We need a broader view that includes not only kinship but
 also . . . the labor market (a sex-segregated labor market is a part of the
 process of gender construction), education (all-male, single-sex, or coedu
­cational institutions are part of the same process), and the polity (universal
 male suffrage is part of the process of gender construction). . . . Gender 
is constructed through kinship, but not exclusively; it is constructed as well in
 the economy and the polity, which, in our society at least, now operate
 largely independently of kinship.
(43-4)36
Although he does not claim that kinship bears no relation to other institutions
 
or organizations, Keith Wrightson argues convincingly against the view that
 kinship is the basic organizational unit of the local community
 
in early modern  
England. He points to great variation in who was recognized as kin, illustrat
­ing how “kinship shaded into friendship in its practical importance. It was one
 of many social bonds, rather than a dominant principle in the social structure,
 one of many foundations on which the individual might build up a network of
 social contacts” (50).
A wholesale importation of the exchange-of-women concept into England
 
in our period introduces the potential for making inaccurate generalizations.
 Regarding marriage and inheritance practices, it only applies to those with
 property (and even among those with property, not just fathers and potential
 suitors “bargain”),37 it fails to consider the legal and social status of widows, and
 many historians question the prevalence of arranged, enforced marriage even
 among the propertied.38 The uncritical
 
use of the exchange-of-women concept  
also has the potential of
 
effacing the extent to which women were transactors  
themselves — at market, in the household, at birthings and christenings, 
as patrons, as providers of charity, 
as
 audiences at the theater39 — in addition to  
conveyors of their own vows and bodies. Susan and Isabella are situated as
 transactors as much as they
 
function as gifts or money. Although she functions  
partially as a gift between Charles and Acton, Susan, in her very refusal to
 transact with Acton, is a potential transactor. Using the concept uncritically
 not only ignores women s potential 
as
 transactors but also can efface the extent  
to which women could and did resist their positioning 
as
 objects of exchange.
The uncritical application of the traffic-in-women paradigm needs modifi
­cation not only when one thinks of it as a literal structure organizing the social
 formation; for early modern England, it needs careful refinement if used 
as
 a 
figurative construct or even as a governing fiction. To assert that women are
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objects of exchange ignores the fact that there is more than one kind of object
 
of exchange, and that there 
is
 more than one system of exchange by which  
objects circulate. One cannot assert that
 
women function like commodities, or  
that women’s sexuality 
is
 a commodity, without considering the distinctions  
between commodities and gifts. Strictly speaking, a commodity is alienable;
 that is, although it 
is
 a possession, it is distinct from its owner. As Marx says  
at the opening of Capital: “A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside
 us” (43), and hence it is transferable to others. Though owned by, or proper to,
 an individual or group, a commodity is transferable to others through sale or
 barter. Once a marriage “transaction” takes place, thinking literally, a woman
 no longer has exchange-value; she is no longer transferable, at least according
 to dominant, normative ideologies of marriage. As husband and wife become
 “one flesh,” the maid/commodity is no longer an “object outside” her husband.
 As the Frankford-Wendoll plot painstakingly unravels, a married woman is
 “out of circulation,” and a married man cannot become one with both his wife
 and his beloved friend. Also strictly speaking, the exchange-value of a com
­modity is calculable according
 
to the going  rate. The value of a woman’s chasti ­
ty, at least in the ideal construction of
 
it, exceeds calculation, is priceless, and  
hence is positioned conceptually in the gift economy. Unlike the exchange of
 commodities, as Nancy Hartsock notes, the exchange of women
transforms all
 
participants in the transaction. The buyer or seller of a com ­
modity remains buyer or seller after the purchase/sale, but after a woman is
 exchanged, those who were strangers are now affines, and the woman her
­self
 
becomes part of another lineage, a married woman, an adult. Every  
participant occupies a different place afterward.
(275)40
This social transformation of both transactors and transacted approximates the
 
effects of gift exchange that forges ongoing affiliations between transactors.
But however much the exchange of women approximates the exchange of
 
gifts, and despite the effort to position women’s chastity in the gift sphere, the
 gift of chastity is one that cannot really
 
be given. Rather, it is moré often seen  
as potentially lost or violated. Chastity is a woman’s virtue, but once she is mar ­
ried it is not hers to give. Rights of sexual access belong to a husband, but his
 wife’s chastity is not a
 
gift which he can bestow on others either. A woman can  
lose her chastity
 
or give it up — for money, to save her  brother’s life or honor —  
but she exchanges the loss of it for this other thing. She is forced to weigh the
 negative value of its loss against the value of what she is losing it for. More
­over, if desired sexually, women’s chaste bodies do not, like gifts, function as the
 “mere badge” of transactors’ goodwill. In the idealist gift scheme, the locus of
 value 
is
 not in the “matter of the benefit,” but things need to be exchanged in  
order to manifest or betoken the “benefit itself.” This need for a transaction
 event in order to express idealized ties between men becomes a problem when
 one or both of the exchange partners has desire for the material object itself.
 The best intentions of a giver cannot control the power of the matter of the
 benefit to engage the affective or erotic energies of
 
the recipient. This is yet  
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another way in which the gift relation cannot be utterly separated from the
 
commodity relation. The gift, as a thing, is in principle the “badge” or token of
 some other good, not valued or even desired in its own right. Once they are
 valued/desired in their own right (as objects or things or even as persons)
 women cannot be used 
as
 gifts between men. Once the transactors’ erotic or  
affective energies are engaged, woman-as-object-of-exchange slips into a dif
­ferent register.
Deliberately or not, the drama that centers on questions of female chastity
 
and marriage exposes how
 
a sharp distinction cannot be drawn between gift and  
commodity exchange. In the plays, marriage is seen to incorporate elements of
 both forms of exchange, disrupting other social bonds and itself being disrupt
­ed by them. The ethic of the gift, markedly absent in Measure for Measure, has
 to be manufactured by the duke in order to keep female chastity in controlled
 circulation. In A Woman Killed with Kindness this ethic, and the power of con
­science that underlies it, 
is
 pushed almost to the breaking point. The plays are  
problems because they expose the contradictions that arise when one tries to
 distinguish sharply between exchange motivated by the desire for personal or
 social bonds, enforceable only by trust, and that motivated by the individual’s
 desire for profit, enforceable only by legal coercion. By
 
offering plots and char ­
acters who try to position women as objects of exchange, the plays expose that
 such a sharp distinction between gift relations and commodity relations cannot
 be drawn; in the process, they show how
 
female sexuality exceeds the means for  
establishing value in either system of exchange. However central to the main
­tenance of the dominant social order, female chastity confounds the economic




In “Constructing Female Sexuality in the Renaissance,” Neely aptly  
articulates the reasons for the period’s concern with female chastity:
Female sexuality 
is
 at the center of Renaissance definitions of female gen ­
der roles. The source of women’s power, it demands their subordination.
 Female sexuality 
is
 necessary for men to satisfy their desires and to fulfill  
their
 
gender  role requirements appropriately.... But  it is potentially uncon ­
trollable or unobtainable; it reminds men that they are all vulnerable moth
­er’s sons, that all children are potentially illegitimate. . . . The reiterated
 admonitions in the prescriptive literature that women should be chaste,
 modest, silent, and obedient are directed to a single end. Modesty, silence,
 and obedience all ensure chastity.
(212-3)
See also the discussions of the cultural and dramatic discourses of female sexu
­
ality in Breitenberg, Carroll, and DiGangi.
2.
 
I have benefited from Carroll’s attention to the importance of negation  
in Shakespeare’s representation of virginity. Rose explores how in Hamlet and
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Measure for Measure “femininity” functions as excess that is beyond interpretive
 
schema and beyond representation (114). We will see in A Woman Killed With
 Kindness and Measure
 
for Measure how female sexuality, especially a wife’s  
chastity, exceeds the means for determining value of both gift and commodity
 exchange. In “The Cultural Biography of Things,” Kopytoff explains the
 notion of the “singular” or “sacralized” versus the “common,” notions that pro
­vide 
a
 way to understand some of  the confusions surrounding female chastity  
and the need to complicate the “exchange of women” concept that I have been
 stressing here. He asserts: “To be saleable for money or to be exchangeable for
 a wide array of other things 
is
 to have something in common  with a large num ­
ber of exchangeable things that, taken together, partake of a single universe of
 comparable values. . . . [T]o be saleable or widely exchangeable is common —
 the opposite of being incomparable, singular, unique, and therefore not
 exchangeable for anything else” (69). Although Kopytoff argues that these are
 “ideal polar types” that no “real economic system could conform to either” (69-
 70), he suggests, following Durkheim, that “societies need to set apart a certain
 portion of their environment, marking it 
as
 ‘sacred,’” and that “singularizaron  
is one means to this end” (73). Singularized, sacralized, female chastity is con
­structed again and again in the sphere of the gift; but it serves as a gift that has
 “terminal” exchange status — once given, it can’t be exchanged again. Women
 have relatively greater “commodity candidacy,” mainly in the marriage transac
­tion, but female chastity, which defines women’s marriageability, is constructed
 partially as a gift. The repeated efforts to mark their chastity as a prime value,
 one that cannot be priced, shows a defensive effort to sacralize their sexuality,
 to singularize it so that it is not exchangeable for counterpart values. We will
 see how the duke’s machinations and the bed trick in Measure for Measure, and
 the “honorable wrested courtesy” of the Mountfords, belie this effort.
3.
 
See Neely’s Broken Nuptials (58-64) for a history of the term “problem  
plays.” On Measure in particular, see 92-102. On the critical history of A
 Woman Killed with Kindness, see Baines’s Thomas Heywood (79-103), Spacks,
 Bromley, and the introduction in Scobie’s edition. It is interesting to me that
 much of the negative evaluation of Heywood’s drama lambasts him for pander
­ing to commercial tastes; he is attacked for being “a purveyor of this kind of




The first three books of De Beneficiis were translated by Nicholas Hay ­
ward, The Line
 
ofLiberalitie Dulie Directinge the Wei Bestowing of  Benefits (1569;  
STC 12939). Seneca’s work was also translated by Thomas Lodge, the author
 of An
 
Alarum  Against Usurers, a cautionary tale of one young man’s victimiza ­
tion by a usurer and his agent. Lodge’s first translation of De Beneficiis appears
 with a translation of
 
all of Seneca’s prose works in 1613, enlarged in a second  
edition in 1620 (STC 22213, 22214).
5.
 
See Cowie for a discussion of how Lévi-Strauss’s exchange of women  
concept presupposes what it aims to explain, positing the “value” of woman
 prior to culture. Hartsock’s critique of Rubin (293-303) is a wonderfully lucid
 theoretical account of how Rubin replicates the problems in Lévi-Strauss. Also
 see Henrietta Moore, especially 60-2, on the debate over the exchange of
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between discussing women's access to property and seeing them  
as a kind of property. This conceptual issue is explored in Strathern. The dif
­ference between women as autonomous subjects and as objects in Renaissance
 ideologies of marriage is addressed by Belsey.
6.
 
See my “Peopling, Profiting and Pleasure in The Tempest” for a reading  




See The Lawes Resolution of Womens Rights, 41-7, on dower and jointure,  
the exchanges of property that accompany marriage.
8.
 
Swinburne was a leading ecclesiastical lawyer whose work on testaments  
and spousals remained standard references for over a century. Of Spousals was
 published posthumously. For a discussion of Swinburne and the relation
 between common and civil law, see Palliser 359. See Ingram 125-67 for a full
 discussion of the legal jurisdiction over marriage. On the difficulties encoun
­tered because of competing conceptions of what constituted matrimony, see
 Cook, chapter 8. Hayne offers an excellent discussion of how Measure
 
for Mea ­
sure intervenes in the debates about the social practices and legalities of
 betrothal and marriage 
as
 well as helpful summary of critical commentary on  
these issues in the play.
9.
 
By de-emphasizing the importance of consummation, Swinburne  
departs from The Lawes Resolution of Womens Rights, in which consummation 
is more central. See Book II, section xxi and Book III, section i.
10.
 
As Wheeler points out, despite his expression of contempt for Pom ­
pey’s profession (3.2.20-8), the duke approaches it himself (121-2). He argues
 that the duke nonetheless 
is
 exalted over Angelo by play’s end. The exaltation  
of the duke takes the form of his liberality; because the play exposes the machi
­nations and reliance on degraded forms of exchange entailed in staging the
 duke’s liberality, I disagree with Wheeler’s reading of him as the “unacknowl
­edged victim” of the comic design. In her focus on the duke as a theatricalist
 who arouses the conscience of his spectators, Diehl offers a more salutary view
 of him than my reading allows for. Diehl acknowledges, however, that the duke
 figures 
as
 an “imperfect playwright” who can be understood in terms of Calvin ­
ist notions of depravity.
11.
 
McFeely argues that the play registers Shakespeare’s respect for monas ­
ticism, and for Isabella’s efforts to keep her chastity out of circulation by enter
­ing the convent. She points to the convent as a locus of hospitality (203), one
 of the period’s most salient forms of gift exchange, 
as




Sundelson argues that the duke earns Isabella’s perpetual gratitude by  
defining a hierarchy — patron and debtor — in his marriage offer (88). Also
 see Baines, “Assaying the Power of Chastity” on how the duke’s marriage offer
 exploits the pretense of liberality.
13.
 
Dollimore discusses sexual offense as a seeming threat to authority that  
in fact legitimates it.
14.
 
Pompey’s sensitivity to the relation between the law against fornication  
and the “laws“ of supply, demand, and market value is like that of Launcelot in
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The Merchant of Venice when he jests that the conversion of Jews will raise the
 
price of pork:
We were Christians enough before, e’en as many as could well live one by
 
another. This making of Christians will raise the price of hogs. If we grow





Shell makes a similar point (98-9). Watson explores the implications  
of the play’s pervasive coining imagery as well (137-8).
16.
 
See Leonard and Kott. Also see Shell, especially chapters four and five,  
on the function of exchange in the play. On the role of human bodies as fun
­gible coins in the play’s vision of state-sponsored procreative love, see Watson,
 135-6. Diehl examines the pattern of substitutions in the play in terms of








Elbow, the "poor Duke’s constable” who "lean[s] upon justice” (2.1.47-  
9), embodies the ineffectiveness of formal legal regulation of sexuality and mar
­riage contracts. His malaprop-filled accusations against Froth and Pompey
 point to the blurring of licit and illicit sexuality, and to the inability of the law
 to interrogate sexual intentions. Although he is the only legally married man
 in the play, his wife is "done” (2.1.118,140,142) in Mistress Overdone’s broth
­el, or so the cryptic scene suggests. Pompey punningly hints that it is Elbow’s
 wife’s own pregnancy-induced "longing” that brings her into the brothel (89-
 90). Arguing that chastity 
is
 a political principle because it is the principle of  
the integrity of the family, itself a political unit, Jaffa comments that Elbow 
is ironically the play’s only "family man” (182-4).
19.
 
Parolles’s arguments for forsaking virginity are echoed by Lucilla’s  
father Ferardo, early in Euphues when he tries to control her sexuality by con
­vincing her to marry:
This grieveth me most, that thou art almost
 
vowed to the vain order of the  
vestal virgins. ... If thy mother had been of that mind when she was a
 maiden, thou hadst not now been born to be of
 
this mind to be a virgin.  
Weigh with thyself what slender profit they bring to the commonwealth,
 what slight pleasure to themselves, what great grief to their parents. . . .
 Therefore, Lucilla, if thou have any care to be a comfort to my hoary hairs
 or a commodity to thy commonweal, frame thyself to that honourable
 estate of matrimony,
(Lyly 71)
By abandoning her vow to remain a virgin, the argument runs, Lucilla will be a
 
"comfort” and a "commodity,” combining
 
the performance of filial duty  and ser ­
vice to the state. Interestingly, Ferardo’s argument also appeals to the satisfac
­tion of young women’s own "pleasure.”
83
Editors: Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (2000/2001): Full issue




For a discussion of how feudal property relations establish a link  
between landholding, marriage and procreation, and how this link in turn
 defines womens subordinate position and leads to efforts to control female sex
­uality, see Middleton. The violation of marital chastity could bring legal action
 in the period, although questions remain about how enforceable these laws
 were. See Fletcher and Stevenson 32-3, on the increased attention on the part
 of nonecclesiastical court justices to efforts to enforce such laws in 1600-1660.
 Also see Ingram.
21.
 
Baines thus explains why the violation of chastity in particular is the  
vice selected to reestablish law and order in Vienna. She argues that the play
 exposes that chastity 
is
 a socially and politically determined virtue, rather than  
a religious one. As Shell points out, the play focuses on fornication because its
 prohibition is the “bulwark of politics and the law itself ” (33).
22.
 
The crucial exception to this pattern comes in the second scene when  
a quarrel between the servants and “country fellows” ends with the friendly
 clasping of hands in dance. Thus, the corruption or dissolution of promise 
is class-marked; Heywood’s country folk easily overcome the antagonisms that
 impede the friendly handclasp that betokens a faithful promise.
23.
 
My efforts to use the drama to historicize the particular forms of  
exchange at work
 
in early  modern England are indebted to the theoretical work  
of Gregory and the essays by Appadurai and Kopytoff.
24.
 
The usurer is the scapegoat for the whole culture, which uses usury to  
explain the economic and social upheaval precipitated by the move toward cap
­italistic forms of production and the rise of money form. The plays with usurers
 often manipulate the contrasts and overlaps between the bond of fellowship
 and legal bonds. Cf. Shylock in The Merchant of Venice and Sir Giles Overreach
 in A New Way to Pay Old Debts.
25.
 
Bach asserts that the play “is not about the heterosexual couple in any  
way that that couple is now recognizable to us” (504). She argues that the focus
 in the critical tradition on the married couple “has obscured some the play’s
 central issues” (505), especially its exploration of homosocial relations between
 men. I am indebted to Bach’s attention to Anne and John 
as
 “enmeshed in the  
network of friendship, service and kinship relations that the play continually
 represents” (509). Gutierrez suggests that the play exposes the inadequacy of
 marriage, family, and patriarchal authority as the source of social order, and,
 with Wendoll’s disruption of the husband-wife dyad, the tension between
 
“fam ­
ily interrelationships and extra-familial bondings” (268). Christensen offers a
 convincing analysis of the tensions in the play and in the culture that follow
 from the transitional nature of household economy in the period.
26.
 
Cf. Orlin’s argument that the old code of Renaissance male friendship  
and beneficence can no longer obtain under the new domestic ethic (138,180).
 Bach’s reading of Wendoll is likewise instructive: Wendoll “endangers the
 bonds between men by identifying too closely with the source of economic
 power — Frankford — without possessing a means of allying to that power —
 without a female affine who can be traded to form an alliance” (517).
27.
 
Again we see how corrupted exchange is class-marked for Heywood.  
Wendoll says “I will return. / And I divine, however now dejected, / My worth
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and parts being by some great man praised, / At my return I may in court be
 
raised” (16.134-7). As in Lyly’s Euphues, aristocrats and courtiers are con
­structed as corrupt transactors.
28.
 
Christensen notes how Frankford dwells at length on the wasted gifts  
that he has bestowed on Anne, despite the fact that
 




See Wentworth on how the main plot of the play “domesticates” the  
fall and repentance pattern of the medieval morality. McLuskie discusses the




For a wonderful  reading of the way the play blunts and parodies its own  
didacticism, see Moisan, who argues that the play destabilizes “the fixity of the
 social order in which the husband would claim his victory” (173). His analysis
 of how the play
 
“exposes the weaknesses in the very  patriarchalist prescriptions  
it ostensibly affirms” (178) is consistent with my argument here.
31.
 
Moisan reads the relation between the main plot and subplot in terms  
compatible with my own; see 178ff.
32.
 
McLuskie points out the combination of metaphor and dramatic struc ­
ture concerning honor and the jewel of virginity at work in Heywood’s subplot
 (127). Charles Mountford’s metaphor of defloration equates commodifying the
 land with female sexual despoliation. His metaphor not only shows the inter
­dependence of gendered constructions of honor, it feminizes aristocratic
 male/family honor. This same metaphorical move 
is
 made in discussions of the  
sale of titles and honors under James I. In their efforts to impeach James’s
 favorite Buckingham, members of both houses of Parliament attacked “[t]he
 introduction of this new trade and commerce of honor” (Peck 194); they
 claimed that before Buckingham “honor was a virgin and undeflowered” (194-
 5). These metaphors of defloration — the conceptual equation of commodifi
­cation and female sexual despoliation that they enact — reveal the interrelated
 concerns over what should or should not be passed in unrestricted exchange —
 the exchange status of objects, whether land or women, and the gendered
 notions of honor that inhere in them.
33.
 
The way in which Acton’s desire for Susan disrupts his desire for  
revenge might be compared to how Volpone’s desire for Celia disrupts his
 scheme to cheat the legacy hunters who “contend in gifts, as they would seem
 in love” (Jonson 1.1.84). Like Susan, Celia is positioned as a slippery combi
­nation of gift and commodity, but it is “funnier” in Celia’s case because it is her
 husband who is doing so.
34.
 
My argument here departs from Bach’s emphasis on the centrality of  
homosocial bonds in the play.
35.
 
Swinburne betrays discomfort over how gifts can be used both to solid ­
ify a spousal and as “bait” (210) or a means of seduction (209). He both ideal
­izes the exchange of the ring 
as
 a symbol of the matrimonial bond (207-8) and  




Scott is to some extent mistaken in her critique since, for anthropolo ­
gists, kinship does not simply refer to “household and family,” as she implies
 here.
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See Cook, chapter five, especially 105-9. Greene and Kahn address the  
need to consider women 
as
 matchmakers and bearers of wealth (10-12).
38.
 
See, for example, Wrightson and Ingram
39.
 
See Cahn’s Industry of Devotion and Chaytor and Lewis’s introduction  
to Clark for a discussion of the changing relation of women and the “domestic
 economy” to the market in this period. See Heal on birth celebrations as an
 “essentially female ritual” (81) and on women’s use of the household as a “sphere
 of social action through generosity” (178-83). Harris discusses elite women as
 politically influential patrons and gift-givers. Willen discusses ordinary
 women’s varying roles as dispensers of charity in
 
poverty relief programs. Argu ­
ing that women’s work in this area shows the inapplicability of our definitions
 of public and private (197), she reveals how women “routinely worked in the
 public marketplace to sustain their
 
households; when employed by civic author ­
ities to perform social welfare services, they served a public function, extending
 welfare services to the general population” (198). See also Howard. Gurr pre
­sents good evidence of women as playgoers.
40.
 
My formulation, here and throughout, of how women function vari ­
ously 
as
 gifts, commodities, and non-gifts and non-commodities — and of the  
important differences between materialist and idealist conceptions of value —
 is greatly indebted to Hartsock’s critique of Lévi-Strauss and of Rubin’s use of
 Lévi-Strauss’s kinship theory in “The Traffic in Women.” For research assis
­tance on this 
essay,
 I would like to thank John Crossley.
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In a
 
late poem called  “The Planet on the Table,” Wal ­
lace Stevens observes that a book of verse lying on 
a table top is simultaneously both a part of the world
 and a world unto itself. For Stevens, the book can be
 compared to a planet — an independent system with
 its own gravity, atmosphere, orbital, etcetera — only
 if the poems within
should bear
Some lineament or character,
Some affluence, if only half-perceived,
 
In the poverty of their words,
 Of the planet of which they were part.
 (Collected Poetry and Prose 450; emphasis added)
With a slight modulation of their subject clause,
 
Stevens’ lines also describe the challenge facing con
­temporary poets: that their work should bear some
 lineament or character, some affluence, if only half
­perceived, in the poverty of their words, of the plan
­et of which they are part. This problematic has been
 discussed under
 
various critical rubrics in our univer ­
sities, most recently within the debates surrounding
 the question of authenticity in contemporary Eng
­lish-language writing. Authenticity, seen through
 the prism of Stevens’ “Planet on the Table,” can be
 read 
as
 the test of a poem’s worldliness, the text’s  
 commitment to its own point of origin. Poets as dif
­ferent in style 
as
 C. D. Wright and Derek Walcott  
have conducted vigorous and prolonged researches
 into new methods of establishing this kind of
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“authentic” relation between poem and place of origin; and perhaps no living
 
poet has negotiated this problem under so much critical scrutiny as Seamus
 Heaney. In this essay I will discuss the various strategies employed by Heaney
 in the construction and assertion of a place for his poetry in the world; these
 strategies range from a deep exploration of the relation between poesis and labor
 to a phenomenological account of the tactile sense, ending with the poet’s
 ongoing investigation into the play between frames of reference and “centrali-
 ty-
Heaney’s verse often approaches the problem of poetry’s place by con
­
structing a sense of physical place within the poem itself. We see this in lyrics
 such 
as
 Anahorish and Broagh,” poems whose titles correspond to place-  
names in the Irish countryside. This poetic act locates the lyric on the most
 basic level, that of geography. In his discussion of “Broagh,” Neil Corcoran has
 commented on the way
 
topography and typography enter into an almost chias-  
tic relation within the space of the poem:
both place and place-name are being very self-consciously translated out of
 
actual topography into what we might call the topography of the poem, or
 the place of the text, by the way it foregrounds that “black O,” the word
 “Broagh” itself, and the last “gh” by distinguishing them in italic font. The
 original place is, we might say, visibly displacing itself into the place of
 writing.
(48)
Beyond the microscopic level of typography, Heaney often constructs his poet
­
ic tableaux on the spatial or phenomenological level, as in the anaphoric open
­ing stanza of “Field Work”: “ Where the sally tree went pale in every breeze, /
 where the perfect eye of the nesting blackbird watched, / where one fern was
 always green” (Selected Poems 121; emphasis added) or the deftly situated musi
­cian of “The Singer’s House”:
who might stand at the end of summer
 
in the mouth of a whitewashed turf-shed,
 his shoulder to the jamb, his song
 a rowboat far out in evening.
(Selected Poems 122)
We can compare the powerfully
 
located and posed figures of Heaney’s verse to  
the rootless and unstable subject positions of John Ashbery’s figures, who seem
 perpetually thrown off-balance by questions such as, “is anything central?”
 (“The One Thing That
 
Can Save America,” [Self-Portrait 21]) in a world where  
"dark spirits and connivance / underlay the people-mover 
as
 it spirals ever high ­
er beyond the counterpane of colored wooden crows” (Flow Chart 65-6;
 emphasis added). In Heaney’s verse, individuals strongly resist the states of flux
 and dislocation represented by Ashbery’s preternatural "people-mover.” They
 assert the body’s situation within the spaces of the world.
In the following pages, I will refer to the poetic act of situating or posi
­
tioning figures within a lyric landscape as "stationing.” Stationing is the con
­
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struction of a habitable physical space within a poem, and the positioning of a
 
body within that space. I borrow the term from Keats, who writes in the mar
­gins of his copy of Paradise Lost
Milton in every instance pursues his imagination to the utmost — he is
 
“sagacious of his Quarry,” he sees Beauty on the wing, pounces upon it and
 gorges it to the producing his essential verse. .. . But in no instance 
is
 this  
sort of perseverance more exemplified than in what may be called his sta
­tioning or statu[a]ry. He is not content with simple description, he must
 station, — thus here, we not only see how the Birds “with clang despised the
 ground” but
 
we see them “under a cloud in prospect” So we see Adam “Fair  
indeed and tall— under a plantane” — and so we see Satan “disfigured— on
 the Assyrian Mount.
Here, Keats proposes that scenes in Milton are more fully spatialized than cor
­
responding scenes in other poets’ work. We see not only Adam, but the tree
 over his head as well; he is part of a landscape. The same imaginative courtesy
 is accorded to Adam’s adversary, Satan, who appears with the Assyrian Mount
 underfoot. Heaney consistently shows an imaginative affinity with Keats’s
 marginalia, as his poetry is full of references to the act of stationing and to the
 idea of the station, a concern most immediately apparent in the titles of his two
 books, Stations and Station Island. In each volume, the word “station” takes on
 a redoubled significance, adding a sense of moral and spiritual stationing to the
 Keatsian sense of the station as a physical place.
Yet at
 
its most literal  level, being “stationed” in Heaney means simply main ­
taining a contact with the earth, as exemplified by the agricultural workers of
 his earliest books, the inhumed bog
 
people of North, and the kneeling moments  
of penance in “Station Island” (Selected Poems 187). And at a metaphorical and
 mythic level, the ideal of gravitas, Heaney’s double invocation of the Antaeus
 myth in North, and the lover’s dream of sleeping “in a moss in Donegal / On
 turf banks under blankets” (“Glanmore Sonnets,” Selected Poems 133) all gesture
 downwards, to the point of contact between our bodies and the earth. Several
 critics have commented upon Heaney’s penchant for constructing lyric spaces
 that are stationed firmly on the ground.2 In his reading of “Bogland,” Harold
 Bloom attributes Heaney’s earthbound stance to the poet’s visionary skepticism
 (2); Henry Hart outlines Heaney’s terrestrial grounding in the agricultural-pas
­toral tradition (9-31); and Sidney Burris goes on to elaborate the relation
 between the pastoral earth and Heaney’s democratizing insistence upon parity
 (as opposed to the hieratic and hierarchizing) in the fourth chapter of The Poet
­ry of Resistance (91-117). Each critical impulse arises from Heaney’s self
­restriction along the vertical spatial axis; readers of this poet are rarely propelled
 skyward or cast precipitously into the depths, as in a poem such as Shelley’s
 “Ode to the West Wind.”
But this poet limits his imaginative spaces along a horizontal axis as well.
 
We often find that our perceptual range is limited to the middle distance at best
 in Heaney’s verse, an effect he attributes to the topographical variations of his
 native landscape in a poem such as “Bogland”: “We have no prairies / To slice
94
Journal X, Vol. 5 [2020], No. 1, Art. 14
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14
90 Journal x




 22). The lack of a Great Plains region in Ireland is, how ­
ever, only one reason for this spatial contraction in Heaney, the limits of the
 human body also delimit and demarcate the poet’s constructions of space.
 Heaney prefers enclosed spaces that seem molded to the shape of the individual’s
 form, no broader than one’s armspan, not much higher than one’s head. This
 preference for the cloistered and snug
 
manifests in Heaney’s striking  impulse to  
station himself in trees, an impulse probed in the disguised sonnet, “Oracle”:
Hide in the hollow trunk
of the willow tree
 
small mouth and ear
in a woody cleft,
 
lobe and larynx
 of the mossy places.
(Selected Poems 34)
We watch Heaney indulge this affinity for the space of the tree-bole repeated
­
ly in his Sweeney Astray translation, and again in the revisited, modernized
 Sweeney of “In the Beech”: “the tree itself a strangeness and a comfort . . . /
 My hidebound boundary tree. My
 
tree of knowledge. / My thick-tapped, soft-  
fledged, airy listening post” (Selected Poems 213). There is a nearly encomiastic
 attitude toward the space of the beech trunk in these lines; the tree as a listen
­ing post, as enclosed lobe and larynx, figures as one of the primary stations of
 poetic composition in Heaney’s verse.
It is worth noting that poetry is almost never generated out in the open in
 
Heaney, as it is in Wordsworths Prelude — “I, methought, while the sweet
 breath of Heaven /
 
Was blowing upon my  body, felt within / A corresponding,  
mild, creative breeze” (Selected Poetry and 
Prose
 198) — or in Whitman’s “Song  
of the Open Road.” Heaney’s poetry is the product of concealed and hidden
 areas, spaces fitted to the poet’s body as the womb is to a gestating fetal form.
 Even the architectural space of the study or den, the literal site of writing, car
­ries this womb-like aspect:
I liked it low and closed,
Its claustrophobic, nest-up-in-the-roof
Effect. I liked the snuff-dry feeling,
The perfect, trunk-fid fit of the old ceiling.
Under there, it was all hutch and hatch.
The blue slates kept the heat like midnight thatch.
(“Skylight Sonnet,” Seeing Things 37)
Though the sonnet goes on to endorse the speaker’s wife’s decision to break
 
open this cloistered space through the introduction of a skylight, the final six
 lines fail to undo this passage’s initial, emphatic praise of the den’s contracted
 area. The den, along with the tree-cleft, is an enclosed space of poetic compo
­
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sition. Like Matisse, Heaney often takes up the site of artistic production (the
 
painter’s studio for the former, the writing den for the latter) as a subject for
 representation. This is the most dramatic and direct strategy possible for
 demarcating an independent, hermetic space for the aesthetic. Early into the
 "Squarings” section of Seeing Things, Heaney thematizes the process of con
­structing a studio space in a lyric that borders on the metaliterary:
Roof it again. Batten down. Dig in.
Drink out of tin. Know the scullery cold,
 
A latch, a door-bar, forged tongs and a grate.
Touch the cross-beam, drive iron in a wall,
Hang a line to verify the plumb
From lintel, coping-stone and chimney-breast.
Relocate the bedrock in the threshold.
Take squarings from the recessed gable pane.
Make your study the unregarded
 
floor
Sink every impulse like a bolt. Secure
 
The bastion of sensation. Do not waver
 Into language. Do not waver in it.
("Lightenings II,” Seeing Things 56; emphasis added)
There is an almost Brechtian exposure of the processes and machinery of how
 
a space is constructed here. The curt, end-stopped sentences, the imperative
 voice, and the insistent materiality of the poem ("Do not
 
waver into language”)  
all tend to efface its status as a "lyric” in the hieratic, spiritualized sense of the
 word; this is a poem that reads like an instruction manual. Helen Vendler reads
 the "Squarings” series as partaking of an "effort of re-imagining everything —
 not representing it numerically as it happened; not representing it embalmed in
 memory; but representing it on an abstract and symbolic plane that presents
 itself 
as
 such” (151); and here, that abstract and symbolic space looks much like  
the actual space of a writer’s study, a poet’s station. The space in "Lightenings
 II”
 is
 wholly enclosed and centered on the composition of poetry; its walls block  
out both the natural world and social life; like a small fortress, the stanzas
 (momentarily) protect and secure a place for poetry.
But spatial constructions can only provide a temporary and provisional
 
grounding for poesis for a poet dwelling in the social world. Under the pres
­sures of shared
 
life, the basic act of physical stationing must develop into a more  
thorough act of location; the poet must establish a place for the lyric within the
 registers of social discourse. To do so, poets (and especially ones from North
­ern Ireland) must enter into a dialogue with other participants in culture and
 political life. Heaney takes up this problem at the very outset of his first
 Oxford lecture, entitled "The Redress of Poetry”: "Professors of poetry, apolo
­gists for it, practitioners of it, from Sir Philip Sidney to Wallace Stevens, all
 sooner or later are tempted to show how poetry’s existence as a form of art
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relates to our existence as citizens of society
 
— how it is of  present use" (Redress  
1; emphasis added). The question of use hangs over the history of poetic dis
­course from its beginnings. To secure a position within the social world,
 Heaney feels the poet must answer his or her fellow-citizens’ question: "Why
 do we need you?” This question of need is further complicated for Heaney by
 his family’s agricultural background and by the situation of agricultural prac
­tices within the political history of Northern Ireland; Daniel Tobin has point
­ed out how the problems of need (specifically, hunger) and colonial politics
 intersect in Heaney’s early literary consciousness at the historical topos of the
 Great Famine (34).
Another poet might respond to this problem by enlarging the convention
­
al definition of "need” to include nonphysical aspects of experience, such as
 spiritual or emotional need. But to answer the question on its own terms,
 Heaney finds it necessary to address questions of need on the most basic, phys
­ical level at the outset of his career. This encounter between poetry and the
 question of survival takes place at the scene of labor in Heaney’s work. Seen in
 terms of utility and pragmatism, the act of writing poetry stands in an almost
 adversarial relation to the act of physical labor in society; labor 
is
 as "necessary”  
to the clothing, feeding, and sheltering of human beings as poetry is "unneces
­sary.” Labor seems "this-worldly,” just as poetry can seem "otherworldly.” So
 the poet and the laborer, like the scientist and the priest, comprise a linked yet
 irreconcilable pair. Poets (and laborers) have known this for a
 
long time. Yeats,  
for instance, writes:
Better go down upon your marrow-bones
And scrub a kitchen pavement, or break stones
Like an old pauper, in all kinds of weather;
For to articulate sweet sounds together
Is to work harder than all these, and yet
Be thought an idler by the noisy set
  Of bankers, schoolmasters, and clergymen
The martyrs call the world.
("Adam’s Curse,” Poems 132; emphasis added)




Yeats makes a case (through apposition) for the work ­
like aspect of writing poetry. This is one strategy for assigning use-value to
 poetic discourse: the poet analogizes writing and work.3 Yet David Lloyd
 argues that Heaney subscribes to a false model of continuity between literary
 and physical labor:
the predicament of a literary culture as a specialized mode of labor is that
 
it is set over against non-cultural labor, yet Heaney’s writing continually
 rests in the untested assumption that a return is possible through writing
 back to the "illiterate” culture from which it stems and with which, most
 importantly, it remains at all times continuous.
(165)
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The same could be said (incorrectly, to my mind) of “Adam’s Curse.” Yeats’s
 
modeling of literary activity 
as
 “continuous” with physical labor (which we see  
again in the divine colt who shivers “under the lash, strain, sweat and jolt / As
 though it dragged road metal” in “The Fascination of What’s Difficult” [Poems
 188]) is only one way in which work enters into the aesthetic field. If writing
 can be compared to dragging road metal or breaking stones, then manual
 
work  
can also acquire the traits of poetry; that is, labor can be claimed, reified, and
 brought within the space of the lyric. In the next few pages I will try to show
 how Heaney gradually develops a model of labor within the lyric that demon
­strates the phenomenological continuity between what Lloyd characterizes as
 “cultural” and “non-cultural” modes of work.
The poeticization of labor dates back at least to Virgil’s georgics and Latin
 
verse, and to Hesiod and Homer in Greek poetry. In the wake of the eigh
­teenth-century revival of the didactic georgic within English literature, the
 Romantic poets turned their attention to the representation of labor as its own
 aesthetic telos. Wordsworth repeatedly poeticizes the acts of shepherding, reap
­ing, and husbandry throughout his work, as in the description of the shepherd
 Michael’s wife: “two wheels she had / Of antique form; this large, for spinning
 wool;
 
/ That small, for  flax; and if one wheel  had rest, /  It was because the other  
was at work” (“Michael,” Selected Poetry and Prose 142). What is the “useful”
 work accomplished by poetry in these lines? Here, the act of writing memori
­alizes the housewife’s daily acts of
 
labor; the words on the page replicate and  
preserve a practice (the spinning of wool and flax) that may disappear alto
­gether
 
from culture. Wordsworth assumes the stance of an elegist  for  rural ways  
of life; rather than competing with and degrading the act of physical work (as
 in Yeats’s verse), Wordsworth translates laborious activity into figuration and,
 by extension, into cultural memory.
The problem for this kind of approach to labor in the lyric is a technical
 
one, one of adapting the English lyric mode, with its traditional emphasis on
 the
 
worlds of love and spirituality, to the representation of vigorous work-activ ­
ity. Wordsworth, for instance, often gives the impression of simply annotating
 the fact of pastoral work without entering into a deeper phenomenological
 exploration of the laborer’s experience.4 Among contemporary poets, Heaney
 has been most consistently concerned with creating a lyric structure to accom
­modate the fact of manual work. That he begins his project in the Wordswor
­thian mode is evident in a poem like “Blackberry-Picking,” with its strong
 echoes of “Nutting”:
hunger
Sent us out with milk-cans, pea-tins, jam-pots
Where briars scratched and wet grass bleached our boots.
Round hayfields, cornfields, and potato-drills
We trekked and picked until the cans were full,
Until the tinkling bottom had been covered
With green ones, and on top big dark
 
blobs burned
Like a plate of eyes. Our hands were peppered
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The child's mock quest, the subtle violence of reaping the natural world, and an
 
unnerving sense of having been perceived by nature (in Heaney’s “plate of eyes”
 and Wordsworth’s “spirit in the woods” [“Nutting,” Selected Poetry and Prose
 107]) align the two lyrics. But Heaney’s child is moved less by the sense of
 juvenile play than by a feeling of physical need, driven by a hunger rather than
 “the eagerness of boyish hope” that motivates the young Wordsworth in the
 “Nutting” fragment. This slight modulation of desire (from boyish hope to
 physical hunger) within the Wordsworthian template draws Heaney’s child
 away from the demesne of play and toward the regions of work and labor that
 will prevail in the poet’s subsequent collections. If hunger is political within the
 context of rural Ireland’s colonial history, this representation of childhood work
 takes on an aspect of political activity in Heaney’s verse.
“Churning Day,” the poem that directly follows “Blackberry-Picking,” is
 
one of Heaney’s earliest attempts at bringing the experience of labor over into
 the field of the lyric. The poet’s strategy here is adjectival:
A thick crust, coarse-grained as limestone rough-cast,
 
hardened gradually on top of the four crocks
 that stood, large pottery bombs, in the small pantry.
 After the hot brewery of gland, cud, and udder
 cool porous earthenware fermented the buttermilk
 for churning day, when the hooped churn was scoured
 with plumping kettles and the busy scrubber
 echoed daintily on the seasoned wood.
It stood then, purified, on the flagged kitchen floor.
(Death of 
a
 Naturalist 21; emphasis added)
It is worth noting that most of these adjectives (thick, coarse-grained, hot, cool,
 
porous, hooped, and flagged) have a strong
 
tactile aspect. But as the poem con ­
tinues to document the work of churning, we begin to sense a growing dispar
­ity between the high tactility of
 
the language and the conspicuous absence of  
human agency in Heaney’s depiction of the churning process:
Out came the four crocks, spilled their heavy lip
 
of cream, their white insides, into the sterile churn.
 The staff, like a great whisky muddler fashioned
 in deal wood, was plunged in, the fid fitted.
My mother took first turn, set up rhythms
that slugged and thumped for hours. Arms ached.
Hands blistered. Cheeks and clothes were spattered . . .
Thirteen lines that precisely detail the churning procedure pile up before we
 
first glimpse a human being at the scene of labor. Until the mother’s appear
­ance, the churning seems to happen of its own accord through a succession of
 agentless verbs: the crust hardening, the crocks standing, and the buttermilk
 fermenting without any apparent aid from human hands. And when an
 
implied  
shadow-person does indeed step into the process, he or she is elided behind a
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conspicuous use of passive constructions: to say that the hooped churn “was
 
scoured” and the staff “was plunged” into the churn excludes more active phras-
 ings such as “I scoured the churn” and “my mother plunged the staff into it.”
 The human laborer here is invisible, like Wordsworth
'
s spinner,  whose presence  
at the site of work is detectable only through the actions of her machine: “if
 one wheel had rest, / It was because the other was at work.”
This opening passage from “Churning Day” can be aligned with a scene
 
from the Disney film Fantasia in which tools such 
as
 brooms and buckets float  
through the air as work
 
tasks complete themselves without human exertion. In  
the film, the self-propelled tools structure a fantasy of leisure and escape; but in
 Heaney’s poem, the scene of agentless labor signals an apparent breakdown in
 the representation of work. There is an emphatic refusal to station the human
 subject at the scene of labor’s performance in this text. (A negative image of
 this “breakdown” would be a poem or film in which we see a person pan
­tomiming all of the actions of butter churning in an empty, toolless room).
 This distance between the human subject and the hovering, working tools can
 be interpreted as a literal avoidance of fitting tools into the human hand at the
 scene of work in the lyric.5
Heaney approaches the topic of tools and the hand frequently in his early
 
poems, especially in Death of 
a
 Naturalist. The problem of lyric figurations of  
tool use even provides a structural frame for the initial poem in the Heaney
 canon, “Digging,” which begins and ends with the following lines:
Between my finger and thumb
The squat pen rests; snug 
as
 a gun.
Between my finger and thumb
The squat pen rests.
I’ll dig with it.
(Selected Poems 3-4)
“Digging” enacts a kind of trial-and-error experiment in the space between this
 
opening and close. The lyric first proposes a hypothetical, almost metaphysical
 conceit of “pen-as-gun” and, after working through its own logic of nostalgia
 and memory for the next six stanzas, it closes by revising or correcting the ini
­tial conceit to read “pen-as-spade.” (If the poem had followed through with its
 initial figurative hypothesis, the last line would read: “I’ll shoot with it”). First,
 pen 
is
 X; then, pen is Y. Helen Vendler reads this trope as one of moral choice:
the Irish Catholic child grew up between the offers of two instruments: the
 
spade and the gun. “Choose,” said two opposing voices from his culture.
 “Inherit the farm,” said agricultural tradition; “Take up arms,” said Repub
­lican militarism. And indeed the poet’s first thought had been to measure,
 so to speak, the pen against the sword.
(29)
However, if Heaney’s pen is poised between two moral options in this poem,
 
the field of potential uses for the pen stretches far beyond the poet’s initial
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metaphorical proposition. One could imagine “Digging” as one lyric in a
 
sequence of figurative experiments, each one picking up where the last left off,
 each one undermining and improving upon the final metaphor of its predeces
­sor; 
so
 the next poem in the sequence would open with the lines: “Between my  
finger and thumb / The squat pen rests; snug as a spade" and would end with
 the spade’s replacement by an even closer approximation to the pen: “Between
 my
 
finger and thumb / The squat pen rests. / I’ll ______with it.” This process
could be continued indefinitely, an eternal approach towards figurative accura
­cy. The sequence would only find total closure, in the unattainable line: “I’ll
 write with it,” a close that would undo the difference between metaphorical
 vehicle and tenor. For Rand Brandes, this closure is only achieved in the much
 later “Sweeney Redivivus” section of Station Island, where “[t]he pen remains 
a pen and is not transformed into the metaphoric spade” (57).
The problem here is one of fitting hand to tool and tool to verb. What 
is 
the proper metaphorical equivalent to the pen in this poem? Neither a gun nor
 a spade can “fit” between the finger and the thumb;6 likewise, it is very difficult
 to make the pen perform either of the verbs “shoot” or “dig” when it naturally
 inclines toward the infinitive “to write.” On a microscopic level, this disparity
 points toward the greater problem of making a poem “labor,” or of modeling
 poetry on work, as Yeats sometimes did. The difficulty we have with the con
­cept of writing as a form of physical labor is deeply linked in this poem to our
 imaginative discomfort at the idea of digging with a pen. We have to wait
 
until  
Wintering Out for a more “ergonomic” pairing of hand to tool in Heaney, in the
 poem “Tinder” (part five of the sequence “A Northern Hoard”):
We picked flints,
Pale and dirt-veined,
So small finger and thumb
Ached around them;
Cold beads of history and home
We fingered, a cave-mouth flame
We clicked stone on stone
That sparked a weak flame-pollen
And failed, our knuckle joints
Striking as often as the flints . . .
(Wintering Out 43)
This poem reverses the representational structures of “Churning Day” in three
 
important ways. First, the almost anaphoric opening of lines with “We
 
_____
ed” undoes the agentless, passive constructions of work in the earlier  
poem. Second, the hand at work
 
is not only  present from the start of “Tinder,”  
it is also exquisitely fitted to the objects and tools of the laboring world. The
 hand and the tool are so closely aligned here that the flints even acquire phys-
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iological characteristics of the human hand: “Pale and
 
(In
“Churning Day,” remember, the hand does not even appear until the poem is
 more than one-third over). And to say the flints are “so small finger and thumb
 / Ached around them” is to indicate an extreme sensitivity, almost a hypersen
­sitivity, of the worker’s digits to the tactile aspect of “smallness ”7
Third, the formal couplets and short lines of “Tinder” are more amenable
 
to the anatomization of action than the bulky, almost prose-like block stanzas
 of
 
“Churning Day.” This is one advantage of the lyric over prose in dealing  
with the representation of labor (or of any other variety of action). Line and
 stanza breaks permit the poet to articulate the work process as a series of dis
­crete steps separated by the white space of the page, 
as
 opposed to the tenden ­
cy of prose to make the various components of an action
 
run together. One may  
compare 
a
 “prose” description of a woman checking the heat of a clothes-iron  
to the “poetic” version from the “Old Smoothing Iron” section of Heaney’s
 poem, “Shelf Life”:
To test its heat she’d stare and spit in its iron face or hold it up next her
 
cheek to divine the stored anger.
To test its heat she’d stare
and spit in its iron face
or hold it up next her cheek
 
to divine the stored anger.
(Selected Poems 170)
The lyric allows each step in the iron-checking process to stand alone, whereas
 
the prose version generates the impression of fluidity and unitary action.
 Heaney is drawn to this kind of precisely anatomized description of labor again
 and again, from the representation of
 
the woman baking in the first canto of  
“Mossbawn” to the careful documentation of the laundry-folding process in the
 fifth Clearances sonnet. The anatomization of action in these
 
poems can only  
be formally undertaken within the textual structures, the line and stanza breaks,
 of the lyric.
So we see that before poetry can position the individual subject in relation to
 
the procedures and tools of labor, a representational scheme must be elaborat
­ed to accommodate the manual aspect of work, to introduce the tactile
 
working  
hand into the lyric, visibly to grip tools and materials in verse. Elaine Scarry
 writes that “[a]s in the literature of desire the genitals become the spoken or
 unspoken locus of orientation, so throughout the literature of creation the
 hands become the most resonant and meaning-laden part of the human anato
­my” (75).8 Likewise in the history of portraiture, the inclusion of 
a
 sitter’s  
hands in a painting denotes his or her status 
as
 a “maker,” an artificer with the  
godlike ability to create in this world. But to write of the hand is not to write
 solely of the individual engaged in the act of creation or menial
 
work; it is also  
to register the tactile life, an immediate contact between the skin and one’s sur
­roundings, and a variety of eroticism concerned with the administering rather
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with the receiving of sexual pleasure. This implies a  very different poetics  
than the conventional poetry of the eye, which registers the visual life, a sensi
­tivity to the distances and intervals between the self and its surroundings, and
 a voyeuristic sexuality predicated upon watching the body of another. Seamus
 Heaney is, in many ways, a poet of the hand — just as Shelley and Donne
 
were  
poets of the eye. Heaney
 
constantly  seeks to “stir us to responses other than the  
merely visual” (Preoccupations 133). This tactile, manual aspect of Heaney’s
 work illustrates a second important way of establishing poetry’s place in the
 world, that of figuratively laying one’s hand upon the world in verse, asserting
 its “here-ness,” and thereby confirming the poet’s position within a tactile,
 solid, immediate reality. This strategy differs from the previously discussed
 approach to the world via labor. Rather, an imaginatively full poetry of the
 hand 
is
 additionally concerned with sensuality and the philosophical implica ­
tions of
 
the tactile fife. Over the next few pages, I will examine the ways in  
which the complex figurations of the hand in Heaney outrun the simple work
­function and lay a basis for a more extensive sensory and phenomenological
 model of the individual subject’s relation to the surrounding world.
It is easy to overlook the fact that
 
the  title poems of three of Heaney’s books  
end with figurations of the poet’s hand. But if the title poem holds a place of
 major importance
 
within any book of verse, the last fine of the title poem is an  
even more highly meaning-laden
 
point  in the text. In Death  of a Naturalist, this  
moment is reserved for the hand. The title poem closes with an image of the
 poet recoiling from the awaiting tactile world of
 
touching, hefting, grasping,  
handling, and groping that will go on to figure so importantly throughout
 Heaney’s career: “I knew / That if I dipped my hand the spawn would clutch
 it” (Selected Poems
 
5). This gesture echoes the Wordsworthian child’s fear  in the  
face of nature’s atropic and morbid aspect, the young Heaney literally with
­drawing his hand from the former site of natural abundance (now festering),
 the flax-dam. This minor moment of hesitation is amplified to the point of
 imaginative crisis later on in the prose poem, “Nesting Ground”:
The sandmartins’ nests were loopholes of darkness in the riverbank. He
 
could imagine his arm going in to the armpit, sleeved and straitened, but
 because he once felt the cold prick
 
of a dead robin’s claw and  the surprising  
density of its tiny beak he only gazed.
(Selected Poems 53)




status in relation  to the primary  act of touching. The movement  
from grasping to gazing, from touch to vision, is a distancing motion, a passage
 from the
 
felt  to the regarded; and this sense of separation  from immediate expe ­
rience is doubled
 
by  Heaney’s casting of the piece in the third person instead of  
in the personalized lyric “I” that predominates throughout Stations. This,
 Heaney’s first major withdrawal of the hand, is prompted by the consciousness
 of death. The poet’s imaginative impulse to caress nesting-places, “to pry into
 roots, to finger slime” (“Personal Helicon,” Selected Poems 11), is countered by
 the fear that his fingers will find only clammy lifelessness in the riverbank’s
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recesses. But these withdrawals of the hand also thematize and signify a
 
momentary refusal to generate poetic language for the experience of touch.
 The fear of death in these two poems is refracted through the young poet’s fear
 of failing to render tactile sensory experience in verse.
Following Death of 
a
 Naturalist, North is the next Heaney collection whose  
title-poem ends with an image of hands. In this
 
volume, Heaney overcomes the  
hesitations of “Death of a Naturalist” and “Nesting Ground” to formulate lyric
 terms actively for the tactile imagination, discovering a “rough, porous / lan
­guage of touch” (“Bone Dreams,” Selected Poems 75) in the midst of a death-
 menaced, Hamletic world of bog Yoricks. In fact, the tactile impulse is so
 strong in North that Heaney devotes an entire lyric to a fantasy of touching the
 artifactual body that is, in the other bog poems, positioned beyond arm’s reach
 behind museum glass:
My hands come, touched
By sweetbriar and tangled vetch,
 




Dream of gold to the bullion
Of her Venus bone.
(“Come to the Bower,” North 31; emphasis added)
It 
is
 worthwhile to keep Heaney’s earliest tool-using, laboring poems (such as  
“Churning Day” and “Tinder”) in mind while reading this sensuous and eroti
­cized use of the poet’s hands in “Come to the Bower.” The thornpricked, blis
­tered, aching hands of the work-poems are now engaged in a caressing,
 fondling, sexualized activity. Heaney has, for the moment, discarded the geor-
 gic poetry of labor in order to outline a more comprehensive phenomenology of
 touch, one that
 
will accommodate both work and pleasure. And as this project  
unfolds throughout Heaney’s career, the poet makes progressively greater
 claims for the tactile life. We see this at the close of the volume’s title poem,




in the long foray
 but no cascade of light.
Keep your eye clear
 
as the bleb of the icicle,
 trust the feel of what nubbed treasure
 your hands have known.
(Selected Poems 70)
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The final quatrain here can be read as an implicit commentary on strategies of
 
lyric closure. If an ending is a privileged and meaning-intensive moment in any
 poem, this point of closure in “North” is reserved for the hand instead of the
 eye. It is remarkable that the eye (“Keep your eye clear / 
as
 the bleb of the ici ­
cle”) is still mentioned, though restricted to the penultimate couplet position. In
 effect, the final two couplets of the text document a sensory progression in the
 development of lyric strategies of closure, adding a new
 
tactile closure to a con ­
ventional visual ending in much the same way that a cross-section of sedimen
­tary rock displays its own history by piling a new layer atop the preexisting,
 older, but still visible foundation layer.
More specifically, “North” critiques a “visionary” strategy of closure and the
 
concomitant poetics of seeing. The
 
very word “visionary” implies a poetry built  
upon the experience of sight (Shelley would have closed this poem with “Keep
 your eye clear / as the bleb of
 
the icicle”), an epistemological experience here  
followed and surpassed by a new test of knowledge, that of the hands.9 Some
 readers of the poem continue to describe “North” as participating in a visionary
 poetics:
Insight and composition occur in the refracting, bending, changing light of
 
the aurora borealis rather than a single, directed, divine shaft of 
l
ight. But  
writing poetry whose source of inspiration is ever-changing, refracting fight
 is more challenging and less certain than writing from an inspiring single




Yet throughout “North,” there 
is
 a regular suppression of the visual field. We  
find this most explicitly stated in the line, “Compose in darkness.” A rewriting
 of the visionary mode also shapes the overall trajectory of the poem. “North”
 begins 
as
 an encounter with the environmental sublime, a scenario common  
throughout Romantic poems such as Shelley’s “Mont Blanc”:
I returned to a long strand,
 
the hammered shod of a bay,
 and found only the secular
 powers of the Atlantic thundering.
 I faced the unmagical
 invitations of Iceland,
 the pathetic colonies
 of Greenland . . .
(Selected Poems 69)
We begin facing out across the vast Atlantic, but end focused directly on the
 
palms of our hands. The overall movement here 
is
 from the panoramic and  
visual to the small and tactile. This deflationary (or contracting) progression is
 forecast from the opening by an initial disjuncture between the poem’s Roman
­tic locale and its strongly post-Romantic rhetorical mode. The seaside may be
 one of the great topoi of visionary verse in English, visited by figures ranging
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from the children who “sport upon the shore” of Wordsworth’s “Immortality
 
Ode” to Stevens’ singer at Key West;
 
but  here the shore-walker has forsaken  the  
hyperbolic accents of the seer from the start, speaking in diminutives (“and
 found only the secular”) and negative adjectives (“the unmagical”). By the
 poem’s end, this initial withdrawal from visionary rhetoric is joined by a grad
­ual perceptual movement away from the telescopic, panoramic coastal scene
 towards a final, tightly focused, immediate attention to what can be held in the
 hands.




 a skeptical movement. It claims that the true test of knowledge  
lies in the hands, in the immediacy of touch. Over 250 years earlier, Bishop
 Berkeley had made a similar case for the epistemological primacy of touch in
 his Essay Towards a
 
New Theory of Vision:
I believe whoever will look narrowly into his own thoughts and examine
 
what he means by saying he sees this or that thing at a distance, will agree
 with me, that what he sees only suggests to his understanding that after
 having passed a certain distance, to be measured by the motion of his body,
 which is perceivable by
 
touch, he shall come to perceive such and such tan ­
gible ideas which have been usually connected with such and such visible
 ideas.
(76; emphasis added)
That is, Berkeley thought that visual impressions of distant objects were deeply
 
grounded in the experience of touch, or that seeing actually entailed imagina
­tively approaching the targeted object of sight and “touching” it with one’s
 mind. This, in Berkeley’s view, is how we attribute volume and mass to a
 remote object like a mountain or a ship. Berkeley noted that we only see a two
 dimensional image of the mountain or ship at a distance, and that we must
 recall our tactile experiences to register the objects’ three-dimensionality and
 weight. At this moment, Berkeley’s skepticist account of vision proleptically
 conducts exactly the same movement we see in “North,” from the distantly
 regarded world to the immediacy of the tactile. For Heaney, this skeptical
 movement is accompanied by a phenomenological violence (from the remote to
 the bodily) reflective of a new kind of historical epiphany, described by Charles
 O’Neill in his article, “Violence and the Sacred in Heaney’s North”:
“
Violence,” Girard writes, “strikes men as an epiphany,” and this recogni ­
tion provides the poem’s epiphanic injunction as the voice of the violent
 past enjoins the modern poet to “Lie down / in the word-hoard,” and there,
 “in the coil and gleam / of your furrowed brain” (20), the poet will find the
 words and images of the past that precisely define the catastrophic present
 moment.
(95)
The bodily recognition of historical violence — impossible to accommodate
 
within a Romantic poetics of vision — completes
 
the skeptical logic of  
Heaney’s engagement with the tactile in North.
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Field Work is the last in the triad of Heaney’s books in
 
which the title poem  
ends with the hand; its eponymous poem closes with what
 
is probably the most  
enigmatic use of hands to be found anywhere in Heaney’s work. I will quote
 the final canto in full, as it displays the lyric “anatomization of action” I have
 discussed earlier in this essay:
Catpiss smell,
 
the pink bloom open:
 I press a leaf
 of the flowering currant
 on the back of your hand
 for the slow tight burn
 of its sticky juice
 to prime your skin,
 and your veins to be crossed
 criss-cross with leaf-veins.
I lick my thumb
 
and dip it in mould,
 anoint the anointed
 leaf-shape. Mould
 blooms and pigments
 the back of your hand
 like a birthmark—
 my umber one,
 you are stained, stained
 to perfection.
(Selected Poems 140)
This is nothing like the anatomized labor processes
 
we found in Death of  a Nat-  
uralist\ the poet’s hand holds no tools, and the object of
 
his operations is the  
passive hand of his beloved, not butter in a churn or blackberries waiting to be
 picked. Neither is this a poem of skeptical epistemology such as “North,”
 where the hand weighs and tests one’s knowledge of the surrounding world.
 Here we find the poet’s hand both at play and at the act of reverencing
 (“anointing”), marking his lover’s hand in an operation that seems simultane
­ously ritualized and improvisatory.




a currant leaf, pressing it against the back of his lover’s hand, and staining  
the resulting flesh-indentations with his saliva-moistened, mould-covered
 thumb. But seen in the context of his earlier work, the gesture revisits the
 stained and mouldering beauty of the reified bog
 
bodies in North; only  now, the  
poet ornaments, stains, and reifies the living hand of his beloved.10 The hand
 becomes art. It is, in fact, treated like a canvas about to undergo the processes
 of painting or lithography; the hand is “primed” (line 8) and stained, inked and
 printed upon by the currant leaf-shape in much the same way an inked wood
­cut leaves its marks on blank paper.
The line between the living and the artifactual, the organic and the reified,
 
is redrawn here just as the woman’s Vein-mapped hand is remapped by the
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superimposed leaf-veins of the currant. (We saw a similar crossing-over of
 
vein-lines in the “pale and dirt-veined” flints of “Tinder”). A symmetricality
 and interchangeability between the organic and artifactual spheres is implicit in
 Heaney’s use of chiasmus, the trope of crossing, to render this effect: “and your
 veins to be crossed / criss-cross with leaf-veins.” Rhetorical trope and visual
 image coincide here to generate a moment at which the human and the non
­human “cross” one another. In Heaney, this crossing-over occurs when the
 human subject is most strenuously and imaginatively engaged with the natural
 world, whether it
 
be in the field of labor (as in “Tinder”) or in this scene of aes ­
thetic creation.11 In each case the living, breathing human being only
 approaches the condition of artifact through sacrifice, or a temporary abandon
­ment or selfhood. The loss (or ascesis) entailed in such a crossing-over from
 the organic to the artifactual is suggested in the tone of the canto’s final three
 lines: “my umber one, / you are stained, stained / to perfection.” This closing
 reads like a classical, elegiac lament in its use of the vocative case and the
 expressive repetition of “stained,” until the
 
lament mode is finally undone by the  
last word in the poem: “perfection.”
I have already mentioned that the final canto of “Field Work” presents us
 
with a point at which the iconic hand is now self-reflexive, at play in the aes
­thetic field, liberated from the demands of basic survival. As soon 
as
 this self ­
reflexive stage in the poet’s treatment of an iconic image is reached, the icon
 begins to lose its representational, referential quality while it accrues multiplied
 associative weight. The hand begins to function 
as
 the severed head does in  
Yeats’s poetry and drama.12 (That is, it operates with diminished reference to
 our everyday bodies and with a newly accented emphasis on the symbolic.) It
 is significant that this self-reflexive, unpragmatic moment arises in a caesura
 between Heaney’s self-lacerating explorations of conscience in the preceding
 North and the subsequent Station Island. (I do not count Sweeney Astray in this
 sequence of Heaney’s lyric collections because of its special status as 
a
 pro ­
longed translation.) The moment of liberated play, when the poet “flies the
 nets” of nationality and religion, is preceded and followed by periods of moral
 and spiritual crisis. Heaney cannot avoid the demands of conscience and the
 social world for long.
When Heaney returns to the pressing topics of contemporary political and
 
social Irish life in The Haw Lantern, it is not surprising that we once again find
 the poet’s hand planted firmly upon the physical world. I have already dis
­cussed how moments of stationing in Heaney are often carried out in a highly
 embodied, “hands-on” manner. In “Terminus,” the poet conducts this hand
­placing quite literally:
Two buckets were easier carried than one.
I grew up in between.
 
My left hand placed the standard iron weight.
My right tilted a last grain in the balance.
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Heaney’s simultaneous allegiance to the industrialized, iron world of moderni
­
ty and the agricultural, wheaten
 
world of the past gives rise to this image of the  
poet’s body stationed with one hand in direct contact with an iron weight and
 the other touching a grain. The passage owes a debt to Robert Lowell’s por
­trait of himself as a child on the porch of his familial summer home: “One of
 my
 
hands was cool on a pile / of black  earth, the other warm / on a pile of lime”  
(“My Last Afternoon with Uncle Devereux Winslow,” Life Studies 31). Young
 Lowell and the older Heaney both assume stances in relation to contrasting ele
­ments of their worlds by quite simply placing one hand on each element. The
 position of the body in such a scenario is precarious, between two poles: “I
 grew up in between.” This “betweenness” is a crucial stationing method
 throughout Heaney’s mid-to-late
 
verse, as we saw  in the first two lines of “Ter ­
minus,” canto 3. And “Song,” “In the Beech,” and “The Disappearing Island”
 provide further instances of stationing through the construction of between
­ness:
A rowan like a lipsticked girl.
Between the by-road and the main road
 
Alder trees at a wet and dripping distance
 Stand off among the rushes.
(“Song,” Selected Poems 141)
On one side under me, the concrete road.
 
On the other, the bullock’s covert. . .
(“In the Beech,” Selected Poems 213)
Once we presumed to found ourselves for good
 
Between its blue hills and those sandless shores . . .
(“The Disappearing Island,” Selected Poems 261)
There is a landscape painter’s fullness of observation in these opening tableaux.
 
Focus on any one object tends also to include those objects on either side of it
 (the by-road and the main road). This notation of betweenness marks the
 moment when peripheral vision begins to rival single-minded, focused atten
­tion; and in political terms, betweenness corresponds to a mode of liberalism in
 which the accommodation of “opposing” perspectives is undertaken through
 the deliberate adoption of a medial position.
In Heaney’s more recent work, this extension of peripheral vision is taken
 
to the extreme of 365 degrees, when the poet is overwhelmed with a feeling of
 “centeredness” in a landscape:
My father’s ploughing one, two, three, four sides
Of the lea ground where I sit all-seeing
 
At centre field, my back to the thorn tree
 They never cut...
(“Poet’s Chair,” The Spirit Level 46)
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all-seeing,” a perceptual state similar  to that of Socrates in the preceding canto,  
the philosopher’s claritas situated "at the center of the city.” At this later stage
 of Heaney’s career, the act of witnessing takes place not at the edge or border
 of the field, but at its heart and center. We can compare this with the acts of
 witnessing that memorialized rural forms of labor earlier in his writing life, in
 poems such as "Churning Day,” where the poet seems to stand at the edge or
 perimeter of the site of labor. Now, in "Poet’s Chair,” the poet is stationed at
 the middle of the worked field. But this center position 
is
 not reserved exclu ­
sively for the poet-witness:
 
A mower leans forever on his scythe.
He has mown himself to the centre of the field
and stands in 
a
 final perfect ring  
Of sunlit stubble.
("Man and Boy,” Seeing Things 14)
This hired laborer is stationed like Socrates at the heart of Athens. Time has
 
stopped at the center point of the field (the mower leans forever) in the wake of
 thoroughly completed labor; and work has taken him from a marginal position
 at the field’s perimeter to its center point of perfection 
("a
 final perfect ring”).  
We discover a mutuality and parity between the acts of poetry and labor as
 Heaney and the agricultural worker switch positions in these two poems. In
 "Poet’s Chair,” the poet is accorded the center position; in "Man and Boy,” it
 belongs to the mower. The continuity between "cultural” and "non-cultural”
 modes of labor evinced by Heaney’s earlier
 
work becomes a superimposition or  
identification of two (socioeconomically) different perspectival centers.
The growing emphasis on betweenness and centeredness in Heaney’s acts
 
of stationing indicates a different conception of space and frames of reference
 than we find in the earlier poetry. The poet now takes an active role in mark
­ing out areas and constructing borders where none once existed, drawing lines
 in the air like Prospero:
You also loved lines pegged out in the garden,
 
The spade nicking the first straight edge along
 The tight white string. Or string stretched perfectly
 To mark the outline of a house foundation . . .
Or the imaginary line straight down
A field of grazing.
("Man and Boy,” Seeing Things 14; emphasis added)
The new concern with centering is accompanied by a fascination with the ways
 
in which we generate borders and perimeters. For Heaney at this stage, it
 seems every center is provisional and constructed, only coming into existence
 through the erasure or ignoring of other demarcations of space. For Heaney to
 say “I am at the center of the field” momentarily cancels out his position with-
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in other frames of reference; for instance, at the field’s center, the poet is no
 
longer thinking of his position upon a map of County Derry (The farm may
 be on the perimeter of the county, or at its center; the map position is invisible
 to a consciousness focused on the field as a spatial unit.) This is the flexible,
 mobile schema of a border-crosser. In his biographical study of Heaney,
 Michael Parker expresses a muted skepticism regarding the poet’s political
 reading of his own passage from his “homeland” in Northern Ireland:
Though political considerations undoubtedly affected his decision to take
 
up residence in the Republic, they were by no means pre-eminent. In ret
­rospective accounts of
 
the period, however, he has laid great stress on his  
determination to distance himself ideologically from “the corrupt set-up” in
 the North. . . . Heaney certainly now sees his crossing of the border as a
 conscious political act. Perhaps it was.
(119-20)
Whether or not one shares Parker’s skepticism regarding an initial political
 
motive for the relocation, it seems safe to say that Heaney’s crossing has
 acquired a political dimension retroactively, in the wake of the poet’s rereading
 of his own actions: “I felt I was compromising some part of myself by staying
 in a situation where socially and, indeed, imaginatively there were pressures
 against’ regarding the moment 
as
 critical” (quoted in Deane 47-8). For a poet  
driven to relocate by political and imaginative violence, any act of centering is
 both a political and an imaginative act, freighted with implications of erasure,
 selection, and reaffirmation. The recent figurations of centrality in Heaney’s
 work demarcate a space in which the poet works through the overlapping
 schematics of farm, county, nation, and various other topoi in order to accom
­modate the multiple centers of his lyric consciousness. For the moment,
 Heaney’s unending search for a place for poetry has arrived at another point of




In his biography of Keats, W. J. Bate locates this passage in The  Hamp ­
stead Keats (303-4), written in the margin beside 
l
ines 420-3 of Paradise Lost,  
Book 6:
but feathered soon and fledge
They summ’d their pens, and, soaring the air sublime,
 




Less has been written on the euphoric and/or vertiginous moments  
when this poet registers a break in contact between the earth and his feet, as in
 the driving poems (“Night Drive,” “Westering,” “On the Road,” and “Post
­script”) or in the Sweeney translations. Such moments grow in frequency in
 Heaney’s later work.
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The classical trope of poet-as-plowman, with its play on the Latin "ver ­
sus,” is revisited repeatedly throughout Heaney’s work, from the early "Follow
­er” to the more recent "Poet’s Chair.”
4.
 
Heaney reserves applause regarding this achievement for John Clare, of  
whom he writes: "It was the unique achievement of John Clare to make vocal
 the regional and particular, to achieve a buoyant and authentic lyric utterance




In both "Churning Day” and "Blackberry-Picking,” it is important to  
note the strong deferral of the human hand’s entry into the lyric; we wait until
 line 16 in "Churning Day” for "hands blistered,” and "Our hands were peppered
 / With thorn-pricks, our palms sticky as Bluebeard’s” only arrives at the fif
­teenth line of "Blackberry-Picking.”
6.
 
The only point at which an object nestles comfortably within the con ­
tours of the hand comes at line 14 of the poem (this is also the line that would
 end the lyric if it were a sonnet): "He rooted out tall tops, buried the bright
 edge deep / To scatter new potatoes that
 
we picked / Loving  the cool hardness in  
our hands” (Selected Poems 3; emphasis added). Neither the pen nor the gun —
 that is, neither tool — fits the hand nearly as well as the natural object of the
 potato, which 
is
 of course not a tool but rather an organic material. There is an  
implicit critique here of manmade, "unnatural” objects of
 
the world and their  
problematic relationship to the body. .
7.
 
This line also replaces the unwieldy gun and spade tools of "Digging”  
with flints that can be placed more realistically between finger and thumb.
8.
 
Though Scarry’s comment arises in a discussion of the novel, it is also  
worth considering the place of the hand within the lyric, the genre most suited
 to the iconicization of bodily
 
parts since Petrarch’s time at least. My preceding  
discussion of work in Heaney’s lyrics is especially indebted to Scarry’s essay.
9.
 
Heaney  deliberately  makes an epistemological claim for the hands as the  
locus of knowledge. The poem does not end with the line "your hands have
 felt” but rather with "your hands have known."
10.
 
The activity here has a highly self-reflexive element; a hand manipu ­
lates a hand. This self-reflexivity lends the poem a Metaphysical tone, echoing
 Donne’s conceit involving the eyes of lovers — "My face in thine eye, thine in
 mine appears” ("The Good Morrow,” Complete English Poems 60) — or their
 mouths in the act of kissing — "Since thou and I sigh one another’s breath” ("A
 Valediction: Of Weeping,” Complete English Poems 89).
11.
 
Again, Scarry’s essay underlies my argument here.
12.
 
This independent, self-activated hand reappears in a later, three-line  
poem from Seeing Things,
 
"An August Night”: "His hands were warm and small  
and knowledgeable. / When I saw them again last night, they were two ferrets,
 / Playing all by themselves in a moonlit field” (Seeing Things 21).
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“What’s the difference between kinky and pervert
­
ed?” the tendentious joke goes: “Kinky means using
 a feather; perverted means using the whole chicken.”
 The satisfied laugh or groan elicited by the joke
 depends on the listener’s anticipated (and, for most of
 us understandable) distaste at the thought of having
 sex with a chicken — either functionally or proxi
­mately. But the difference between kinky and per
­verse can be dangerous as well 
as
 distasteful, for the  
line separating one from the other demarcates zones
 of habitability: one feather is okay, but the whole
 chicken is not. Jokes reinforce the line between hab
­itable and uninhabitable, but depending on the time,
 place, and persons involved, disrespect for that line
 can turn deadly. When JoAnn Wypijewski went to
 Laramie, Wyoming, after Matthew Shepard’s mur
­der, she was told a different joke: “‘You can have sex
 with a sheep in Wyoming, just don’t tie the shepard
 to the fence’” (70). Gallows or humor?
While crossing into the zone of uninhabitability
 
may elicit a range of responses from laughter to exe
­cution, the line that marks the exit from habitable
 zones shifts with time, culture, situation, and thus is
 always determined by society, by the shared under
­standing of the audience. The first joke tacitly sug
­gests that utilizing a chicken for sex makes 
a
 body  
perverted; in fact, it is not the presence or absence of
 the chicken but the audience’s laughter that does so.
 It is thus entirely possible for a body to cross the
 threshold into abjection and not be aware of the trans
­gression until the audience’s response indicates a line
 has been crossed. Critical theories informed by the
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de Saussure, Lacan, and Foucault — work that powerfully called into  
question Cartesian models of subject formation — has enabled scrutiny of these
 lines, both their construction and maintenance. The language I deploy
 
here —  
"abjection,” “zones of habitability” — reveals my indebtedness to certain theo
­rists engaged in this kind of scrutiny, particularly the work of Judith Butler in
 Bodies that Matter, Interrogating the formation and the materiality of the sub
­ject, Butler
 
finds that  the production of subjects “requires the simultaneous pro ­
duction of a domain of abject beings” (3). Abjection is not simply a matter of
 othering, it “designates a degraded or cast out status within the terms of social
­ity” (243). Today in the United States, zones of abjection include those states
 of being that are cast out from the norm and that invite violent consequences:
 the physically or mentally disabled body as well as the black or homosexual
 body. The subject “fantasizes” that the abject constitutes a threat to its own
 integrity: “I would rather die than do or be that!” (Butler 243). But the threat
 is just that, a fantasy; the iteration of norms through utterances or acts (jokes
 or executions) maintains that fantasy by violently casting out the threatening
 body or bodies. Fortunately for those of us who live close to the fine (and I
 would say that is each of us some times), critical inquiry into the economic, sex
­ual, and- historical constructions of the subject has attended to how the lines
 separating subject from abject are generated and sustained. However, it has not
 examined closely enough its own participation in the reinforcement of those
 fines. When criticism relies on the same shared understandings as the joke
 about the chicken, it works to maintain those lines. One of the most damag
­ing and most commonly shared understandings assumes that fear is the “nor
­mal” response to abjection.
Criticism of the brief altercation between the Pardoner and the Host at the
 
end of Chaucer’s The Pardoner
'
s Tale provides a useful heuristic device for exam ­
ining such shared assumptions. In The Canterbury Tales, the Prioress’ odd
 brooch and even the Friar’s cupidity, however contemptible, still fall within the
 range of habitable, acceptable space. They remain in the company of pilgrims;
 neither is singled out for particular castigation. Only the Pardoner crosses the
 line into abjection, an excess made manifest not by his own actions but by the
 Host’s vehement response. The scene I am using takes only sixty lines and
 occurs almost as an afterthought to The Pardoner
'
s Tale, At the end of his tale,  
the Pardoner invites the company to purchase absolution from him, either for
­getting he has already revealed his game or assuming
 
he is good enough to dupe  
even these pilgrims who are aware of it. Of all the company, the Pardoner
 invites the Host first: “I rede that oure Hoost heere shal bigynne / For he is
 moost envoluped in synne” (lines 941-2). The Host denies the Pardoner’s offer:
 “‘Nay, nay!’ quod he, ‘thanne have I Cristes curs! . . . /
 
Thou woldest make me  
kisse thy olde breech, / And swere it were a relyk of a seint, / Though it were
 with thy fundament depeint!”’ (946, 948-50). The Host rightly specifies the
 consequences of paying for absolution without
 
true confession: not redemption  
but “Cristes curs.” And he further exposes the Pardoner’s game. These are not
 saints’ relics, but the Pardoner’s own relics, collected from wherever, possibly
 even from his own ass. But the Host follows his refusal with a threat: “I wolde
 I hadde thy coilions in myn hond / . . . Lat kutte hem of” (952, 954). When
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he follows his refusal with a violent threat, the Host participates in the itera
­
tion of a norm that works to cast out the Pardoner; the threat signifies that the
 Pardoner has crossed a line, the consequences for which are violent.
The short altercation between the Host and Pardoner has received little
 
critical attention until recently when interest in subjectivity and abjection has
 rendered the Pardoner
'
s contestable morality and sexuality  irresistible. While a  
number of recent studies offer intelligent, alternative explanations of what
 makes the Pardoner’s offer so unpardonable, on one point they agree: the Host
 threatens the Pardoner because he fears him. Yet if the scene — replete with
 ambiguities and laden with emotion — begs for an analysis of
 
its emotion, it  
provides almost no information about either the Pardoner’s or the Host’s emo
­tional state; thus we can never know what the Host feels. Instead of acknowl
­edging the text’s silence, though, many critics interpolate their own culturally
 inflected understandings of emotion into the text, a practice that is, of course,
 defensible on the grounds that any act of interpretation is also an act of inter
­polation, but my argument 
is
 that an ethical reading will consider the implica ­
tions of positing one emotion over another.
A quick survey of several recent studies reveals the tendency to posit unin
­
terrogated assumptions about the Host’s reaction to the Pardoner: Monica
 McAlpine characterizes the Host’s response as a reaction to 
a
 threat (17); H.  
Marshall Leicester claims that the Pardoner embodies the “horror of existence”
 (44); Allen Frantzen discusses the Host’s “frightened and frightening respons
­es” (144); and Carolyn Dinshaw speculates that “[p]erhaps, sensing something
 of the Pardoner’s lack, the Host fears for his own manhood” (163). All of these
 writers rest their logic on this notion of fear but fail to explain how they know
 it 
is
 fear that the Host feels. Dinshaw even acknowledges her reliance on a par ­
ticular interpretation of the Host’s emotional state: “Harry’s response power
­fully corroborates the associations I have been pointing
 
to here” (168). The text  
of the tale gives little indication of precisely what the Host feels. The only
 overt mention of emotion comes at the end of the scene when the Host says he
 will not “pleye” with any “angry man” (951). This refers to the Pardoner’s emo
­tional state, not Harry
 
Bailey’s, though it is just as likely that the Host responds  
out of anger rather than fear. Any interpretation of the Host’s emotions would
 require a justification based on careful reading and logic. Yet these writers, who
 are impressively careful in their research and in the construction of their argu
­ments, assume they know the Host’s emotions but refrain from providing any
 evidence for those assumptions. Even if
 
they are correct that the Host fears,  
they would need either to theorize or historicize their assumptions about the
 Host’s emotions. They do neither. Nor do they consider that the superlative
­ly masculine Harry Bailey threatens violence out of an aggressive impulse
 instead of
 
a fearful one. As a result, their arguments finally participate in and  
reinforce a shared understanding that abjection provokes fear. Such a shared
 understanding works to establish fear as an essential response to abjection — an
 essentialization that poses the possibility of violent consequences for abjected
 bodies.




 “The Pardoner’s Homosexuality and How it Matters.”
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The description of the Pardoner in The General Prologue certainly contributes
 
to McAlpine’s interpretation of the Pardoner as a homosexual. The text indi
­cates an ambivalent sexuality when the narrator conjectures that the Pardoner
 is either already castrated or effeminate: “I trowe he were a geldyng or a mare”
 (General Prologue 691). Where evidence of his masculinity should be — in his
 lap — he has instead a fungible penis, a “male” in which he keeps his “relics.”
 Thus, at the end of his tale, when the Pardoner invites the Host over to “kisse
 the relikes,” he implicitly invites the Host to kiss the “male” part in his lap, an
 invitation to fellatio. In case the Host should be too dull to understand such a
 subtle come-on, the Pardoner ends his request by directing the Host to
 “‘Unbokele thy purs,”’ inviting the Host not just to part with his money (con
­tained within the purse) but to expose himself sexually (Pardoners Tale 945);
 “purs” appears as a gloss for penis (specifically 
as
 an instrument for sexual plea ­
sure) in the Wife’s prologue (44b). The Pardoner’s offer thus contains a fairly
 explicit sexual invitation. While it would be wrong to ignore the sexual come-
 on in the Pardoner’s offer, it is equally wrong to interpret this as a scene of
 homosexuality and homophobia. Allen Frantzen appropriately remarks on the
 ahistorical assumptions of McAlpine’s argument: “It is not necessary to insist
 that [the Pardoner] is homosexual or to identify the Pardoner as gay; to do so
 
is
 to assume (without evidence) that such a category constitutes medieval iden ­
tity when it seems, rather, to describe acts performed by certain persons that
 contributed to their identity but did not define them” (133). While it’s possi
­ble that the Pardoner’s offer constitutes a threat, it is far more likely a spiritual
 than a physical or sexual one.
When Monica McAlpine argues for the Pardoner’s homosexuality, she
 
almost assuredly does so out of concern for justice and from an antihomopho-
 bic stance. But if the Pardoner’s sexuality matters, then so does the Host’s
 response. If she were right about the Pardoner, then assuming the Host 
is homophobic serves to establish a tradition of fearing homosexuals; the impli
­cation is that people have always feared the homosexual — an essentializing
 move. The danger in McAlpine’s argument lies in its perpetuation of fear as an
 understood response to abjected bodies, in this case, the homosexual body.
 Though Frantzen and others address other, more historically accurate readings
 of the Pardoner’s abjection, they still assume the Pardoner incites fear when
 they participate in a
 
“shared understanding” that the abject is to-be-feared (just  
as the guy with the chicken is to-be-laughed-at). While these readings unset
­tle our understanding of medieval subjectivity, their unquestioning assumptions
 about the scene’s emotional content reinforce the notion that fear 
is
 the under ­
stood (read: approved) response to abjection.
In The Pardoners Tale and other texts, the impulse to attribute negative
 
responses to fear is understandable enough. In Powers of
 
Horror, Julia Kristeva  
argues that, when “[c]onfronted with states of distress that were evoked for us
 by the child who makes himself heard but is incapable of making himself
 understood, we, adults, use the word Tear’” (33). In the same way, critics
 attribute negative reactions in texts to fear: the child cannot articulate the cause
 of distress, the text does not. As observing adults or observant readers we can
 only guess, and we guess fear. While I am indebted to Kristeva’s understand
­
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ing of abjection for my argument, her explanation of the interrelation between
 
fearfulness and abjection 
is
 less useful. She asks “why is it phobia that best  
allows one to tackle the matter of relation to the object? Why fear and object?”
 (33). But she does not find a clear answer to her own question. Referring to
 Otto Rank’s comments on birth trauma, Kristeva concludes:
Fear, therefore, in a first sense, could be the upsetting of a
 
bio-drive balance.  
The constitution of the object relation might then be a reiteration of fear,
 alternating with optimal but precarious states of balance. Fear and object
 proceed together until the one represses the other. But in which one of us
 
is
 that fully successful?
(33-4)
The final question in the above quotation turns, the text away from an inquiry
 
into why fear and toward an inquiry into the machinations of fear. The two sen
­tences that ought to answer the question, though, are plagued by uncertain
 verbs: “Could,” “might be.” More importantly, an inquiry into why it’s fear
 begs the question of whether it’s fear. When the text remains silent, neither
 naming the emotions at play nor providing enough physical description to infer
 the emotions (racing heart, sweating, and so on), we finally cannot know. Since
 even precise physical descriptions can be misleading (“a racing heart,” or
 “sweating” might just as easily describe excitement 
as
 fear), even hard evidence  
becomes suspect and calls into question the possibility of interpreting emotion
 at all.. What is possible, however, 
is
 to examine the implications of overriding  
our epistemological limitations.
In her work on abjection, Kristeva explores the interrelation between fear
­
fulness and abjection, but the cultural implications of interpreting emotions are
 made clearer by an anthropological model that focuses on culture rather than a
 psychoanalytic model that focuses on the individual subject. David Scruton, in
 his anthropology of fear, Sociophobics, observes that “[f]ear 
is
 commonly  
thought of as an innate human trait, the result of the species’ phylogenetic
 development, something which is triggered by various stimuli and experienced
 in phylogenetic terms” (9-10). However, he argues against a purely biochemi
­cal-based explanation of fear; instead, he finds “biology is, in fact, nondirective”
 and that emotions occur in a cultural matrix (10). Fear, he argues, is an event
 like any emotion and as such is experienced within a “framework of social rela
­tions” (18). This means that when we experience fear, we do so as a function
 of our culture; it also means that fear has specific consequences. Scruton’s point
 here has important implications for the way theorists read emotions:
It is altogether unlikely that emotions can occur, be mediated as we have
 
described, and have no results. On the contrary, emotions do have impor
­tant consequences: they influence our behavior. They are means, in fact,
 through which society accomplishes vital tasks, for they are instrumental in
 encouraging conformity to significant behavioral and attitudinal norms of
 that society. They provide individuals with approved and accepted response
 tendencies in situations which are judged to be important.
(26)
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If the Host indeed fears the Pardoner, he does so not out of an innate response,
 
but as a culturally encoded event. But this would also mean that the Host —
 and other medieval subjects — fear the same things we do, that they are the
 products of the' same culture. Readings that assume the Host fears the Par
­doner not only rely on an ahistorical understanding of abjection but further
 reinforce fear of abjection as a cultural norm: it is as acceptable to laugh at the
 chicken as it is to fear the abject.
Other assumptions about fear make these readings dangerous. Scruton
 
notes that we tend to believe fear is an innate response to dangerous situations
and triggers a flight-or-fight mechanism. Because we see fear 
as
 a means of  
protection from danger, we tend also to judge less harshly the actions of a fear
­ful person: if the fear response is primal, then it 
is
 in some measure beyond  
rational control and originates in the drive toward self-preservation. Self
­defense 
is
 more comprehensible, and invariably more forgivable, than aggress-  
sion. Perpetuating an understanding that fear constitutes a culturally approved
 response to abjection also perpetuates a culture in which violence against
 abjected bodies is more comprehensible and thus more forgivable. When crit
­icism of The Pardoner
'
s Tale focuses on the Pardoner’s abjection as an obvious  
incitement to fear, it tacitly pardons the Host’s response. No one questions
 whether the Host responds reasonably; they know
 
he fears because they assume  
it’s normal to fear abjection. While the Pardoner thus comes under further
 scrutiny, further abjected by the writers who wish to understand him, the Host
 escapes interrogation.
The implications of such criticism, or even of laughing at a chicken joke,
 
may not appear to invoke dire consequences. But the other joke I cite at the
 beginning of this article does. In her essay on Matthew Shepard’s murder,
 Wypijewski refers to the clichéd line between love and hate to argue that such
 a line is kept strong by “all the little things of
 
a culture, mostly unnoticed and  
unremarked” (67). And when we notice those lines (on one side is love — or
 at least its possibility — acceptance, normalcy; on the other side is hatred,
 abjection, perversion), even if we notice them only to decry them, we often
 reinstantiate them: “Among those who advocate hate-crime laws, it’s always
 the sexuality of the victim that’s front and center, not the sexuality of the crim
­inal or the everyday, undifferentiated violence he took to extremity” (73).
 When the abjected body
 is
 homosexual, we have a peculiar way of naming such  
acts of violence — homophobia — that carries an excuse within its condemna
­tion. Calling such acts “phobic” means they are rooted in fear, a fear we believe
 is beyond our control and is part of our self-defense mechanism.
Both Aaron McKinney and his girlfriend, Kristen Price, wanted to rely on
 
a shared understanding that the abjected homosexual quite reasonably incites
 homophobia and thus a violent response: “presuming homophobia to be an
 acceptable alibi, [Price] thought she was helping him when she told the press
 that he and Henderson just wanted to beat [Shepard] up bad enough to teach
 him a lesson not to come on to straight people’” (Wypijewski 63). And
 although he told the police that Shepard did not hit on him, McKinney later
 wrote to someone, attempting to exonerate himself: ‘
“
Being a verry [sic] drunk  
homophobick [sic] I flipped out and began to pistol whip the fag with my gun’”
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(63). While Wypijewski repeatedly interrogates the assumptions that enable
 
such violence, her essay reveals that few others in Laramie or elsewhere do.
 Even the director of a program with the Southeast Wyoming Mental Health
 Center attributes McKinney’s actions to fear: “‘When it’s fear or hurt, which is
 typically the primary emotion at work, when you can’t say, “I’m scared shitless,”
 most hurt and fear
 
will come out in the only vehicle men are allowed. It comes  
out crooked. It looks like anger, it’s expressed as anger but it isn’t’” (quoted in
 Wypijewski 70). How does he know? We need to believe fear motivates such
 crimes because violence rooted in fear still leaves McKinney and Russell Hen
­derson as people we can in some way accept as human.
Two responses typify our reactions to the Matthew Shepard murder, the
 
Littleton, Colorado murders, the dragging death of James Byrd in Jaspar, Texas:
 one posits the killers 
as
 afraid, the other calls them monsters. We are prepared  
either to accept the crimes 
as
 understandable because the violence initiated  
from a primal response or to reject these men as not fully human. Any other
 explanation threatens our conception of humanity. Regardless of our respons
­es, of course, they are human. But to assert
 
that their violence originates in fear  
leaves an important part of our culture unexamined. At the beginning of
 
her  
essay, Wypijewski claims, quite radically, that “[i]t’s
 
just possible that Matthew  
Shepard didn’t die because he was gay; he died because Aaron McKinney and
 Russell Henderson are straight” (62). An ethical response to Matthew Shep
­ard’s murder would question not only the crime, but why McKinney and oth
­ers think that fear of abjection helps to explain, if not to excuse it.
This interrogation needs to occur in all readings of culture, including read
­
ings of literature. In January 1999, PMLA devoted an issue to ethics. While
 the articles contribute to the discussion of ethics in literary studies, not one
 article interrogates the cultural implications of how we read. Whether scenes
 like those of The Pardoner
'
s Tale merely reveal or actively produce fear matters  
less than our professional responsibility to examine the ways our reading prac
­tices may participate in normalizing violent phobias. It is the interpretation,
 not the creation, of the scene between the Host and Pardoner that should con
­cern us because it is impossible to know what motivates the Host to react as he
 does. And the gap in this text does not comprise one of the small inconse
­quential gaps Wayne Booth so engagingly ridicules; this gap 
is
 the unbridgeable  
distance between heaven and hell, with a deadly temptation in the middle —
 the temptation to assume we know what motivates others, to assume that cer
­tain emotional responses are now and have always been “normal.” Which is not
 to say critics should refrain from commenting on such stubborn texts, but their
 commentary ought to include (or at least have considered) its own assumptions
 and consequences. Sure the chicken joke 
is
 funny, but what are we doing  when  
we laugh at it, and what are we doing when we fear the Pardoner?
I would like to thank Gary Taylor, Sheree Meyer, Sharon O’Dair, Harold
 
Weber, and Elizabeth Meese for their helpful editorial comments.
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Sovereign Pleasures
Jayne Lewis




English at the  
University of Califor
­nia, Los Angeles. Her
 most recent book is
 Mary Queen of
 Scots: Romance and
 Nation (Routledge,
 1998). Her son, Peter,
 recently learned to say
 “please.”
I’ve always taken pleasure in anything lucid, solitary,
 
spare: the arm cleaving clear water, the one hawk in
 blue heaven. Now that I have this baby, though,
 
what  
offers itself up for joy is mysterious and curved. It 
is almost utterly shared. I wonder therefore if the fac
­ulty of pleasure is the absolute I always thought it
 was, or if its shape and meaning mutate with the
 objects available to it. This is not the same thing, by
 the way, as wondering if pleasure is Historically Con
­structed, which everything and nothing is, 
so
 why  
ask.
It’s more that we almost need to be pleased.
 
Hobbes thought so, observing in Leviathan that
 "pleasure seemeth to be a corroboration of vitall
 motion, and a help thereunto.” I like this notion of
 corroboration, as if pleasure somehow approves of our
 creaturely animation, permits it. As if we would do
 well to befriend pleasure, so that it will give us its
 help. It’s evidently in our interest to provide the plea
­sure principle with as many different subjects as pos
­sible. That way we stand a chance of getting all the
 help we need.
We need a lot. I knew someone who was in love
 
with someone. The two of them studied the same
 language, and the same problems, and once one of
 them — the one I knew — checked out a library
 book on that language and its problems. When she
 opened the book, out slipped a postcard from Venice
 or someplace twisted and ravishing and malevolent
 like that. This postcard was addressed to a woman
 she knew very slightly in the unfortunate handwrit
­ing of the man she was in love with. On the front
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were two hands clasped, a detail from some infinitely bigger canvas, and on the
 
other side was one word, which was please. You should be able to interpret
 
that  
word in a lot of different ways, but really you can
'
t. Really, the implications are  
crystal clear, and not pleasing unless the word please is addressed to you. Plea
­sure in general has this element of supplication. There is a power differential
 in it: something is given and received. Anyone pleased 
is
 lordly.
So there was John Milton, radical republican, putting pleasure at the cen
­ter of Paradise Lost, and in the most surprising ways. God, for example, when
 answering the rhetorical question of why he made Adam et al. free admits he
 did that for his own pleasure. In turn, human sovereignty is expressed through
 enjoyment. In the unspoiled paradise the one adjective you come across over
 and over again 
is
 “sweet.” Here is Milton the radical republican saying  
nonetheless that pleasure is a divine right, an absolute of human being.
Just as he was saying this, they were, if paradoxically, seeing pleasure very
 
differently in the court of Charles II. This court was notoriously sybaritic to
 say the least, a garden of priapic splendor if you believe the myth, all emanat
­ing from the lazy, cunning king at its center. Yet people there seem to have
 regarded pleasure the way Milton should have, given his mistrust of kings and
 lust and anything pretty. For one thing, they did not especially believe in it.
 The most imperfect of courtly enjoyers, the earl of Rochester, for example held
 that it’s easy
 
to “tak[e] false pleasure for true love / But pain can ne’er deceive.”  
Whereas for Milton the capacity to be pleased confirms autonomy with all its
 powers and obligations, Rochester proposed that really pleasure subjugates,
 producing illusions that only pain dismantles. If you are interested in the truth,
 you want at least to be the pleaser, not the pleased, and it’s better yet to be out
 of it altogether.
This isn’t the middle of the seventeenth century of course; it’s barely the
 
beginning of the twenty-first, and absolute sovereignty is more or less a thing
 of the past, as are perhaps the forms of enjoyment that bothered Rochester.
 Also, fewer and fewer postcards are falling out of books. Fewer and fewer
 books are being opened in the first place. Instead, most words are flickering
 through cyberspace, moth-like but more cynical than moths, less questing.
 There’s nothing for anything
 
to latch on to, which could get to be a problem for  
pleasure, seeing as how always before it seemed to work like a lock and key,
 needing something notched and unique to fit into a shape that was already
 there somehow, commanding its own contents.
I’ve noticed more and more keys disappearing from my life. For instance,
 
I have an alarm system built into my car. If I am outside the car
 
but want to be  
inside it, I am compelled to press a button on my
 
keychain. I do that and there  
is a little yelp and then the car unlocks itself but there is no pleasurable grind
­ing slide of a key’s teeth, no twist of the wrist or jolt the lock springing up,
 released. There’s no pleasure. The car’s yielding feels arbitrary, 
as
 if I just hap ­
pened to be walking by when it decided to make itself available. Recently, how
­ever, the baby was playing with my keychain and he must have jiggled some
­thing loose because the last time I pressed the button on my keyless key
 absolutely nothing happened. The car sat still for a change, and it was good, if
 somewhat inconvenient.
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Like most babies, mine has his own set of keys, colored plastic ones that he
 
likes all right, but the jingle of the real ones, or maybe their weight, pleases him
 more. In this case, his pleasure has given mine back to me, and I am humbled
 by his largesse, accidental though it is. In their way, his pleasures happen like
 accidents too. I do watch him laying down certain laws of liking. Yet at first it
 seems that objects fall to him by chance and then he will or wont piece them
 into some jigsaw of affection and, ultimately, desire. It’s impossible to say
 which comes first, the pleasure or the thing that gives it. It’s impossible to say
 if the baby is freed or bound when he learns to command this and not that —
 the banana and not the applesauce, the dragonfly and not the duck, The Snowy
 Day and never, never Good Night Moon, though (because?) he has five copies of
 it. I cannot tell if with age he is growing imperious or cowed, and if cowed
 whether it is by the brute force of his own pleasure or by the objects that pro
­voke and thereby seem to govern it.
Yet pleasure is supposed to be a primal motive; from Freud’s point of view,
 
it is an absolute motive, or at least it was until, as for Adam et al., the death
 drive made its despotic ambitions known. Jeremy Bentham was really much
 less compromising in his Principles of Morals and
 
Legislation, where even the  
most malign instincts boil down to pleasure: “Let a man’s motive be ill-will; call
 it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive; the
 pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his
 adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself is good. It
 may be faint; it may be short; it must at any rate be impure; yet while it lasts,
 and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any other that is not
 more intense.”
There’s much to interest us in this particular principle of morals and legis
­
lation, but one thing is the question of what makes pleasure, even wretched
 pleasure, “good.” What seems to do that is its discreteness, its detachment
 from “consequence.” It is as if any consequence, good or bad, would make the
 pleasure itself less good. The other thing that makes pleasure good is its inten
­sity. In either case, pleasure is pure lyric. Narrative seduces and adulterates it.
 No more sweet paradise with the walls around it. Everyone: learn to say please.
So back to pleasure and the question of what it might or might not have to
 
do with history. With personal history, the troublesome skein of
 
redundancy  
and change, incursion and obduracy. With narrative history, the chain of con
­sequences from which we don’t know how to deliver ourselves and yet per
­versely reckon an affirmation of our freedom. With history history, the fath
­omless sea of particularities where the people who enjoy themselves the most
 just drown, as witness the House of Stuart, or Marie Antoinette, or poor
 Princess Di
 
just when by all accounts she was happy at last. In general, histo ­
ry seems inimical to pleasure, which requires stately domes and the instant the
 red currant bursts on the tongue. And suspense, 
as
 in the infinite pause at the  
top of the ferris wheel. Even when there is a whole piece of music, joy gathers
 to a point, a summit, perilous and absolute. You can plot it on a map, some
­how, but not in sentences.
Before the baby was born I went swimming almost every day, at once sin
­
gular and accompanied. I’m an earth sign who has trouble with liquids, but this
124
Journal X, Vol. 5 [2020], No. 1, Art. 14
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14
120 Journal x
was my first true and absolute maternal pleasure, the water one great hand lift
­
ing and molding me, patiently erasing the difference between the me and the
 not-me. The sun browned my back, beating a white H in the place where my
 suit straps went, and the baby would rest in the effortfill peace of my swim
­ming. Two weeks after
 
he was born  I went back to the water, assuming it would  
bless me,
 
but instead I found myself floundering there, lonely  and cold. I drift ­
ed like an empty sack, unsaved and clumsy, my grace gone.
So I turned
 
back to my books, and  to authors no one pays me to study: Tol ­
stoy
 
and  Margery Allingham. Janet  Frame. There’s a world of pleasure  in  these  
books, the pleasure of vicarious life. I hadn’t thought I would need the vicari
­ous now, with my own life suddenly so present and full, so this is a source of
 pleasure worth looking into. What for that matter is vicarious pleasure? Is it
 imaginatively experiencing the pleasures that others — even unreal others —
 take in reality, or is it taking pleasure in what happens to others, regardless of
 whether they themselves are pleased? Is it that someone else 
is
 your substitute,  
your vicar, in the stately pleasure dome?
Vicarious pleasure seems at first to have something to do with standing
 
back, apart, at that chaste, absolute point that 
is
 the solstice of history. Except  
vicis means alternation, or change, so that if you are going to be true to the
 word vicarious (and why wouldn’t you?) you have to think about there being in
 the purity of pleasure like that some sudden undulation, 
as
 of clean grass as a  
shape passes through it.
There’s an ethical thread in this that is hard but important to pluck apart
 
from the problem of definition. It has to do with what pleasure permits us to
 be to each other, its place in relations of power. Here is
 
where you  have to  bring  
pain
 
back into the picture, as a point of contrast. Vicarious pain, that is, is oth ­
erwise known as sympathy. It confirms your talent for substituting yourself for
 another, at
 
least imaginatively, and from there becomes the ground of kindness,  
of intervention in the unjust
 
business of the world. Vicarious pleasure is some ­
how more sinister; its seeker seems starved, but righteously so, haughty and
 immaculate and selfish. The thing is that pleasure of this sort, vicarious sensa
­tion of this sort, would never prod you to do anything. The opposite: it
 
would  
suspend you like Mary Poppins’s giggly uncle forever pouring tea up in the
 eaves.
And yet. It ought to be possible merely to respect the pleasures of others
 
without concerning yourself in them in any way. This would be a
 
good, in exact  
contrast to the way in which it’s a good to concern yourself in the pain of oth
­ers (short of being the one to inflict it, of
 
course). I understand that the idea  
of such a good occurred to Rebecca West: “If we do not live for pleasure we
 shall soon find ourselves living for pain. If we do not regard as sacred our own
 joys and the joys of others, we open the door and let into life the ugliest
 attribute of the human race, which is cruelty.” That’s stark, and pleasingly
 Hobbesian, albeit portentous of a world more
 
liberal than  the one Hobbes envi ­
sioned.
The woman I knew, the one who found the postcard, held it in her hand
 
and thought what shall I do. The thing is, until that moment her love affair
 had given her nothing but pleasure. She had been pleasingly drowsy all the
 
125
Editors: Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (2000/2001): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Jayne Lewis 121
while, whereas for the rest of her life (which had been going on for a long time
 
by then) she had had to keep her brain wakeful, flooded with light. With this
 man she thought she could lie still and even sink. And all the while she had
 been taking false pleasure for true love, perhaps even mistaking for pleasure
 something radically different from it. All the
 
while, the man who had been her  
bed, her dim room, her quiet house, was thinking please, and writing that very
 word, and mailing it secretly to someone else while travelling in Italy. It was
 someone else and not she who could please him, yet the survival of her own
 pleasure now demanded the denial of his. It now required the other woman to
 say no or nothing at all. As it did seem she had done, choosing to see his plea
 as nothing more than a tool, a means of marking a page she liked.
Even when pleasure 
is
 not essential, it is essential to what is essential.  
What is essential is some sense of self-rule. But the inessential 
is
 what pro ­
duces that sense. Georges Bataille worked this out in considerable detail,
 somewhat predictably identifying sovereignty ancient and modern with the
 powers of consumption, indulgence, and excess. “The sovereign, if he 
is
 not  
imaginary, truly enjoys the products of this world — beyond his needs. His
 sovereignty resides in this. Let us say that the sovereign (or the sovereign life)
 begins when, with the necessities ensured, the possibility of life opens up with
­out limit. Conversely, we may call sovereign the enjoyment of possibilities that
 utility doesn’t
 
justify. [. . . ] Life beyond utility is the domain of  sovereignty.”  
Enjoyment here subsists beyond need, which is where sovereignty is too. We
 are back to the power of pleasure, or at least to the way that enjoyment affirms
 prerogative, one’s place above and beyond. Bataille qualifies this, however, by
 speaking of “the sovereign, if he 
is
 not imaginary.” What sovereign today is not  
imaginary? Who can forget the pop psych trope of the inner child, who was
 basically the inner tyrant, and most decidedly imaginary? To the imaginary
 sovereign, enjoyment 
is
 rooted not in excess but in virtual necessity, in that  
Hobbesian assistance to our own vitality.
When the woman I knew showed her lover the postcard she’d found, he
 
didn’t deny having sent it. He did not do anything like that. Still she left it to
 him to say whether he thought she should go on loving him or not. “It’s not
 that you don’t please me,” he said. When he said it she realized that it wasn’t
 that. It was more that she had never known him to have done anything remote
­ly 
as
 playful as what he had done when he’d sent that postcard. In her mind,  
this turned out to be more decisive than the question of who had the power to
 please whom — though of course play and pleasure and power all converge in
 the end.
They do this because they did it in the beginning. In 1970 D.W. Winni-
 
cott, an expert in child’s play, was wondering why people (or at least English
 people) like having kings, and queens. He thought it had to do with the per
­manence of monarchy, with the way kings — like the indestructible object of a
 child’s play — have the power to survive the buffets of love and fury and all the
 other primitive passions. By surviving like that, sovereign figures organize “the
 paradox that links exterior reality with inner experience.” And this organiza
­tion is a great pleasure, for what is being organized is the relationship between
 the accidental and the determinate. Eventually words attempt to do the orga
­nizing for us, but it’s never quite the same.
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Speaking of words, the linguist Elinor Ochs was interested in baby talk, the
 
high-pitched ska I’ve mastered pretty well
 
by now She found that mothers the  
world over do not talk to their babies in this tone of voice. As a matter of fact,
 in some places such 
as
 Samoa you hear it only when adults are speaking to their  
superiors. The elevated singsong placates, appeases. It gives a pleasure that
 protects the speaker from lordly wrath. In the interest of democracy, I did for
 a day or two try to speak to the baby in a level alto and in sentences that didn’t
 rhyme. But it
 
was really much too hard: the family with a baby is the last bas ­
tion of absolute monarchy.
In fact, babies are the final refuge of the absolute, period. So much that has
 
been lost from the rest of the world, for better or for worse, 
is
 hiding out there  
behind the Stevie Wonder smile. Actually, my particular baby has an amazing
 smile, focused and radiant and recognizing. Nothing pleases me more than this
 smile.
In sum? Clearly there is no arithmetic of pleasure which might yield an
 
actual sum. There may be a geometry, but not one expressible in a series of
 proofs. All I wanted to ask
 
was what you can learn about pleasure by having a  
baby around. What can you learn by observing both the baby and your rela
­tionship to him? What I’ve learned is that pleasure survives its own alienation,
 and possibly even thrives on it. Also I have learned that enjoyment is primal,
 but not 
as
 much as you might think. It’s a power born of subjection, ours to  
what 
is
 already there. The subjection comes first, and then the sovereign plea ­
sure. Babies are tyrants. They demand to be pleased, but only because they
 
can  
do nothing else. It’s a relief to know this. It’s liberating in its 
way. Here are some sovereign pleasures, as specific as they are not: my mouth
 on the baby’s warm belly, blowing. Eucalyptus leaves spilling some of the sun
 on his face. Our deep chair in darkness. There are really no words for any of
 these pleasures, but that possibly is how, and why, they can bind us into a com
­mon good.
I saw a woman recently. She was bobbing up and down at the shallow end
 
of a swimming pool and in front of her, on the deck, was a stroller, its hood
 down at an angle that, frankly, recalled the bassinet in Rosemary’s Baby. Any
­way, from her place waist deep in water this woman was looking up and pour
­ing baby talk into the space under the hood. Then a man who must have been
 her partner came and wheeled the baby back. I watched the woman watch
 them go, grateful and aggrieved. After that she turned and struck out through
 the water, her arms bright, her legs lost in 
l
ight as she swam.
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The Beat Influences of Thomas Pynchon’s V.
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In the preface to his collection of stories, Slow Learn
­
er (1984), Thomas Pynchon discusses the effect that
 Beat writers had upon him in the mid-to-late 1950s
 when he was an undergraduate at Cornell University.
 Pynchon argues that an opposition between the
 newly canonized mythopoetic high modernists and
 the subcultural or countercultural Beats arose in Eng
­lish departments in the late 1950s. Pynchon
 describes his attraction to Beat writings: “It was
 actually OK to write like this! Who knew? The
 effect was exciting, liberating, strong positive. It was
 not a case of either/or, but an expansion of possibili
­ty” (Slow Learner 7). Despite the mountain of
 
criti ­
cism that has been published about Pynchon over the
 last thirty years, there has been very little written
 about Pynchons connection with the Beat writers.
 Biographically, Pynchon’s affinity for the Beat
 lifestyle seems apparent in his own early, restless
 wanderings. Pynchon joined the navy (as did Jack
 Kerouac) in 1955 after his first two years at Cornell
 and briefly rejoined after his college graduation.
 Subsequently, Pynchon lived in Greenwich Village in
 1958, right around the apex of Beat publications and
 the subsequent emergence of Village Beat-style
 bohemianism. After a two-year stint as an engineer
­ing aide at Boeing in Seattle, Pynchon resumed his
 travels in 1962, dividing his time between the two
 famous Beat locales of California and Mexico
 (Chambers xiv). The next year, Pynchon would pub




Criticism on V. is ample and covers such varied
 influences as Vladimir Nabokov (one of Pynchon’s
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teachers at Cornell), the French surrealists and spy novels, Edgar Allan Poe,
 
Joseph Heller, and William B. Yeats.1 Yet, despite Pynchon’s own admission
 that Beat writers played a formative role in his development as a fiction writer,
 no critic has fully explored the connections between the early Pynchon of V and
 Beat writers. Typical 
is
 Judith Chambers’ book-length study of Pynchon in  
which she devotes only three sentences to the Beats, most of which are quotes
 from Slow Learner, In The Fictional Labyrinths of Thomas Pynchon, David Seed
 likewise devotes 
a
 scant two pages to the influence of the Beats upon Pynchon.  
However, Seed does cite a personal letter he received from Pynchon in which
 Pynchon writes, “Of all the influences I remember then [while at Cornell], his
 [Jack Kerouac’s] was the most glamorous” (8). Yet Seed lumps together the
 Beats with Saul Bellow and Philip Roth as equal but all ultimately
 
minor influ ­
ences upon Pynchon. Seed does admit that Kerouac might have acted as a cat
­alyst for Pynchon, “opening up his sense of narrative possibilities” (11), but he
 never explores this thought any further. In Understanding Thomas Pynchon,
 Robert Newman only devotes a page to Pynchon and the Beats, but he does
 claim, “In his depiction of the social misfits of 1950s America and the idea of
 yo-yoing 
as
 travel for its own sake, Pynchon is clearly influenced by Jack Ker ­
ouac’s On the Road, a novel that was at the height of its popularity during the
 period that he came of age” (50). While Christopher Ames has touched on
 some Beat threads running through Gravity's
 
Rainbow in his essay, “Calling for  
Ketchup in Burroughs and Pynchon,”2 elsewhere there are only brief references
 to Pynchon’s potential debt to William Burroughs. Evidently, there is a gap in
 Pynchon scholarship, which this essay seeks to fill.
I want to argue that V. shows evidence of a writer both fascinated and
 
repulsed by Beat ideology. While Pynchon praises the original, life-affirming,
 positive
 
values of the Beats, V. can be read as a critique of the social Beat move ­
ment, 
as
 immature, unrealizable and unproductive. Essentially, Pynchon  
believes that the Beat style of life is admirable in theory but doesn’t work in
 practice. Here is Pynchon’s entropy at work: the life-affirming, positive values
 of
 
the Beats become petered out, stale, and fruitless almost as quickly as they  
are introduced into society and adopted by the mock-beatniks, The Whole Sick
 Crew. Therefore, what Pynchon criticizes is not the Beat ethos itself but the
 transference from philosophy to practice, the co-option of the Beat movement
 by the media, and the misguided attempts of image-conscious, bohemian fol
­lowers, who aimlessly follow trends that the media glamorizes. In addition, I
 want to argue that Pynchon adopts certain
 
writing techniques and subject mat ­
ter from the Beats, while critiquing misguided appropriation of Beat ideals by
 “beatnik” followers.
Pynchon, more than any other American novelist, with the possible excep
­
tion of John Barth, is known 
as
 a quintessential postmodern writer. Converse ­
ly, the Beats occupy a strange, liminal space in American literature; they are
 somehow suspended between modernism and postmodernism. Certainly, there
 is a huge amount of variance within the Beat movement: from the Buddhist-
 inspired poetry of
 
Gary Snyder to the dystopian, allegorical novels of  Richard  
Brautigan. In addition, there 
is
 much within the Beat canon that might be  
described as postmodern, especially exemplified in the writings of William
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Burroughs. With his emphasis on textual cut-ups and epistemological indeter
­
minacy, Burroughs could be considered more radical a postmodernist than Pyn
­chon. Pynchon does claim that the late 1950s and early 1960s, the time in
 which he wrote V, was a period of significant literary change in America: "We
 were at a transition point, a strange post-Beat passage of cultural time,
 
with our  
loyalties divided” (Slow Learner 9). Still, the division between Beat writings
 and postmodern writing is fuzzy. Although in many ways he 
is
 not as radical a  
postmodern writer 
as
 some of the Beat writers, it was Pynchon who helped  
commercialize postmodernist writing with his astute but restrained voice, con
­taining much that one could find disturbing but little that one could find offen
­sive (as with Burroughs) or life-affirming (as with Kerouac). Ultimately, it is
 not the ideals of the Beat movement that Pynchon effectively critiques but the
 adaptation of those ideals by foolish followers.
In this essay, I will examine the influences of two seminal "Beat” novels,
 
Jack Kerouac’s On The Road (1957) and to a lesser extent William Burroughs’
 Naked Lunch (1959), upon Pynchon’s post-Beat V. (1963). I have chosen these two novels because I feel that their influence can most clearly be seen through
 a close reading of V, In Slow Learner, Pynchon specifically cites On The Road
 as a shaping influence on him (12). I choose Naked Lunch because it appears to
 be linked thematically to V. To a key extent, Pynchon describes a "beat” world
 in V., a world that seems exhausted, sliding towards a violent apocalypse or
 towards a nihilistic or vapid cybernetic age. The male characters in V. (Herbert
 Stencil, Benny Profane, and Hugh and Evan Godolphin) are borderline
 obsessed searchers who, in the Beat tradition, religiously seek something to
 frame or shape the chaos of their lives. That the searchers never find
 
what they  
are looking for or cannot articulate the meaning of their searches comprises
 Pynchon’s ultimate critique of the Beat movement. He might admire the
 instinctual passion of the Beats and their innovative praxis, but he feels that
 neither offers intrinsic advantages and produces no meaningful or practical
 results. For Pynchon, the Beat movement is a very brief pocket of time in the
 1950s, which was swept away by an ongoing and ultimately more powerful
 technological movement that stretches back
 
to the Industrial Revolution. Pyn ­
chon argues that the Beats’ primal passion cannot compete with technological
 advancement. Consequently, the machine ethos supplants the fleeting roman
­tic ethos of the Beats, leaving its followers lost and confused, subject to the
 increasingly violent aftereffects of technology run amok.
Structure and Substance of V., Naked Lunch, and On The Road
While the structure of V. is not outlandishly postmodern by today’s standards,
 
it was a bold departure from most novels that were published during the early
 1960s. Aside from Pynchon, the only well-known American novelists who
 were pushing literary boundaries during the late 1950s and early 1960s through
 their use of bold and radical structural forms were Vladmir Nabokov,3 William
 Burroughs, and, to a lesser extent, Jack Kerouac. While Nabokov’s influence
 appears in Pynchon’s use of alliteration and wordplay, Burroughs’ and Kerouac’s
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influence can be seen more clearly. Many of Burroughs’ textually bold, and dar
­
ing novels were published during the late 1950s and early 1960s.4 V.’s structure
 is peculiarly similar to Burroughs’ Naked Lunch. Like V., Naked Lunch jumps
 globally from location to location and through time and space (from Paris to
 Germany to Mexico to Italy to North Africa to America). While V.’s geo
­graphical and chronological shifts are clearly demarcated by chapter breaks,
 Naked Lunch's geographical moves are more haphazard, occurring frequently in
 the same chapters with the only notification being a new paragraph or a cine
­matic “fade out.” Pynchon and Burroughs utilize a similar technique of char
­acter overload by
 
including a huge number of characters, most of which are not  
fully developed. These purposeful distortions aim to evince that most people
 one encounters in real life are fleeting and two-dimensional, leaving the indi
­vidual to fill in the lack of information with his or her own necessarily artificial
 constructs. Both novels include incomplete, insubstantial and frequently
 ridiculous characters 
as
 a means to reflect reality more accurately.
The names of the characters in Naked Lunch and V. are typically playful,
 functional, and mechanistic. Pynchon’s The Gaucho, Teflon, and Stencil mir
­ror Burroughs’ The Pusher, The Vigilante, and The Gimp. This comic utili
­tarian naming establishes an atmosphere of existential insubstantiality and
 emphasizes that human free will is an illusory concept. While Pynchon may
 have adopted Burroughs’ method of naming, he concurrently distorts central
 Beat ideals with his creation of Benny Profane, the schlemiel. Benny Profane
 is an inversion of Kerouac’s romantic narrator-hero in On The Road, Sal Par
­adise. “Benny” in 1950s Beat circles was a slang word for Benzedrine, a sub
­stance that Kerouac used heavily during his marathon writing sessions of On the
 Road and The Subterraneans. In On The Road, Sal’s only writing advice to aspir
­ing writer Dean Moriarty is, “after all what do I know about it except you’ve got
 to stick to it with the energy of a benny addict” (6). Sal and Benny do have
 many situational features in common: both drift aimlessly from odd job to odd
 job (both were in the navy, both work as nightwatchmen, Sal briefly works as a
 cotton picker in California while Benny briefly works as an alligator hunter).
 However, while Sal is starry-eyed, idealistic, and passionate, Profane the
 schlemiel 
is
 despondent, clumsy, and aloof, a hollow simulacrum of Sal Par ­
adise.
Both V. and Naked Lunch explicitly detail encroaching mass violence in
 
their different global settings. Both
 
writers disturbingly  portray a world in sig ­
nificant decline. In V., random, chaotic violence reverberates in the Fashoda
 Crisis of 1898 in Cairo, the chaos at the Venezuelan embassy in Florence in
 1899, the violent rebellion of the Bondelswarts in German-occupied South
 Africa in 1922, and in the desecration of Malta during the Second World War.
 Naked Lunch reflects a similar sense of concurrent, random global violence and
 chaos. Much of the violence occurs in Burroughs’ mythical Intervene, where
 shady, criminal organizations terrorize people through brainwashing, drugs,
 and physical torture. Just as Pynchon’s Foppl’s crew mercilessly tortures and
 murders while colonizing in southwest Africa, Burroughs’ Africa-based Islam
 Incorporated is devoted to aimless torture and murder for sadistic pleasure.
 Heading Islam Incorporated is Hassan i Sabbah, who stages shows of sodomy
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and execution in front of jeering, bloodthirsty crowds. Other members of Islam
 
Incorporated are similarly prone to violence: A. J. decapitates American girls,
 while Dr. “Fingers” Schaefer (The Lobotomy Kid) performs lobotomies upon
 unwilling victims. Burroughs and Pynchon take us into the bleakest corners of
 humanity, leaving the reader shuddering with disgust at human beings’ horrif
­ically destructive and violent tendencies, which are exaggerated by technologi
­cally advanced Western culture.
Sickness, Madness, and Addiction
The main narrative of V. revolves around a group of disaffected New Yorkers
 
who call themselves The Whole Sick Crew. Sickness 
is
 a key thematic device  
in seminal Beat writing. The state of sickness is the starting point for both On
 The Road and Naked Lunch. On The Road begins with: “I [Sal] met Dean not
 long after my
 
wife and I split up. I had just gotten over a serious illness that I  
wont bother to talk about except that it had something to do with the miser
­ably weary split-up and my feeling that everything was dead” (3). Similarly,
 Naked Lunch begins with Burroughs’ account: “I awoke from The Sickness at
 the age of 45, calm and sane and in reasonably good health except for a weak
­ened liver and the look of borrowed flesh common to all those who survive The
 Sickness” (xxxvii). Although Burroughs defines “sickness” in Naked Lunch as
 “drug addiction,” sickness seems inherent and ineradicable in Burroughs’
 
vision  
of humanity. Burroughs claims that a “naked lunch” is 
a
 moment of revelation  
in which “a man realizes his cannibalism, his predatory condition and his nec
­essary parasitism and addictive nature.” According to Burroughs then, humans
 are biologically predisposed towards “sickness,” characterized by their inherent
 capacity and desire for violence. One doesn’t necessarily have to be a drug
 addict in order to be “sick.” By Burroughs’ definition, humans are inherently
 cruel, selfish, and aggressive. Nevertheless, some people are “sicker” than oth
­ers. That is, there is a contemporary, perverted American sickness.
Burroughs attacks this “civilized” sickness in Naked Lunch through his sar
­
castic and gruesome portrayals of racism, sadism, and homophobia. For
 instance, a white girl from Texarkana predicates the murder of a young black
 male in East Texas for “looking at me so nasty” and because “he’s give me a sick
 headache” [sic] (176). Similarly, a racist southern county clerk tests a stranger
 from an unnamed city by asking him what he thinks of “The Jeeeews.” Bur
­roughs uncovers the motivating sexual insecurities of these pathetic characters.
 A stranger passes the county clerk’s test by responding: “The only thing a Jew
 wants to do 
is
 doodle a Christian girl. . . . One of these days we’ll cut the rest  
off” (177). In the trial of Naked Lunchr Allen Ginsberg (originally Jewish,
 although he would later convert to Buddhism) defended Burroughs to the
 Massachusetts Supreme Court, which considered this passage, along with many
 others, to be obscene. Ginsberg argued that the passage uncovers the inane
 narrow-mindedness of American bigots: “He is making a parody of the mon
­strous speech and thought
 
processes of a red-necked Southern, hate-filled type,  
who hates everyone —Jews, Negroes and Northerners” (quoted in Naked Lunch
 xxxi).
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While Kerouac and Burroughs detail societal sickness within Eisenhower
 
America in their novels, they don’t celebrate its existence as The Whole Sick
 Crew does in V. Many of the Beats, especially Kerouac, set up a dichotomy
 between sickness and madness. According to the Beats, sickness 
is
 a weariness,  
cruelty, and paranoia engendered by society or civilization. In contrast to soci
­etal sickness, the Beats extolled their own visions as an illuminating form of
 Rimbaudian madness, derived from passionate excess. For Kerouac and many
 of the Beats, there is a special kind of madness that allows an individual to
 experience life more authentically or passionately. This form of madness
 encourages expression of primal
 
instincts, thereby liberating the individual from  
the sterile repression of Western civilization. As Sal Paradise emphasizes in On
 The Road, “the only ones for me are the mad ones, the ones who are mad to live,
 mad to talk, mad to be saved, desirous of everything at the same time, the ones
 who never say a commonplace thing, but burn, burn, burn like fabulous yellow
 roman candles exploding like spiders across the stars and in the middle you see
 the blue center light pop and everyone goes Awwh!”’ (8). Ginsberg dedicated
 his seminal Beat poem, “Howl” (1956), to Burroughs for “an endless novel
 which would drive everybody mad” (quoted in Mottram 12). However, the
 Beats acknowledge that while “madness” is a more authentic, creative state, it
 can lead to destruction in contemporary society, which represses and perverts
 the natural expression of emotional impulses. Indeed, “Howl” begins on a note
 of destruction begot by madness: “I saw the best minds of my generation
 destroyed by madness” (Ellmann 976). Society thwarts the natural expressions
 of humans, driving the individual seeking emotional authenticity to “madness.”
As mentioned earlier, many of
 
the Beats used drugs to help liberate their  
inhibitions and to pursue alternative states of consciousness. Pynchon mainly
 satirizes the Beats’ extreme use of drugs with The Whole Sick Crew’s predilec
­tion for alcohol. Only when he is drunk does Benny Profane have heroic aspi
­rations. Another of Pynchon’s characters, Pig Bodine, who is perpetually drunk
 and aspires to be 
a
 pornographic film star, seems clearly modeled after one of  
Burroughs’ atavistic characters, for whom only violence, sex, and drugs have any
 meaning. Likewise, Mafia Winsome’s obsessive overemphasis on sex, evi
­denced in her practice of “Heroic Screwing,” which to her is “screwing five to
 six times a night with many wrestling holds thrown in” (87), appears to be a
 parody of Kerouac’s Dean Moriarty, to whom “sex was the one and only holy
 important thing in life” (4).
Pynchon’s The Whole Sick Crew embraces the urbane civilized sickness
 
that the Beats reject and joyfully awake from, without reaching the illuminat
­ing (but potentially destructive) state of the Beats’ visionary madness. Essen
­tially, The Whole Sick Crew completely misinterprets Beat philosophy. In V.,
 Roony Winsome describes sickness as “a lack of morality, rejecting morality for
 personal aggrandizement, insanity, accomplishing nothing” (338). This is a
 deterioration of the Beats’ concept of glorified madness, which was a counter-
 cultural response to a sickness that they saw in “healthy” society. In On The
 Road, Sal Paradise becomes “sick” by leading a normal civilized life that has
 become spiritually barren and insubstantial. Consequently, he and Dean look
 for an alternative form of
 
healthy life untainted by civilization, somewhere in
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America and beyond its borders. This possibility is noticeably lacking in Pyn
­
chon’s cold, technologically advanced world, which offers little or no hope for
 personal redemption.
The Beat Generation, The Whole Sick Crew, and Decadence
In coining the term Beat Generation, Kerouac described it as “a generation of
 
crazy, illuminated hipsters suddenly rising and roaming America, serious, curi
­ous, bumming and hitchhiking everywhere, ragged, beatific, beautiful in an ugly
 graceful new
 
way” (portable Kerouac 559). For Kerouac, beat meant “down and  
out but full of intense conviction.” The Beats invented their own alternative
 morality. It 
is
 important to recognize that the word “beat originally meant  
poor, down and out, deadbeat, on the bum, sad, sleeping in subways.” The neo
­hobo Beats, especially Kerouac, identified with the disenfranchised, the out
­siders, and ethnic others. In his deification of the musical form of jazz and
 social alienation, Sal Paradise expresses Kerouac and the Beats’ rejection of
 America’s white dominated culture: “I wish I were a Negro . . . anything other
 than a white man disillusioned” (On The Road 180).
Essentially, Pynchon’s The Whole Sick Crew is a group of Beat posers who
 
misguidedly attempt to emulate a bohemian lifestyle through their mechanical
 and passionless forays into drunkenness and casual sex. They are readers and
 theoreticians while the Beats relied upon and emphasized the need for empiri
­cal firsthand experience. Whereas the Beats eagerly roamed across the country
 and world in search of higher truths and higher pleasures, The Whole Sick
 Crew “lived half their time in a bar on the lower West Side called the Rusty
 Spoon” (26). Unlike the Beats, most members of The Whole Sick Crew never
 leave the confines of New York City. In essence, they are aesthetes or simulacra
 of the Beats. They base their behavior on the pseudo-philosophy of popular
 culture forms: “Most of them worked for a living and obtained the substance
 of their conversation from the pages of Time magazine and like publications”
 (46). As Rachel Owlglass explains, The Whole Sick Crew, “does not create, it
 talks about people who do” (356). The Whole Sick Crew is closer in philoso
­phy to the artistic dandies and critics whom Oscar Wilde endorsed in the late
 nineteenth century than to the Beats. The Beats emphasized the creation of art
 through empirical or personal experience. Whereas the Beats were heavily
 influenced by nineteenth-century American Transcendentalists such as Whit
­man and Melville, in addition to Russian and French existentialists, “anything
 properly English went over with The Whole Sick Crew” (361).
Opposed to the energy or vitality of
 
the Beats is The Whole Sick Crew’s  
lethargy, exemplified in Fergus Mixolydian, “the laziest living being in Nueva
 York” (45), who connects himself electronically to the television set. Pynchon
 emphasizes, “The rest of the Crew partook of the same lethargy.” Their ideas
 . are decadent abstractions of theories that are themselves abstractions of per-
 . sonal experience, distorted through the crooked lenses of magazines and televi
­sion. This sort of quirky popular-culture decadence appears in Slab (presumably
 based on Andy Warhol), who paints cheese danishes and claims he is revolting
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against Catatonic Expressionism. Whereas Kerouac describes the Beats as kind
 
and generous, Roony Winsome describes the minds of the Crew as “vile” (V.
 387). While Pynchon does not implicate or directly critique the philosophy
 and practice of the original Beat writers, he does appear to argue that the Beat
 style of life 
is
 doomed as a movement, as are most lifestyles when applied to a  
large body of people. That is, once any philosophy
 
leaves the hands of its orig ­
inal members, it can be misinterpreted, bastardized or misrepresented by those
 merely interested in gaining a portion of the power and glory achieved by the
 original members.
The Whole Sick Crew
'
s misguided appropriation of Beat-style bohemian-  
ism results in puerile, doltish characters who are frequently inane and insub
­stantial. Whereas Sal and Dean are jazz aficionados who eagerly detail jazz
 performances in lucid musical metaphor, Pig Bodine drunkenly mentions:
 “There is nothing I love more than good shit kicking music” (117). The Whole
 Sick Crew attends the jazz concerts of McClintic Sphere merely to solidify its
 simulated bohemian images. When Sphere plays, they sit silently and oblivi
­ous — “None of them were saying anything” (48) — whereas Dean and Sal
 become passionately animated when they hear jazz. While the parties of On
 The Road are long Dionysian celebrations, lasting up to three days at a time, the
 parties of The Whole Sick Crew are mechanical and passionless: “The party,
 as if it were inanimate after all, unwound like a clock’s mainspring toward the
 edges of the chocolate room” (41). The Whole Sick Crew attends jazz concerts
 and holds parties presumably because it 
is
 the “in” thing to do, according to the  
magazines The Crew reads. Rather than a spontaneous celebration of joy, The
 Crew’s actions are hollow and calculated.
The Road Becomes the Street
In V., Pynchon repeatedly uses an image of a yo-yo to describe various mem
­
bers of The Whole Sick Crew and their activities. Profane feels the closest
 thing to an animate yo-yo in the sense he, like it, “has a path marked out for it
 over which it has no control” (201). Pynchon, in fact, describes Benny Profane
 as a human yo-yo. Yo-yoing in V. parodies the frequent boomerang trips that
 Sal and Dean take in On The Road, which are supposed to be an expression of
 extreme free will and romanticism. The idea behind yo-yoing, conversely, is
 determinism and control — after all, someone or something holds the string of
 a yo-yo. For Pynchon, the hand that holds the yo-yo string may be the invisi
­ble, deterministic hand of genetic predisposition that motivates people to trav
­el as a form of territorial expansion and/or territorial appropriation. Profane
 and other members of the Whole Sick Crew are described as yo-yos who trav
­el back and forth, mostly within in New York City, typically on the subway.
 Benny yo-yos from Norfolk to New York, then within New York, and ulti
­mately to Malta. Similarly, Kerouac’s Sal Paradise might also be described as a
 human yo-yo in the sense that he continually boomerangs back to his aunt’s
 house in Paterson, New
 
Jersy, after his successive trips across the country with  
and without Dean Moriarty.
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Whereas The Whole Sick Crew’s yo-yoing takes place almost entirely
 
within the confines of New York City, Sal and Dean’s traveling takes them all
 across America and into Mexico. Furthermore, yo-yoing becomes an abstract
 game for The Whole Sick Crew. The Crew sets up a contest of yo-yoing up
 and down the subway where "Slab is the king with 69 cycles over a week-end”
 (277). Similarly in On The Road, traveling is sometimes done excessively as a
 kind of sport. At one point, Sal mentions, "We had come from Denver to
 Chicago via Ed Wall’s ranch, 1180 miles, in exactly seventeen hours ... for a
 mean average of seventy miles per hour across the land, with one driver. Which
 
is
 a kind of crazy record” (237). Unlike The Whole Sick Crew, Sal recognizes  
that it is crazy to keep numerical records when the journey and the destination
 are infinitely more important than the distance traveled. Furthermore, The
 Whole Sick Crew
 
rarely has a destination  when it travels. While Sal and Dean  
find a new
 
kind of freedom in their travels, Pynchon represents Profane as aim ­
less in his wanderings, which themselves appear to be determined by chance
 rather than an act of free will.
The Whole Sick Crew’s universe has condensed from the Beats’
 
worldwide  
expansiveness to New York City, just as Kerouac’s expansive Whitmanian open
 road has been reduced to a street. Profane has "nightmares of a single abstract
­ed street” (2), whereas Paradise has dreams and visions of "the holy road” (23).
 Pynchon denies mysticism and transcendentalism as ways "out” of the limiting
 human condition or as alternatives to escalating world violence. Unlike Sal,
 who grows through his travels by acquainting himself with different
 
people and  
different ways of life, "[s]treets had taught him [Profane] nothing” (27). In V.,
 romantic dreams of the road and America have disappeared as the world has
 grown steadily more sterile and mechanized. The individual’s imagination has
 become constricted by urban and technological sprawl: "This was all there was
 to dream; all there ever was: The Street” (31). While Kerouac uses the image
 of
 
the road as lifeblood for the new American romantic, in V., Pynchon con ­
nects the dreamer with the bleak urban street. The heavily industrialized, tech
­nologically advanced environment limits the dreamer, who is described as "only
 an inconsequential shadow of himself in the landscape, partaking of the soul
­lessness of these other masses and shadows. This 
is
 the Twentieth Century  
Nightmare” (303). In V., the technological/inanimate world invades the human
 psychological realm that perceives concepts in crude cybernetic binaries (the
 hothouse and the street, the underground and the street). The street is also
 described 
as
 "the kingdom of death” (47), whereas Kerouac’s road itself is "life”  
(211). In part, Pynchon’s direct inversion of Kerouac’s thematics 
is
 ultimately  
an attempt to denigrate his romantic idealism as unfeasible in and not pertinent
 to the world of the late 1950s and early 1960s, in which the world hangs in 
a delicate balance of power, seemingly ready to crumble at a moment’s notice.
The Quest or Search
On one level, both V. and seminal Beat works are updated twentieth-century
 
stories about searchers and quests. V. can be interpreted as the story of the
 quest of Herbert Stencil to find the woman V., whom he at least initially
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believes to be his mother. 
V.,
 in her various forms, links the novel together even  
though the narrative moves somewhat haphazardly from country to country
 and person to person. Burroughs’ Naked Lunch has a similar global focus.
 Instead of being linked
 
by various versions of V., “the world network  of junkies”  
links Naked Lunch together (6). Junkies themselves are linked to one another
 (dealer to user and vice versa) by need. Burroughs calls this “the algebra of
 need” (178). In Burroughs’ nightmarish
 
vision, humans are reduced to running  
on “the silent frequency of junk” (31). Like the various incarnations of V.,
 drugs become semi-mystical totems for the addict: “Junk 
is
 surrounded by  
magic and taboos, curses and amulets” (5). While Naked Lunch is populated'by
 a number of addicted drug searchers, V contains only one main searcher, Her
­bert Stencil. While the search for V. gives Stencil a purpose, he approaches his
 search coldly, much like an empirical scientist. In contrast, in On the Road, the
 search itself provides mystical revelations and transcendence for Sal and Dean.
In On The Road, Sal and Dean search for a similar undefined object, which
 
they call “IT.” Their idea of “IT” involves a vision or insight into the nature of
 existence, or a lost Eden that they naively or romantically believe to be recov
­erable. At one point, Dean tells Sal, “Now man, that alto man last night had
 IT — he held it once he found it” (206). Like V., IT is a concept that can take
 many forms. At times, IT is the sound of a jazz musician hitting the right
 notes. IT can also be a feeling of joyful abandonment that Sal and Dean get
 while on the road. When Sal asks Dean what “IT” is, Dean cannot explain. He
 says, “now you’re asking me impon-de-rables” (206). Their Tao-like search for
 IT leads them towards artistic nonhuman forms that they hope can transcend
 their own human mortality.
Before his first trip, Sal claims, “Somewhere along the line I knew there’d
 
be girls, visions, everything; somewhere along the line the pearl would
 
be hand ­
ed to me” (On The Road 11). Sal Paradise sets off for the West confident that
 he will find hope in a particular place. He wants to emulate Dean Moriarty,
 whom he describes as a “sideburned
 
hero of the snowy West” (8). Pynchon par ­
odies Sal’s desire for heroism in Benny Profane. The only times that Benny
 aspires towards heroism are when he is drunk. At one point, Pynchon details
 a drunken Benny attempting to piss on the sun: “It went down; as if he’d extin
­guished it after all and continued on immortal, god of a darkened world” (17).
 Pynchon debunks the idea of heroism 
as
 a drunken and deluded illusion of  
human grandeur, whereas Kerouac tried to resuscitate the American hero for
 the post-World War II generation. Benny, more of an everyman figure than
 Dean or Sal, tells Mafia, “Nothing heroic about a schlemiel.... Somebody who
 lies back and takes it from objects, like any passive woman” (268). While Sal
 strives towards heroism, there appears to be no possibility for heroism in V.
While Stencil is the primary searcher in V., other characters also hunt for
 
meaning. Hugh Godolphin, the explorer, looks for the mythical land of Vheis-
 su. One of his explorations takes him to the South Pole, where he sees the
 corpse of one of Vheissu’s spider monkeys encased in ice. He tells Signor Man
­tissa, “It was Nothing I saw” (188). He continues to describe his vision as “a
 mockery, you see: a mockery of life.” Godolphin’s romantic quest ends in the
 ironic perception that the surface 
is
 all there is; beneath it  lies only  nothingness.
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Likewise, at the end of V., "Stencil sketched the entire history of V. that night
 
and strengthened a long suspicion. That it did add up to only
 
the recurrence of  
an initial and a few dead objects” (419). As David Seed argues, “Whereas in
 the fiction of Kerouac, the quest pattern gives the narrative impetus, Pynchons
 ambivalence about meaningful goals renders his characters’ quests ludicrous”
 (8).
Indeed, in On The Road, the road appears to lead to a real visionary place
 
just as Godolphin believes that his searches would lead to the holy land of
 Vheissu. When Sal and Dean go to Mexico, they believe, “We had finally
 found the magic land at the end of the road and we never dreamed the extent
 of the magic” (On The Road 276). However, similar to Godolphins disillusion
 at realizing his vision of Vheissu to be misguided, the magic of Mexico wears
 off quickly, as Sal succumbs to another physical sickness in Mexico, mirroring
 his original sickness before the book begins. Still, Sal’s trips affect him, change
 him for
 
the better, and while he seems to reject  Dean as a hero figure, he regains  
an almost neo-Catholic belief in the basic goodness of humanity and the sacred
 nature of the land itself. While Pynchon’s V. ends with little hope for the
 future, Kerouac sees promise in America. Indeed, the Beats thought that the
 people and the world itself could be changed for the better, but Pynchon holds
 no such hope in V.
Written during the gloomy heights of the Cold War, V. displays a world that
 
creeps towards a kind of technological Armageddon in its increasing brutality
 and inhumanity. At the epilogue of V., Sidney Stencil ruminates that “some
­time between 1859 and 1919, the
 
world contracted a disease which no one ever  
took the trouble to diagnose because the symptoms were too subtle ;— blend
­ing in with the events of history, no different one by one but altogether fatal”
 (433). In V., the human world is ultimately unexplainable and illogical, where
 even the “logic” of
 
the inert universe is a false human construct. Benny Pro ­
fane’s last words are symptomatic of his continual ignorance and the seeming
 pointlessness of knowledge: “Offhand I’d say I haven’t learned a goddamn
 thing” (454).
This is not to suggest that Pynchon’s vision in V, is completely apocalyptic,
 
but he does argue that the Beat approach, favoring the emotions over the intel
­lect, while romantic, is not practically sound. He veers more towards esteemed
 jazzman McClintic Sphere’s dictum, “Keep cool, but care,” which seems like
 pointed advice to both Beat writers and followers, who feel that coolness, or a
 lack of emotional response, is repressive and morally suspect. For the Beats,
 one cannot truly care and keep cool or distanced at the same time. In order to
 care truly, one must project the self outwards. This gets us back to one of Ker
­ouac’s initial meanings of “beat” 
as
 “beatific” or giving and generous. Allied  
with Kerouac’s neo-Catholic vision is his emphasis that the imagination can
 somehow surmount or counteract human frailties or weaknesses. Whereas
 Pynchon nullifies or reduces the dreamer’s imagination to the mechanical rep
­resentation of the street, Kerouac leaves us with the image of “all the people . . .,
 dreaming in the immensity of it [America]” (On The Road 309). Perhaps the
 dreamers will be left as Sal is, to dream on
 
“the old broken-down river pier,” but
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the hope remains of dreaming themselves into a better future or world. For
 
Pynchon, this notion is ridiculous as humans have already sowed the seeds of
 their doom through rampant technological advancement.




as alternatives to general meaninglessness, these are empty  constructs for the  
quintessentially postmodern Pynchon. This leads everyone — the characters,
 the author, and the reader — towards a feeling of
 
worthlessness and inertia.  
Pynchon may initially have been attracted to Kerouac
'
s romanticism, but V. is  
anything but romantic. For Pynchon, the Beats’ romanticism is only admirable
 in theory. Yet Pynchon does not adequately prove that the Beat lifestyle 
is unrealistic, only that it has been misappropriated by misguided followers. If
 The
 
Whole Sick Crew cannot live the intense, passionate lifestyle promoted by  
Beat writers, it is not because this lifestyle is impossible, but because The
 Crew’s commitment to life is minimal and self-interested. While Pynchon’s
 vision of entropy veers closer to Burroughs’, Pynchon lacks Burroughs’ sense of
 social agency. While Burroughs reels with disgust at the horror he witnesses in
 the contemporary world, Pynchon appears resigned to its increased presence
 and to the ultimate death of humanity in V. With all its postmodern doom and
 gloom, V. revels in cynical intellectual word play and allusion. The ultimate
 joke of V. is on all of us, when we realize that we are all in Benny’s position of
 having not learned a goddamn thing. According
 
to Pynchon, the historical pat ­
tern of entropy dominates human free will. Even Burroughs’ emphasis on the
 supremacy of the author/creator in disordering narrative or form 
is
 no real  
alternative to Pynchon.




Lot 49 (1966) shows his gradual abandonment of his doom-ridden vision  
of future. For in V., written in the early 1960s, but set largely in 1956, Pynchon
 seems not to have anticipated the countercultural movement of the mid-to-late
 1960s (which he lampoons brilliantly in The Crying of Lot 49) and the subse
­quent positive movement towards civil and social rights. Unlike Allen Gins
­berg, who later
 
became the most public of the Beat writers, playing a significant  
role in countercultural movements during the 1960s, Pynchon stayed in the
 shadows during the 1960s (and continues to do so today). In a way, Pynchon’s
 mission was more admirable: to identify the forces that lie underneath cultur
­al change throughout the past several hundred years of Western history. Still,
 Pynchon’s contention that these submerged forces were largely violent and
 obsessional and that they have increased and will continue to increase leaves the
 reader with little hope. Furthermore, Pynchon’s reluctance to become a public
 figure or make clear his political and moral
 
views during the 1960s helps make  
him appear significantly more detached from the world than the Beats and
 their followers. Nevertheless, almost forty years after the publication of V..,
 Pynchons critique of Beat followers or beatniks seems telling. Indeed, the
 unexpected fame and subsequent pressure from becoming the media-appointed
 “King of the Beatniks,” helped lead Jack Kerouac into the seclusion and severe
 alcoholism that sent him to an early grave. If there is a lesson that Pynchon
 wishes us to learn from his critique of the Beat followers, it 
is
 that what is  
admirable and romantic in pinciple can often turn formulaic and even danger
­ous when it becomes a real-life movement.
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Aside from Naked Lunch, Burroughs published The Exterminator (1960),  
The Soft Machine (1961), and The Ticket That Exploded (1962) while Pynchon
 was working on V. Burroughs’ first novel, Junky (1953), predates his others by
 several years.
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 particularly good movement  
with 
a
 similarly valuable case, so it may  
happen with jokes that the best achieve
­ments in the way of jokes are used as an
 envelope for thoughts of the greatest
 substance.
—Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to
 
the Unconscious
A minor literature doesn’t come from a
 
minor language; it 
is
 rather that which a  
minority constructs within 
a
 major lan ­
guage.
—Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka:
 
Toward a Minor Literature
1.
The charge that the short story is a “major” form
 
belies the fact that it continues to be studied 
as
 a  
“minor” genre. It 
is
 curious that in this age of theo ­
ry and practice the short story remains one of the
 most theoretically “deterritorialized” narrative genres.
 Though many critics and students of the genre
 
would  
vehemently protest against its “minor” or “marginal”
 status, it nevertheless remains a fact that, with one or
 two exceptions, no extensive study of the short story
 as either a narratively major or minor form is cur
­rently in print. Regardless of the reasons why such an
 obvious lack of critical attention to the short story
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ertheless appears to mitigate against the popularity of the short story as a seri
­
ous venue for many fiction writers. The present essay seeks to some extent to
 offer an explanation of the genre’s “minor” status among critics while remain-
 ing one of
 
the most “seriously playful” forms within which many current and  
past “major” writers create.
Though it would be impossible, in the short scope of this essay, to offer a .
 
theoretical framework for discussing the major versus minor status of the short
 story in general, by examining a few examples of the subgenre of the short
­short story in light of Deleuze and Guattari’s first qualification of a minor lit
­erature — that it bears a “high coefficient of deterritorialization” — it becomes
 possible to understand how the short story has managed to retain its major sta
­tus among writers while at the same time remaining a critically
 
marginal genre.  
Moreover, by considering the genre and its subsidiary forms in light of Freud’s
 work on the tendentious
 
joke as an example of a “minor” narrative genre, some  
light 
is
 shed not only on the narrative functions of short-short stories but also  
on the question of how major versus minor literary status is conferred upon a
 popular yet marginal form that to some extent depends on its marginal status
 to retain its major effect.
Deleuze and Guattari describe three characteristics of a minor literature: 1)
 
the deterritorialization of language, 2) the connection of an individual to a
 political immediacy, and 3) a collective assemblage of enunciation (18). In
 order to adapt the concept of minor literature to a study of a genre within a
 major language, this essay will focus on describing and evaluating the deterri
­torialization of a genre: the short-short story. By deterritorialization of genre
 is meant the way in which a genre — in this case the short-short story — acts
 
as
 a passage point into “territory” not usually seen as territory the genre usual ­
ly occupies. In this case, the deterritorialization of genre signifies a space of
 freedom, a territory of genre wherein experiment and inversion take place in
 spite of the rigid controls of generic convention. Freud’s work on the genre of
 the joke in his Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious
 
will likewise be adapt ­
ed to demonstrate first the similarity between the narrative operations of the
 joke and the short-short story, and second how these generic similarities are
 operative
 
within the short-short subgenre. Short-short stories by  Kafka, Petro-  
nious, Colette, and Woolf
 
have been chosen to examine generic deterritorial ­




the short story and the joke has not  gone unremarked  
by critics of the short story. Walter Allen, in his The Short Story in
 
English, cites  
the
 
joke as the present-day survivor of the oral tale and notes that “[v]ery few  
jokes, written down, would seem much Eke modern stories. They might very
 well, though, remind us of many of Boccacio’s tales in skeleton form. This
 throws light on the relationship of the modern story both to the joke and to
 tales of
 
earlier times” (4). Although Allen does not examine this relationship  
and implies that it is one in which dissimilarities dominate, at least one short
­
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story critic, Clare Hanson, notes that the short-story writer Saki “frequently
 
uses the frame of the practical joke for the purpose of unmasking, revealing
 something hidden beneath the surface of life” (47). Hanson adds that the plea
­sure this unmasking yields in Saki
'
s stories is connected to the workings of the  
unconscious in the same way as in the joke. According to Freud:
A joke has quite outstandingly the characteristic of being a notion that has
 
occurred to us “involuntarily.” What happens is not that we know a
 moment beforehand what joke we are going to make, and that all it needs
 
is
 to be clothed in words. We have an indefinable feeling, rather, which I  
can best compare with an “absence” a sudden release of intellectual tension,
 and then all at once the joke is there as a rule ready-clothed in words.
(Jokes
 167)
We shall return to the crucial role that “absence” plays in both the joke para
­
digm and the short-short, but for now it is enough to note that Hanson’s use of
 Freud’s formula constitutes the only specific correlation that has been made to
 date between the short story and Freud’s text. Furthermore, in regard to short
 stories with “trick” or surprise endings (such as those written by both Saki and
 O. Henry), Hanson perceptively situates the reader in the position of the “lis
­tener,” or necessary third person, in Freud’s tendentious joke paradigm (47).
Hanson’s use of Freud signals a formal recognition of the connection
 
between the short story and the joke, but it also presents a veiled threat to the
 critical status of the short story. For although both Saki and O. Henry are
 admittedly “major” short story writers,
 
both have been accused of being “minor”  
artists for having written in the highly formulaic, technically prefabricated style
 for which they are known. Their works have often been cited 
as
 examples of  
what the short-story genre can be reduced to in the hands of “sensationalists,”
 and the beginning writer is admonished not to imitate their methods. In addi
­tion, though they are both considered to be “short-story writers,” it is in the
 subgenre of the short-short that some of their most memorable work has been
 done.
Paradoxically, it is precisely because their short-short stories (O. Henry’s
 
“The Gift of the Magi” and Saki’s “The Open Window,” for example) are so
 closely related to the joke paradigm that their effects as stories are ensured and
 the writers’ reputations so tarnished. Does this then mean that a study of the
 short-short by way of the structure of jokes will “short-circuit” at the outset,
 will amount only to a catalogue of the gimmickry at the writer’s disposal and
 therefore an implicit admission that the short story is, after all, a
 
“minor” genre?
At least two factors guard against this outcome. First, not all short-shorts
 are as transparently
 
related to the joke paradigm as those of Saki and O. Henry.  
Second, the joke-work itself, 
as
 articulated by Freud, is not as easily appropri ­
ated as it may seem. After all, there are “good” jokes and “bad” jokes, success
­fully and unsuccessfully told ones. As Freud notes, the defining characteristic
 of what constitutes a joke 
is
 elusive and lies not simply in the joke technique  
nor in the pleasure that the joke affords its creator Jokes 145). Furthermore,
 “the joke-work is not at everyone’s command, and altogether only a few people
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have a plentiful amount of it; and these are distinguished by being spoken of as
 
having wit’” (140). In this regard the successful joker is not unlike the creative
 writer, as for both the success of their craft originates in play with words and
 partakes of the workings of the unconscious as it also manifests itself in the
 dreamwork (170). As for jokes themselves, they have a “subjective determi
­nant” that indicates that
[o]nly
 
what I allow to be a joke is a joke. What is a joke to me may mere ­
ly be a comic story to other people. But if a joke admits of this doubt, the
 reason can only
 
be that it has a facade — in these instances a comic one —  
in the contemplation of which one person is satiated
 
while another may  try  
to peer behind it. A suspicion may arise, moreover, that this facade 
is intended to dazzle the examining eye and that these stories have therefore
 something to conceal.
(105-6)
Furthermore, by not being at the disposal of all tellers, the joke becomes a high
­
ly deterritorialized genre, one that
 
by its own nature is inherently removed from  
the language in which it 
is
 told.
What Freud suggests here is that the joke — any joke — 
is
 paradigmatic.  
The joke itself is an “envelope” for a thought that would otherwise not be
 expressed (92). In other words, “the substance of a joke is independent of the
 joke and 
is
 the substance of  the thought, which is here, by means of a special  
arrangement, expressed as a joke.” The “special arrangement” — the
 
joke par ­
adigm — involves three people: the “first person” (teller), the “second person”
 (object of the joke), and the “third person” (the listener). In textual terms we
 can revise this paradigm in any one of several ways: 
1)
 first person/writer, sec ­
ond person/text, third person/reader; or 2) first person/narrator, second per-
 son/narrated, third person/narratee; or 3) first person/reader, second person
 text, third person/context. Each revision corresponds to and overlaps with cer
­tain theories of textual production: intentionality and reader response, textual
 hermeneutics, and Marxist/materialist theories of the cultural production of
 textual identity. By superimposing the joke paradigm we can establish a psy
­choanalytic criticism that can incorporate, rather than be reduced to, a diversi
­ty of critical approaches to textuality (Brooks 112).
Thus we find that at least two factors safeguard a study of the correlation
 
between the short-short and the joke against a reductivist cataloguing of tech
­niques: jokes themselves cannot be reduced to such a catalogue; and they pos
­sess a “subjective determinant” that implicates both creator and listener in the
 process of construction and deterritorializes the genre. Thus the rich potential
 of the joke paradigm enables us to discuss the short-short 
as
 itself a facade that  
“dazzles” and “conceals,” a facade that the writer “exposes” and that we as read
­ers “try to peer behind.” Jokes and short-shorts, mutually reliant upon brevity
 and economy to achieve their effect, share Freud’s requirement for abbreviation
 (Jokes 42).
  The technique of using brevity, as Freud noted in his connection with the
 seminal joke borrowed from Heinrich Heine, is related to other techniques
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 condensation, multiple use of the same material, and double meaning.  
Freud notes that the element common to these techniques is "a question of
 economy” (42). But
not every economy of expression, not every abbreviation, 
is
 on that account  
a joke as well. . . . There must be some peculiar kind of abbreviation and
 economy on which the characteristic of being a joke depends; and until we
 know the nature of
 
that peculiarity our discovery of  the common element  
in the techniques of jokes brings us no nearer to a solution of our problem.
 
(20)
The problem Freud refers to is that of discovering the psychical process that
 
characterizes both the production of jokes in the first person and the pleasure
 they produce in the listener. As regards the listener, Freud writes, "laughter
 arises if a quota of psychical energy which has earlier been used for the cathexis
 of particular psychical paths has become unusable, so that it can find free dis
­charge” (Jokes 147). The joke thus “lifts” the inhibitory cathexis in the listen
­
er.
 But the creator of the joke is barred from participating in this same psychic  
process if the joke is to succeed — nothing ruins a joke more readily than if the
 joker begins laughing in the process of telling the joke. Therefore, the psychi
­cal process the creator undergoes differs from that of the listener. In his char
­acteristically dualistic fashion, Freud offers two explanations for the process: 1)
 no inhibitory cathexsis is lifted for the listener, or 2) there 
is
 an “interference”  
with the possibility of discharge that may arise from the application of the lib
­erated cathectic energy to some other endopsychic use. The teller of the
 
joke,  
in telling it, produces the force that lifts an inhibition
 
by  economizing a psychic  
expenditure of energy within the joke itself, thus clearing the way for the lis
­tener, who brings little or no psychic investment to the joke, to receive its plea
­sure.
Jokes, like dreams, are “overdetermined” according to Freud. Both employ
 
the processes of displacement, condensation, and indirect representation. In
 both jokes and dreams, brevity results in condensation. Clearly, the literary
 genre of the short-short story shares with both the joke and the dream this
 reliance upon condensation through brevity to achieve its effect. However,
 short-shorts require, as do jokes, a listener actively engaged in the textual
 process.
Brevity, in both jokes and short-short stories, serves the purposes of com
­
munication: a joker, like a writer, must “capture”
 
the listener in a relatively  short  
period of time. Jokes are short both because there is not much time in which
 to tell them and because, owing to the nature of their dynamic, they accentuate
 the ephemerality of perception. Short-shorts, as imitations of the joking
 process, duplicate the joke’s advantage of brevity and are thus aligned with the
 “economy of psychical expenditure” offered by the joke.
In order to trace more closely the thread weaving Freud’s discussion of
 
economy in the joke with that of economy, or brevity, in the short-short, it 
is helpful to subject Freud’s analysis to 
a
 type of “secondary revision” by consider ­
ing it in light of a story by Franz Kafka. Because the story, “Absent-Minded
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 is so short, it is possible to reproduce it here in English  
translation.
Absent-Minded Window Gazing
What are we to do with these spring days that are now fast coming on?
 
Early this morning the sky was gray, but if you go to the window now you
 are surprised and lean your cheek against the latch of the casement.
The sun 
is
 already setting, but down below you see it lighting up the  
face of the little girl who strolls along looking about her, and at the same
 time you see her eclipsed by the shadow of the man behind overtaking her.
And then the man has passed by
 
and the little girl’s face is quite bright.
(Kafka 387)
Revision of Freud’s analysis here involves substituting the “first person” of the
 
narrative for the “first person” of the joke. We will temporarily bypass the
 authorial position and triangulate the text into narrator, narrated, and narratee:
 we will make use, in other words, of our second revision of the joke paradigm.
 In doing this we find that the narrator is itself split into the “we” of the first
 line and the “you” of the end of the first paragraph. At the same time, the nar
­ratee stands outside the text, in the third-person position, 
as
 listener to a text  
that is simultaneously implicating the reader and constructing the reader as
 Other. In this way, the first revision of Freud’s paradigm is superimposed onto
 the second.
In this superimposition, the “second person” of the joke/text is the narrat
­
ed: the setting of the window, the sun setting, the girl, the man, the act of
 eclipsing, the brightening of the girl’s face, and so on. . In the second revision,
 the “second person” is the text, including the narrator, the narrated, and the nar

















In the second paragraph of Kafka’s story, the “first person” we/you conjures
 
the inhibition that is to be lifted by putting the “third person” you/reader in
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sympathy with the young girl walking in the sun. Thus when the shadow of the
 
man eclipses her, the you/reader’s inhibition against the ominousness of this act
 
is
 lifted by a narrative sleight of hand — it is only his shadow that comes into  
contact with her face. But his threatening potential as abductor or molester 
is alluded to by his approach from “behind overtaking her.” The last line lifts the
 inhibition, passing over the you/reader as the shadow passes over the girl’s face;
 like the girl’s face, the you/reader is psychically left “quite bright” as well. At
 the same time, because the reader as “you” is implicated in the process of con
­structing the joke/text, the we/you “economizes” the lifting of the inhibition by
 emphasizing the mutual construction of the narrative itself, thus crediting the
 reader with the creation of the text/joke s/he also receives.
Kafka’s peculiar use of both the third-person plural and second-person uni
­
versal pronoun makes the story especially well-suited to a revision of Freud’s
 analysis. Because the pronoun chain allows the reader to participate in both the
 first- and third- person positions of the joke paradigm, the “economy of
 
psy ­
chical expenditure” flows continuously through the narrative. The economic
 chain of the story is interrupted only by the reader’s position outside the text,
 by her awareness of herself as being in the position of listener. Once the read
­er disengages from the narrative, she finds herself in the same position as that
 of the third person; that is, the story can now be retold and passed on to the
 next listener.
This story originates in a textually preconscious “thought”: “spring is as
 
fresh and vulnerable to change as a young girl alone on a street.” Given over to
unconscious revision, the “vulnerable to change” manifests itself as the man’s
 shadow overtaking the girl. The season’s vulnerability is displaced to the shad
­ow’s eclipse of the girl, whose brightened face restores triumph to spring’s abil
­ity to overcome changing weather. The story makes use of joke techniques such
 as displacement, allusion, condensation and substitution. And both the we/you
 and the you/reader participate in the “economy of psychical expenditure”
 offered by the joke paradigm and set into motion by Kafka’s shift in point of
 view from the first-person plural to the second-person “you,” which can be
 taken as either singular or plural or both and so completes the circularity of the
 joke chain.
The success of the story, and the success of a joke, depends on the reader’s
 
having been “captured” by the punch line, or moment of closure. There is a
 marked similarity between the success of a joke as described by Freud — hid
­den similarities are revealed between dissimilar things, sense emerges out of
 nonsense, bewilderment yields to illumination — and the success of a short
­short. Irving Howe agrees that in the short-short, “[everything depends on
 intensity, one sweeping blow of perception” (xi).
In the joke the liberated cathectic energy finds its release, for the listener,
 
in laughter. Though Kafka’s story is not “funny”
 
in this sense, the release of psy ­
chical energy experienced in the moment of closure constitutes a type of Kris-
 tevan “laughter of the text” on the part of the reader. In fact, a revision of the
 tendentious joke paradigm in terms of what Freud calls “woman’s inflexibility”
 (the first condition of smut according to Freud) is itself a type of “motor dis
­charge,” an expenditure that places woman simultaneously in the subject and
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object position and allows her access to the joking chain as the “first person,” or
 
teller of the joke (Kristeva 224-5).
Brevity and psychical expenditure, or closure, then, are two Freudian char
­
acteristics shared by the joke and the short-short. The third quality, absence,
 what Freud calls a “sudden release of intellectual
 
tension,” is, in the short-short,  
precisely the nature of the creative condition. The writer, as Freud notes in his
 essay on daydreaming and creativity, must occupy a place of absence in order to
 create. In Kafka’s story, this connection 
is
 underscored by the title itself:  
“Absent-Minded Window Gazing.”
That short-shorts depend not only on brevity and closure but also on the
 
presence of an absence is substantiated by the work of
 
any number of writers.  
For instance, in O. Henry’s story, “The Gift of the Magi,” the success of the
 ending turns on this play between presence and absence in the “presents” the
 couple “present” each other with at Christmas: both gifts are purchased at the
 price of the very thing that the other sacrificed for. The girl sells her hair to
 buy the boy a watch fob; the boy sells his watch to buy a comb for the girl’s hair.
In Petronius’s story, “The Wife of Ephesus,” the soldier attempting to
 
seduce the wife faithfully mourning her dead husband wins his aim by cajoling
 her with the presentation of a meal as a substitute for the absence of her hus
­band. Death, he declared to her, 
is
 the common end and last home of all men,  
enlarging on this and other commonplaces generally employed to console a
 wounded spirit (262). The absence of the crucified body of
 
a criminal (which  
the soldier had been entrusted to guard) that was stolen while he seduced the
 wife 
is
 what prompts her to offer her husband’s body as a substitute for the  
missing body of the criminal in order that the negligent soldier not be execut
­ed for failing his duty. It is this action, on the part of the wife, that effectively
 moves her, as woman, from the position of object, or “butt,” of the seduction
 joke into the subject position, as a third-person listener becomes the first-per
­son teller of her own joke. The punch line of this textual
 
joke coincides with  
the moment of closure in the story:
“The gods forbid,” she cried, “I should at one and the same time look on
 
the corpses of two men, both most dear to me. I had rather hang a dead
 man on the cross than kill a living one.” So said, so done; she orders her
 husband’s body to be taken from its coffin and fixed upon the vacant cross.
 The soldier availed himself of
 
the ready-witted lady’s expedient, and next  
day all men marvelled how in the world a dead man had found his way to
 the cross.
(Petronius 265)
The wife’s action, as well as her response to the seduction, has earned her the
 
reputation as the paradigmatic “fickle woman.” A revision of the story by
 means of the joke paradigm reveals the wife of Ephesus as the heroine of her
 own seduction: society would deny her, in her widowhood, any sexual satisfac
­tion, yet she plays society’s “rules” against themselves to take control of her own
 future. In short, within a deterritorialized genre, the wife succeeds in deterri
­torializing society’s expectations concerning her.
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3.
Only jokes with 
a
 purpose run the risk of meeting with people who don’t want  
to listen to them.
—Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious
Tendentious jokes, according to Freud, serve an aim, and “where a joke 
is
 not  
an aim in itself there are only two purposes that it may serve. . . . [I]t is either
 a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire or defense) or an
 obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure) (Jokes 97). For woman in the
 position of object, or “butt,” of the joke, purposes of hostility and obscenity are
 necessarily conflated: in either case, woman is to be “kept in her place” within
 the scheme of male domination. Feminist critics working with Freudian texts
 often find that Freud himself provides the paradigm that allows woman access
 to the subject position in the textual/joking chain. As Jerry Aline Flieger pro
­poses, “'she,’ however offended by the male conspirators, refuses to leave the
 room feeling ashamed” (960).
According to Freud, it 
is
 “woman's inflexibility,” her  refusal to yield to man’s  
attempts at sexual exposure, that constitutes the “first condition” for the devel
­opment of the obscene joke. Thus, woman is simultaneously the inhibition
 underlying the joke and the source of cathectic liberation once this inhibition
 is lifted. In other words, in her “inflexibility” woman has access to all three
 positions on the joking chain. Her inflexibility is itself a superimposition of the
 three stages of the psychical process of the joke: 1) the inflexibility that renders
 woman unwilling to acknowledge herself 
as
 the butt of the joke reenacts the  
first-person position, in which the teller is unable to laugh at the joke in the
 telling of it; 2) that inflexibility is also the “absence” from which the joke aris
­
es
 involuntarily; and 3) inflexibility, whether a matter of attitude or of the lit ­
eral stiffening of the body, is itself a “cathectic response,” a “motor discharge”
 (albeit nonhysterical) that aligns woman with the third-person position on the
 joking chain, that of the listener whose inhibitions are lifted by the joke.
Moreover, in Freudian terms, “woman’s incapacity to tolerate undisguised
 
sexuality” is nothing less than her refusal to have exposed as her sexuality the
 pseudo-sexuality of herself as “castrated man” constructed out of man’s own
 refusal to tolerate his homoerotic nature. The obstacle to man’s desire, in other
 words, is not woman but man’s own inhibitions regarding his homoerotic
 nature. Woman in the tendentious joke paradigm serves as the displaced object
 of man’s “desire” for the company of his own, not the Other’s, company. Her
 refusal to allow herself to be used this way (evidenced by her own cathectic
 response of not laughing at the obscene joke) is a powerful deterritorialization
 both of herself and of the joking chain to which she would be denied entrance.
Thus, woman, who through her refusal to participate in the joke with the
 
same type of cathectic response as men finds access to the joking chain,
 becomes the Medusa who laughs, rightly, at man, who in his own homophobic
 fear insists that woman herself cannot be looked upon directly. The short-short
 story, so closely related to the paradigm of the joke, enables women writing to
 overdetermine themselves as subjects and to gain direct access to the power of
 the punch line in such a way as to “ex-pose” themselves as beyond male ridicule.
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For instance, in Colettes “The Hidden Woman” (“La Femme Cache”) the
 
figure of the male doctor finds himself simultaneously exposed to woman’s
 repressed desire and liberated by the free expression of that desire through a
 double-edged
 
joke that the doctor and his wife each play on each other. Both  
the doctor and the wife tell each other that they won’t be going to the green and
 purple masked ball: the doctor because he says he will be with a patient and
 the wife because of feigned modesty. In fact, unbeknown to each other they
 both attend the ball, the doctor beneath a cowl and domino, the wife dressed as
 Pierrot. Fascinated by the Pierrot, the doctor 
is
 startled to hear it give a cough  
and an “ahem” very much like that of his wife. When the Pierrot scratches “its”
 thigh, “with a free and uninhibited gesture,” the doctor says in relief, “It’s not
 her.” In fact it is, and this is confirmed for the doctor when the Pierrot brings
 forth an antique snuffbox he recognizes as his wife’s. Convinced that she 
is there for a rendezvous with another man, the doctor has his own duplicity
 turned back on him, and he follows the Pierrot to see
 
whom she is meeting. In  
the process he is awakened to a new sense of
 
his wife’s free expression of her  
sexuality by the way she rolls her hips, lets men embrace her in the crowd, and
 even herself fondles the breasts of another woman. Finally, the doctor is sure
 that she is not waiting for anyone in particular but was “tasting only the mon
­strous pleasure of being alone, free, honest in her native brutality, of being the
 one who is unknown, forever solitary and without shame, whom a little mask
 and a hermetic costume had restored ... to her irremediable solitude and her
 immodest innocence” (235-6).
The “hidden woman” of the title is both the wife the doctor knows beneath
 
her disguise and the “brutally” free woman the disguise allows her to be.
 Woman’s position as “object” in the doctor’s joke 
is
 doubly overdetermined, and  
though he is startled by her mastery, he reassures himself that she will wear
 
her ­
self out and go home. The doctor, having knowledge of
 
her Otherness while  
she remains unaware of his voyeurism, is not, in his mind, made an object in the
 joking chain at all.
Yet this is only one side of the double-edged joke. In fact, the end of the
 
story, its “punch line,” lifts the doctors inhibitions regarding his wife’s unre
­strained desire and turns the reader back to the beginning of the story, to the
 wife's own lie: namely, the inhibitions she constructs against attending the ball
 alone. These inhibitions are themselves offered as a posed resistance to her
 husband’s pretense of granting her freedom. She constructs, with her lie, a text
 of herself that the husband 
is
 willing to accept as “really” her. In fact, Irene’s  
construction of these inhibitions effectively places her in the first-person posi
­tion on the joking/textual chain. This is, then, a joke that the doctor cannot
 “get,” for his wife ever remains the “one who is unknown” to him. As the
 “shameless woman” she destroys the very base from which the male-told
 obscene joke is constructed. Thus, the “hidden woman,” the absence or blind
 spot in the joke paradigm, surfaces as a subject who retells the joke as one in
 which man’s own devices for objectifying woman become the instruments of his
 undoing and result in his ultimate failure to “know” his woman.
Virginia Woolf’s “Nurse Lugton’s Curtain” (154-5) is another short-short
 
story that “exposes” objectified woman as the butt of the joke and in so doing
 offers a revision of the joke paradigm that stresses the authority of woman’s
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subject position. As “Nurse,” wakeful Lugton 
is
 “phallic” woman, the “ogress”  
in charge “with a face like the side of a mountain with great precipices and
 avalanches, and chasms for her eyes and hair and nose and teeth.” But once
 asleep, the wild beasts portrayed in the fabric of the curtain she is stitching
 romp across her lap, the maternal site of playfulness and birth. On coming back
 to wakefulness and regaining her “phallic” position, she restores the carnival
 scene of the curtain to fixity and “normalcy.” At this moment of closure, Nurse
 Lugton returns to her phallic position of authority as it rules by tyranny, an
 authority that terrifies the children in her charge and illustrates the
 
way women  
are forced to use male forms of power in order to rule.
The “Otherness” and alternative view of feminine forms of power repre
­
sented by Lugton’s dreamworld and the fantastic lap scene coincide with Adri
­enne Rich’s portrayal of
 
female authority in “Aunt  Jennifer’s Tigers.” In both  
cases, needlework — a form of creative power traditionally allowed to women
 — becomes the occasion for the release of repressed desire. But Woolf’s story
 rewrites the joke of totalizing repression to create a fanciful vision in which
 Nurse Lugton represents herself the repressive force that in its turn must be
 tamed, lulled to sleep, in order
 
for  pleasure and freedom to surface and have life.
While the joke appears to be made at
 
the expense of Nurse Lugton, Woolf’s  
rhetorical strategies reveal another twist on the position of woman as object in
 the joke paradigm. By combining the motif of the sleeping ogress with the
 imagery of an enchanted animal world, and by shifting from third- to second-
 person narration once the Nurse falls asleep and the animal kingdom comes to
 life, Woolf enables the reader to account for the story “logically” as the Nurse’s
 dream. That the enchantment may be dreamt by Nurse Lugton, yet she herself
 may be unaware upon waking, coincides with Freud’s theory of the forgetting
 of dreams as evidence of psychical censorship (Interpretation 555). Nurse Lug
­ton’s “objectified” position as the waking force of repression perhaps causes her
 to “forget” her natural state of emancipation,
 
but by means of the rhetoric of the  
story, the reader “gets” the punch line and in so doing frees Nurse Lugton from
 the mantle of her own repressive authority.
Both Woolf’s and Colette’s short-shorts, considered in terms of the joke
 
paradigm, can be read as “exposures” of woman, who from the position of object
 can achieve a subject position in the joking chain. The stories cleverly make use
 of the rhetorical strategies of the joke-work in order to make the male construct
 of “woman” the butt of the joke. In order for woman to achieve authority she
 must not only endure but also embrace the pain to which her male-defined
 position subjects her. This is a lesson that can be appropriated by all minori
­ties who find themselves “butted” out of the joking/textual chain, made objects
 of the none-too-funny joke of cultural dominance, oppression, and imposed
 silence.
4.




both of Freud’s model of the subject positions at stake in the joke  
and of Deleuze and Guattari’s account of deterritorialization as a defining ele-
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ment of minor literature, reveals similarities between the two genres that
 
enhance and reinforce their narrative complexity. If, as Freud has said, the
 function of the
 
joke is to protect words and thoughts from criticism, then per ­
haps the "protective coloring” of the short story 
as
 a "minor”  genre is in fact part  
of its strength. Its status as a minor genre has thus far safeguarded it from the
 more voracious critical beasts roaming the narrative jungle in search of meatier
 game such 
as
 the novel. As a genre that, according to Georg Lukacs, "sees  
absurdity in all its undisguised and unadorned nakedness” (51-2), the short
 story as a "minor” form has resisted reappropriation and reterritorialization. In
 this way it has managed to preserve itself 
as
 a narrative haven against the total ­
izing and territorializing operations required of a major literature.
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In the figure of the dandy, Baudelaire
 
seeks to find some use for idleness, just as
 leisure once had a use. The vita contem
­plativa is replaced by something that
 could be called the vita contemptiva. . . .
 Dandyism is the last glimmer of the
 heroic in times of decadence.
—Walter Benjamin, “Idleness,” The
 
Arcades Project (1939)
In naive, or pure, Camp, the essential
 
element is seriousness, a seriousness that
 fails. . . . [C]amp is the modern dandy
­ism. Camp is the answer to the problem:
 how to be a dandy in the age of mass cul
­ture.
—Susan Sontag, “Notes on ‘Camp’”
 
(1964)
My father's mess kit was not what it sounds like,
 
namely a snapped-together aluminum dinner set,
 complete with dual-purpose utensils, that you buy to
 go camping. It was, instead, the formal uniform he
 wore to attend mess dinners in the Canadian Air
 Force squadrons — the 404 in Nova Scotia, the 415
 on Prince Edward Island — to which he
 
was attached  
during his twenty-year association with late-century
 air power. The mess kit was impressive and extrava
­gant, like all military dress uniforms a combination of
 evening wear and martial regalia.
The black bow tie, white shirt, and cummerbund
 
were standard-issue tuxedo, but the blue-grey melton
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James Jacques Tissots portrait of Frederick Gustavus Barnaby (1870). National Portrait Gallery,
 
London.
jacket was cut short and scalloped in the back, with trousers that were high,
 
tight, and stirrupped, a gold stripe down each side, ending in gleaming
 Wellington boots with elastic sides and a leather loop on the heel. The jacket
 had gold buttons on the cuffs, silk facing on the lapels, a pair of gold naviga
­tor’s wings, small epaulettes with his captain’s insignia, and the miniature ver
­sions of his two decorations — British and Commonwealth armed forces being,
 at least as compared to the American military and especially in peacetime,
 stingy with what servicepeople call “fruit salad.” There were white cotton
 gloves, clutched rather than worn, and no headgear.
The mess kit resided most of the time in a thick plastic bag in my father’s
 
closet. The gloves, decorations, and a pair of white braces were kept in a sepa
­rate plastic sarcophagus in my father’s top dresser drawer, along with various
 cuff
 
links and tie pins, often of exotic aeronautical design: one in the shape of  
a French Mirage fighter, another fashioned after the distinctive double-delta
 silhouette of
 
the Saab Viggen. This drawer was a source of continual fascina ­
tion for me, explored extensively during periods of parental absence. Contrary
 to convention, I discovered nothing disturbing — no condoms or porn mags or
 letters from women not my mother. Just the detritus of masculine dress, the
 jangly hardware of maleness. The drawer smelled of aftershave and wood and
 leather.
Because my father wore a uniform or flight suit every day of his working
 
life, he didn’t seem to possess any other clothes. The uniforms changed over
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Officers standing on the steps of the Tower of London (1895). Mary Evans Picture Library.
the years, from the belted Royal Canadian Air Force tunics in grey-blue wool,
 
indistinguishable from the ones to be seen in films such as 633 Squadron, The
 Battle of Britain, or The Dam Busters, to the mediocre garage-attendant green
 zipper jackets and trousers of the unified Canadian forces of the 1970s. When
 the RCAF was absorbed into this formless mass in the 1960s, in a misguided
 attempt at republicanism, it lost its royal prefix, and my father’s romantic rank
 of Flight Lieutenant (pronounced with the raf-and-jag eff sound) was modified
 to the unremarkable Captain. Whether from outspokenness, lack of ambition,
 or some other cause I was too naive to discern, he never advanced beyond it.
If the uniforms he wore were not always sartorially
 
interesting, like the Ital ­
ian Air Force designs supplied by Giorgio Armani in the 1980s or (more dark
­ly) Hugo Boss’s sharp silver-and-black outfits for the Gestapo in the 1930s,
 they nevertheless presented a stop-action essay in male attire. And when my
 father emerged, periodically, in the full glory of the mess kit, a peacock fanning
 to display, he was a brilliant reminder of the beauty masculine clothing can
 achieve when its vanities are unchecked. The military uniform is the ur-suit,
 the source of the norms that have for almost two centuries governed the pre
­sentation of the male form in everyday life. It spans both the range of ordinary
 working clothes, from the overalls of sappers to the T-shirts of naval gunnies,
 and the high-end, almost foppish finery of the dress uniform, an ensemble that,
 in its way, 
is
 the intrusion of dandyism into the serious male business of killing  
people. The spectacular military uniform is a kind of suited repression, an
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incongruous mixture of the lovely and the deadly. And so an encounter with
 
the uniform is the first step on the road to the rich and edgy territory of
 
male  
dress, perhaps the discovery of
 
a personal sense of  style, a long-overdue revival  
of dandyism at the dawn of this new century
This 
is
 not simply a matter of the uniform enforcing a minimum level of  
presentable polish — though there is that, as the movement of the uniform into
 other areas of life amply demonstrates, from the chaos-prevention programs of
 boys’ high schools to the casual-seeming but actually rigid dress codes of con
­temporary waitstaffs and chain-store employees. Likewise the common under
­standing of the business suit — sometimes diplomatically dubbed the lounge
 suit, as on formal invitations — as a uniform of commercial life, the standard
­issue duds for Wall Street or inside the Beltway. The uniform, whatever its
 details, is a bulwark against the uneven seas of individuality and (let it be said)
 against unsettling variations in taste and income. The uniform is, paradoxical
­ly, both democracy and elitism in action.
But the relations between military uniform and suit are more proximate
 
still, from the cuff buttons allegedly introduced to prevent nose-wiping during
 the Napoleonic wars, when Europe’s armies first fully realized the heady com
­bination of violence and regalia, to the silk flashes and cravats that once indi
­cated regimental membership and now signal personal style in the necktie, or
 the choice between shawl and pointed collar, double-breasted or single-breast
­ed, vents or no vents.
In the shadow of this declension from function to decoration, my father
 
confronts me as a figure reduced to his everyday uniform, complete with use-
 driven pockets and epaulettes, his name — my name — carved in white on a
 black plastic name tag pinned above the left front pocket. These name tags,
 which were secured with two spring-loaded tabs, were scattered around the
 house, including the seductive top drawer. Little chunks of identity, of unifor
­mity, measuring three inches by three-quarters of an inch.
Also lying around the house was this sense of order in male clothing, the
 
completeness of the uniform, even the beauty of it when got up in its formal
 version. I thought of my father’s mess kit the first time I donned a black-tie
 dinner suit. I was an usher at the wedding of my college roommate, Tim Baker,
 and we rented outfits from a formal shop in Toronto. Twenty-one, a slightly
 built undergraduate at 5’10” and 150 pounds, I looked boyish and (I thought)
 rather devastating in the tux, snugly fastened in every imaginable place by cum
­merbund and braces and links. I felt like I was actually wearing clothes for the
 first time in my life, strapped in tight for whatever the world had to offer. Our
 ride to the church in Tim’s beat-up blue Toyota, sunroof and windows wide
 open, Bruce Springsteen on the stereo, was for me one of those crystalline
 magic moments of late boyhood. We honked the horn and waved at people
 walking sloppily along Bloor Street, the lords of formalwear acknowledging
 these peasants of casualness.
In the end I didn’t follow my father into military service, though I thought
 
about it more or less constantly during the final years of high school. I had a
 real twinge just once, at a Christmas Day mass in 1979, a few months before I
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was to graduate and go off (as I planned at the time) to study geology at the
 
University of Toronto. My decision to switch to philosophy and English came
 later in that up-and-down year, during an early summer vacation when, float
­ing aimlessly in my uncle’s pool like Dustin Hoffman in The Graduate, the word
 "metaphysics,” not "plastics,” came swimming to mind. The Christmas event
 was of another order. In jeans and an old football jersey, number 60 for my
 hero, Bubba Smith of the Detroit Lions, I shuffled into church with my fami
­ly. I had argued
 
with my father even as we were leaving the house, an old argu ­
ment that neither of us really cared for any longer. God doesn’t care what I
 wear, I had said. God deserves your respect, he’d replied.
Now we were in the church, Pope John XXIII in the Westwood section of
 
Winnipeg, and there was a collective turning of heads at something behind
 where I was sitting with my parents and two brothers. I looked back. A
 
young  
man in the belted red tunic and black trousers of the Royal Military College,
 clearly back from Kingston, Ontario, for the holidays, was walking up the nave,
 his mother on his arm. He wore white gloves and had his pillbox under his
 arm. He was upright and tall and gorgeous, and I suddenly felt like an idiot in
 my football sweater. My father said nothing but I could feel him radiating I-
 told-you-so’s down the pew. I thought, I want to look like that. I want to be the
 young
 
warrior at home, earning admiration and envy as I  float through the crowd or  
congregation.
The appeal of the uniform, like the violent conflict that creates it, 
is
 atavis ­
tic and troubling. Wearing one establishes a young man’s relationship with a
 community, and with his own masculinity. Putting on a uniform is also, there
­fore, taking one’s place in the larger order of things; it 
is
 a rite of passage that  
asserts adulthood. The badges of rank and regimental insignia, the orders of
 valor and corps identifiers, speak a complicated semantics of hierarchy and
 accomplishment. As a youth I could identify, by ribbon colors alone, most of
 the major decorations of the Commonwealth armed forces, from the Distin
­guished Service Order and Military Cross to the Distinguished Flying Medal.
 In the film Ryan
'
s Daughter, when the traumatized English army officer arrives  
in Ireland, a disabled hero of the trenches, the junior ranks of his obscure post
­ing eye the plain maroon ribbon of his Victoria Cross with envy and awe. Like
 them, I recognized the tiny slash of ribbon for the sign it was, if not of valor
 then at least of violence ably survived.
The hint of violence is essential to the uniform’s power. That is why there
 
are so often hazing rituals associated
 
with the privilege of wearing it, not mere ­
ly formal qualifications like age or education. Hazing, often
 
violent and humil ­
iating, is a displacement ritual. We no longer think it appropriate to subject our
 young men to tests of pain and fortitude, to see if they belong in male society,
 but we do, in certain corners of that society — athletic teams, fraternities, the
 military — indulge in mild versions of such tests involving full-body shaves,
 canings and beatings, or the forcible consumption of excrement. Even these
 second-order initiation ceremonies are too much for our sensitive times,
 though. When a pirated video of similar brutal practices in Canada’s elite Air
­borne Regiment was brought to light in the mid-1990s, it led to a different, and
 far more public, form of humiliation: the commanding officer, 
a
 knife-like lieu ­
tenant-colonel in a beret, was forced to resign and the unit was disbanded.
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The continued presence of shaving in hazing rituals would be fodder to a
 
cultural anthropologist of the right inclination. Bobby Orr, the gifted Boston
 Bruins defenseman of the 1970s, related in his memoirs how he was welcomed
 to the team by being pinned to the locker-room floor, lathered up, and rough
­ly shaved clean from top to toe. It was a favorite in my high school locker
 room, too, and continues to be the haze of choice among blue-collar minor
­league hockey teams, daring fraternities, and elite squadrons the continent over.
Just as interesting as the homoerotic sublimations of the act itself, with the
 
helpless neophyte manhandled by
 
his beefy new colleagues, is the act of remov ­
ing hair. Hair plays a large role in male entry to adulthood, of course, from the
 first sproutings on groin and chest to the first shave, an act of initiation so com
­mon and apparently unremarkable as to have escaped sustained theoretical
 attention. But that is too bad, because the act of shaving, for many boys, marks
 their passage to a self-image of manhood. It most often occurs before the loss
 of virginity, and there might be years in between. Significantly, it is often done
 in the presence of the father, who passes on the mundane knowledge of razor
 and lather. Most very young boys are fascinated and awed by the father’s act of
 shaving, observing technique in the service of transformation, a daily ritual of
 maleness. My brother Steve and I used to take turns watching our father shave
 when we were children.
Learning how to shave — to remove the very hair that marks puberty —
 
thus takes its place in the set of routine skills that modern urban fathers rou
­tinely pass on to their sons. These skills also include tying a necktie, polishing
 shoes, perhaps wearing cologne. They are hardly the stuff of rugged maleness,
 at least as traditionally conceived, but they signal the creation of a presentable
 male figure in the non-lethal society of business and everyday life. No one will
 ever make a movie mythologizing these father-son bonding rituals, in the man
­ner of Field
 
of Dreams, say, with its tear-jerking evocation of the fabled Game  
of Catch between dad and junior, but for many of us they loom just as large, if
 not larger.
It was my mother who taught me to tie my shoes and, later, to bake and
 
cook; but it was my father who taught me how to tend to my body and its
 accoutrements, how
 
to prepare myself for presentation to the gaze of the world,  
how to dress. I laboriously copied his demonstration of how to create a chunky
 full-Windsor knot, though I was not comfortable enough with it to do it every
 day at my Catholic boys’ school: like most of us, I kept a knotted tie in my
 locker and simply pulled it over my head each morning. When I did start tying
 ties regularly, I was so fixed on my father’s instruction that I stuck with the full-
 Windsor well past the point of fashion, only shifting down to the sleeker half
­Windsor six or seven years ago. It was like learning how to throw
 
left-handed.
Nowadays I shop for clothes by myself or in the company of one or two
 trusted female friends, who can be counted on for accurate flattery and good
 advice, but it was my father who took me to buy my first suit for school. And
 when I was in university, on a rare visit to take me out for lunch, he offered to
 take me shopping afterwards at Harry
 
Rosen on Bloor Street in Toronto. It was  
1984 and the fashions were all English and collegiate, long rows of striped ties
 in garish colors arrayed like confections in wood-and-glass cabinets. The shirts
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were fanned out in swaths of pastel broadcloth, multi-hued couches of cotton.
 
Thinking of Tom Cruise in his underwear in Risky Business, and my then-girl-
 friend’s recently communicated fantasy, I picked out a pale pink oxford-cloth
 button-down. My father smiled and got out his credit card. I kept that shirt
 for years, wearing it through at the collar and cuffs, fading it almost to white
 with many launderings, and finally left it in a closet during one of many
 
moves  
in my late twenties. It no longer fit me at the neck or across the chest: I was
 no longer the boy my father treated that day in
 
Toronto.
There is a depth of unrealized feeling in male attitudes to fashion and dress.
 My friend Russell, a novelist, for a couple of years wrote a weekly newspaper
 column about men’s fashion. His sartorial advice was tart and peremptory but,
 to my mind, almost always accurate: no shirts with "swanky” designs on the
 collar, no backpacks, no crummy shoes. He received a lot of mail, much of it
 intemperate to the point of derangement, from men who felt slighted by his
 pronouncements. He speculated that the reason for this lay in the fact that
 these men, like all men, acquired whatever basic understanding of fashion they
 possessed from their fathers — or from role models to whom they stood in
 some kind of quasi-filial relationship. The phenomenon works in the other
 direction too. When Russell struck a chord with a man by recommending, say,
 a Burberry raincoat, he received letters suffused with longing and nostalgia,
 miniature and often halting paeans to lost fathers who wore that very symbol
 of male sophistication and, so attired, towered in the imagination of the boy
 now grown to manhood.




 clearly a filial homage in play every time I put on one of my Italian  
suits, even though they are not the kind of thing my father would ever wear or
 have worn, even as a young man. Too expensive, too stylish, too dandyish. But
 my own dandyism, which proceeds more proximately from cinematic heroes
 such as Cary Grant or Gary Cooper, is nevertheless implicated in those
 glimpses of the RCAF mess kit from my father’s closet. My uniforms run to a
 Fendi silk-and-wool three-button in dove grey; a
 
brown, two-vent, high-gorge,  
narrow-trouser number by Tombolini; and a couple of classic-cut Armanis, one
 grey and one black. But every time I complete the ensemble of elegant male
 attire, I feel the sense of fulfillment that the French word for suit, complet, cap
­tures so much more economically, and truly, than the boring word "suit.”
 It is true that you can wear a suit like a
 
uniform, the way bankers and down ­
town lawyers don their navy pinstripes and white-shirt/red-tie Identikit urban-
 hominid camouflage each morning; but the suit 
is
 also, and better, conceived as  
a stretched canvas, a blank slate. It does not allow anything at all, but within its
 limits lie nascent the possibilities of wit and dash, sex and seduction. The con
­strained freedom of assembling the elements in felicitous combination makes
 the suit a modern narrative in potentia, a story of downtown life waiting to be
 told. Beauty and utility emerge conjoined, in the pockets and buttons and
 padding that create the quintessential male silhouette — a silhouette whose
 minute variations from year to year (bigger shoulders, vents or no vents, and so
 on) are followed by the dandy not in the interests of fashion so much as of con
­noisseurship. A truly good tailor can give back some of the elements that con-
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venience and mass production have mostly taken away: the functional surgeons
 
cuffs that may be unbuttoned and folded back, the way Jean Cocteau wore his
 sports jackets; or the right-lapel button that will be received by the left-side
 buttonhole, whose usual flower, if present at all, just plays with an originally
 ordinary way to achieve more protection, as seen (say) in an old photo of a wil
­lowy Frank Sinatra.
The suit is an idea, a set of associations. It comes to us in images, stills and
 
movies, that reflect its presence in twentieth-century male life. The received
 wisdom says that
 
whereas most men like to imagine women naked, women like  
to imagine men in suits. The suit finishes them, puts them in proper context.
 It smoothes out their imperfections and pads their deficiencies. It is armor
 against the contingencies of a hostile, judgmental world. And yet the last few
 decades have seen a steady decline in norms of dress in North American soci
­ety, with the disappearance of evening wear, the nearly complete baseball-cap
­ping of the population, the tendency of grown men to dress like simulacra of
 Bart Simpson: T-shirt, sneakers, and shorts. In fact, most of them are worse
 than that, since Bart’s invariable red T-shirt at least sports no corporate logo,
 no abusive or inane slogan.
Dandies, meanwhile, are almost universally disdained. Frasier Crane, the
 
fussy television psychiatrist mocked successively in the prime-time comedy
 shows Cheers and Frasier, is the exemplar here. His fashion sense and aesthet
­ic discrimination are at once displayed and undermined. He is frequently
 
taken  
for gay. In a typical scene from the latter show, Frasier, off to meet an attrac
­tive policewoman at a cop-hangout bar, rushes off to his bedroom, saying, "I’ve
 got to put in new collar stays, and — ooh, ooh — I have a fabulous new cash
­mere
 
jacket I’ve  been dying to premiere!” His long-suffering regular-guy father,  
a cop himself, sighs, “Yeah, this is gonna work.” Here, a sense of style 
is
 equat ­
ed with being educated beyond sense, a pointy-headed idiocy. Given all this,
 which is hardly controversial, it is nevertheless dismaying how often the suit,
 when it 
is
 worn at all, is worn badly, or is simply a bad suit. It is impossible to  
have a suit that is too 
nice
; the idea is a conceptual non-starter. But it is easy, all  
too easy, to have a suit that creates deficiencies rather than hides them. Some
­times, as for the character Ben in Louis Begley’s The Man Who Was Late, this is
 a tale of lifelong disappointments, miniature “tragedies” of cuff width and
 sleeve buttons. Finally, late in life, Ben finds a Paris tailor who can solve these
 problems, but the man retires to the country soon after, leaving Ben disconso
­late: another moment of arriving too late.
Surely part of the reason that so many suits one sees are bad suits is that
 
they are resented by their wearers. This is self-defeating, and unnecessary. At
its best, the suit is the outward sign of intelligence and attention. It takes its
 place in a lexicon of sophistication, an element in a grown-up world of travel
 and business in which bartenders know your usual drink, drivers bearing signs
 meet
 
you at the airport, documents and telephones are brought to your table in  
restaurants, and every rental car in every visited city is a sexy convertible. This
 fantasy of male success, which surely cannot be unique to my daydreams, has
 little to do with the more robust pursuits of an Ernest Hemingway or Ted
 Williams, the fishing and hunting and horseback riding next to which this
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other ideal of maleness may seem slightly effete, but its role models in litera
­
ture and film are arguably more impressive: the flaneurs of the Symbolist
 moment, dandies such as Wilde and Beardsley, the young Disraeli, Ronald Fir
­bank and Diaghilev, slightly ambiguous figures such as Grant. (Ellen Moers
'
s 
work on the dandy as a staple literary figure, a central avatar of modernism, is
 the best assessment of these movements.)
One should also add the dandies of pop music. In the 1998 film 
Velvet Goldmine, a loosely fictional bio-pic about a David Bowie figure called Brian
 Slade, a voice-over describes the late-sixties transition from Mod to Glam this
 way: “Taking their cue from Little Richard, the swank London Mods, short for
 Modernists, were the first to wear mascara and lacquer their hair — the first
 true dandies of
 
pop. And known to just about any indiscretion where a good  
suit was involved. Style always wins out in the end.” The last line is spoken
 over a scene of Brian, dressed in a purple French-cuffed shirt, black-and-white
 barred tie, taupe shoes, and a black pinstriped suit, having just sodomized a
 young boy in traditional British school uniform.
Velvet Goldmine explicitly links the Mods and the glitter-rock crowd to
 
Wilde’s languid modernism — the film starts with him in Ireland, and a brooch
 allegedly belonging to him becomes a magic talisman through the narrative.
 But it also alludes more gently to inter-war bird-of-paradise beauty junkies
 such as Stephen Tennant, a man who used to go out with a handkerchief tied
 over his eyes so as not to expire from “excessive sensibility.” Tennant’s fiction
­al counterpart appears as 
a
 lovely comic confection in Nancy Mitford’s novels,  
a Canadian-born beauty who descends on the staid aristocratic household of
 Love in a Cold Climate, but he is also said to be the model, in darker form, for
 Anthony Blanche, the depraved stuttering dandy of Waugh’s Brideshead Revis
­ited. It is Blanche who, in two separate scenes of that novel, tries to poison the
 young Charles Ryder against winsome Sebastian Flyte, warning him of the
 Flyte family’s “fatal English charm” — a charm that, in the event, proves indeed
 to be Charles’s undoing. In love in turn with alcoholic Sebastian and his self
­hating sister Julia, Charles is caught in the sticky amber of Anglo-Catholic
 decline during the 1930s.
This may be the somber side of the dandy-aesthete: the bitter outsider,
 
given to outrage and cynical (if accurate) condemnations. Consider, for a dif
­ferent
 
view, Grant in a wide-lapel pinstrip in Hitchcock’s Notorious, a dandified  
spy falling in love with Ingrid Bergman in Rio de Janeiro. Or, even better,
 Grant as Roger Thornhill in North by Northwest, the suave Madison Avenue
 advertising executive thrown by mistake into Cold War intrigue. Thornhill is
 one of American cinema’s great unlikely heroes, a modern paragon in slick
 hand-sewn dress. Habitually charming, even glib — “In the world of advertis
­ing,” he says, “there 
is
 no such thing as a lie; there is only expedient exaggera ­
tion” — Thornhill is Urban Man polished to a high gloss. Twice divorced,
 devoted to his mother, he favors cold martinis, French cuffs, and mono
­grammed matchbooks. In vivid Technicolor, his exquisitely tailored silver-blue
 suit, a three-button whose lapels nevertheless fall into a fashionable deeper
 gorge, precisely matches the distinguished greying hair at his temples. In the
 film’s opening scenes, Thornhill emerges quickly as a 
fussy,
 narcissistic, appar ­
ently superficial mannequin.
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Cary Grant and Eva Marie Saint in North by Northwest (1959). Photofest.
But under pressure he is also agile, wily, resourceful, and brave. When a typi
­
cal Hitchcockian trope of mistaken identity spins him into a world of espionage
 and betrayal, he manipulates the apparatus of modern life — telephones, hotels,
 trains, taxis, bars, banter — with enviable, grown-up assurance. And in the ver
­tiginous world ruled by the urbane menace of villains James Mason and Martin
 Landau, where Hitchcock’s unexpected overhead shots and thrilling signature
 sequences (the strafing crop-duster, the scramble on Mount Rushmore) seem to
 reflect a sort of cognitive imbalance, it is Thornhill who finds his feet. The
 film’s title evokes Hamlet’s description of his feigned madness; it savors decep
­tion, mistaken identity, the yawning chasm between appearance and reality. It
 is also, in its off-kilter way, a romantic comedy. How ironic, but how fitting,
 that the professional deceiver should carry the day — and carry off Eva Marie
 Saint, the beautiful double-agent who entered the picture on a mission to
 deceive him. Under the suit lies a man, and a particularly appealing one, too.
 The suit doesn’t disguise these properties so much as reflect them, allow them
 play.
In our society, dandyism comes haltingly when it comes at 
all.
 It is a func ­
tion of early adulthood, I think, and that first blush of success that frees a man
 to close the frustrating gap, so typical of post-graduate life especially, between
 taste and means. The unspoken tragedy of urban life in our century 
is
 this con ­
stant struggle to afford the self-presentation we desire. I don’t have to want the
 baggy convict-wear and brand-name jackets of the urban scene to appreciate
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the yearning evident in the startling statistic that the average inner-city African
 
American spends $2440 on clothes in a year, compared to the $1508 considered
 sufficient by the average US consumer. I would consider it rolling pretty high
 if I granted myself an annual clothes budget of $2500, but apparently that’s
 nothing to write home about in East Los Angeles or the Bronx. It
'
s not about  
how much money you have; it
'
s about what you choose to spend your money  
on.




writers who might be thought above such things. David Mamet,  
in a long-ago article in the New York Times Magazine, described the way he
 would buy secondhand tweed jackets and then have them carefully tailored to
 his tastes: sleeves shortened, elbows patched, rear vent sewn shut to prevent
 “rooster-tail” (this before the advent of the now ubiquitous Italianate ventless
 jacket). In The Facts, Philip Roth mocks himself, post facto, for his clothes-
 horse tendencies as a youngish man, the way he ran out with his first big
 advance check and bought some tailored Savile Row suits: “I proceeded to have
 clothes made by three distinguished tailoring establishments, half a dozen suits
 that I didn’t need, that required endless, stupefying fittings, and that finally
 never fit me anyway.” This lack of fit is indicted as part of a “restlessness,”
 mainly sexual, that afflicts Roth at 35. And yet, he cannot quite silence an
 enthusiasm for that reckless young man, nor can he entirely quell the affection
 aroused by an even younger, still more dashing version of himself, the hotshot
 freshman comp teacher he was in 1956, aged 22, who bought a Brooks Broth
­ers suit to look more impressive. Contrast with this the dourness of George
 Steiner’s Errata, say, which is admirably forthright about professional jealousies
 and intellectual epiphanies but reads as if the author never wore anything in
 particular, indeed as if he were continually naked.
But the quintessential dandy of American letters is probably, for good or
 
bad, Tom Wolfe, whose cream-colored suits and high-collared dress shirts were
 adopted in the 1960s as a means at once of identifying the emerging social
 commentator and of pissing off the people he was writing about and talking to.
 Wolfe is, in this sense, the early literary analogue of someone such as Dennis
 Rodman, the Detroit Pistons and Chicago Bulls forward who took to extensive
 tattooing, cross-dressing, and polychrome hair-dyeing as a means of getting his
 share of available attention in the saturated late-century mediascape. Wolfe’s
 latter-day attempts to pick fights with Norman Mailer and John Irving over his
 blowhard novel, A Man In Full, his tauntings of The New Yorker, are desperate
 versions of the same desire for notice. Yet, this is dandyism gone bad, its orig
­inal impulse of disdain transformed into something far less defensible, and
 more dangerous: publicity-seeking. When Harpers magazine made the odd
 error of featuring Wolfe sitting opposite Mark Twain, another cream-suited
 dandy, on its 150th-anniversary cover (and, worse, including inside a ridiculous
 and shallow essay from the previously acute author of The Painted Word and
 Radical 
Chic),
 we knew that dandyism in American letters was in trouble.
Fictional accounts of young men at play are just as compelling as real-world
 examples, maybe more so, from John Barth’s postmodern jape, The Sot-Weed
 Factor, which includes a description of
 
the rituals and variables of eighteenth-
166
Journal X, Vol. 5 [2020], No. 1, Art. 14
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14
162 Journ al %
Jeremy Irons and Anthony Andrews in Brideshead Revisited (1982). Photofest.
century male dress 
so
 delicious it makes the mouth water, to Sebastian and  
Charles in
 
Waugh 's elegiac Brideshead. Charles’s priggish cousin Jasper remon ­
strates with him about, among other things, his lunchtime drunkenness and
 flashy habits of dress: “When you came up I remember advising to dress as you
 would in a country house. Your present get-up seems an unhappy compromise
 between the correct wear for a theatrical party at Maidenhead and a glee
­
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singing competition in a garden suburb.” Charles, for his part, is undeterred by
 
this precise insult. "It seems to me that I grew younger daily with each adult
 habit that I acquired,” he says of this undergraduate flowering. "Now, that
 summer term
 
with Sebastian, it seemed as though I  was being given a brief spell  
of what I had never known, a happy childhood, and though its toys were silk
 shirts and liqueurs and cigars and its naughtiness high in the catalogue of grave
 sins, there was something of nursery freshness about us that fell little short of
 the joy of innocence.”




wartime England — though, as an officer with the extremely fashionable  
Household Cavalry, or Blues, he had only contempt for the Royal Air Force
 uniforms I grew up envying. Airmen come in for all kinds of superior
 
joking  
in his Sword of
 
Honour trilogy, finally  depicted as culturele s near-morons in the  
concluding volume, Unconditional Surrender. Like all writers of his generation
 and class who served in the war and wrote about it — Anthony Powell in his
 roman fleuve, Dance to the Music of Time, or Simon Raven in his second-rate
 version of the same, Alms for Oblivion — indeed like most soldiers of his time,
 Waugh was obsessed with the relative "smartness” of English regiments. The
 Coldstream Guards or Corps of Rifles are honored less for their prowess than
 for their fine red tunics or frogged green jackets. It is war to the tune of invid
­ious social distinction, all passed for judgment in bright colors and badges.
Hans Castorp retails his partial seduction
 
by  the perfect turn-outs and slick  
style of
 
the humanist Settembrini, and who can resist the pull of hard collars  
and spats, the cream-colored suits and high waistcoats of spa-life fashion?
 Even the cynical narrator of Graham Greene’s The Comedians cannot conceal
 his admiration for a poverty-stricken dandy, who, despite living in near squalor,
 is 
so
 fastidious about his suit that he covers himself with an expansive hand ­
kerchief when he urinates. Reading these accounts, you cannot help thinking:
 I want to wear silk all the time! I want to be festooned and beswagged!




 one thing to view Cary Grant in all his grown-up perfection. His appeal  
is the appeal of the fashionable father you never had, a slightly foppish but
 unquestionably strong man who knew the ways of the world. This is surely his
 appeal for women too, whether realized with subtlety (Grace Kelly’s sly banter
 in To 
Catch
 A Thief) or with crudeness (Audrey Hepburn repeatedly throwing  
herself at him in Charade). By contrast, watching Sebastian and Charles dress,
 or listening to the youthful ambition of Mamet and Roth, we hear something
 else, an echo from an earlier life-stage, the call of possibility. Here the suit of
 clothes still has an air of playfulness, of a costume worn. It is a uniform not in
 the common pejorative sense of the thing you don every day, without thinking,
 but in the antic sense of the uniforms worn by naval suitors in Jane Austen’s
 novels, the finery sported by subalterns in the Raj, the arrogant peacock strut
­ting of young Florentine carabinieri.
In my line of work, wearing suits is not normal, and so some of this playfulness
 
continues to be available. Universities are sites of arrested development anyway,
 so a program of stylish adolescent rebellion often seems called for, bucking the
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patched-tweed-and-hairy-sweater norm in favor of something more glam
­
orous, more suggestive of the outside
 
world’s vast  potential for  beauty and plea ­
sure. My students understand this very well, in their own mass-produced
 
way.  
They care about how they look; like anyone alive today, they are past masters of
 the nuances of brands and models, styles and options. This is sometimes ener
­vating, but among other things it issues in a surprising and complimentary
 degree of interest in my clothes. Style has become a running theme in the
 annual course evaluations they fill out, sometimes even entering into otherwise
 abstruse discussion of Aristotle or Spinoza in their papers.




detail of his or her appearance. A  political science professor I had  
in college wore just two suits, a blue and a grey, prompting the guy next to me
 to speculate that he actually had a closet full of identical ones, like Superman
 costumes. My colleague Allan receives on his course evaluations long paeans to
 his impressive wardrobe and suggestions he should go into acting. On mine I
 have been asked what brand my watch 
is
 and where I bought a certain rather  
flamboyant tie. I have even been shyly consulted for fashion advice, something
 to add to the already lengthy list of topics — illness, relationships, car trouble,
 family conflicts — that make up the unseen, pastoral element of university
 teaching.
The half-formed dandyism of students, so depressingly conformist com
­
pared to the fin-de-siècle wonders of the last century’s turn, so apparently dri
­ven by consumerism and branded free advertising, nevertheless confesses itself.
 Their desires speak louder than the bright colors of their FUBU shirts, the
 need to individuate all the more insistent for being diverted into a back-turned
 Kangol cap. It is the least I can do to make myself an example.
All this concern with clothes strikes others as unseemly, of course, espe
­
cially since it seems to sit oddly with the other-worldly ambitions of my sub
­ject,
 
philosophy. How is it possible for someone  to be engaged  in lofty thoughts  
when he is checking the creases on his trousers? How can concern with the
 implications of the Habermasian ideal speech situation be reconciled with con
­cern for a precise color match between tie and socks? A simple answer to that
 
is
 the one the former prime minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau, himself a style  
maven of no mean gifts, once gave to reporters in an Ottawa
 
press scrum. They  
wondered if he would have the nerve to call out the military to deal
 
with sepa ­
ratist terrorists in 1970 Québec. He said: “Just watch me.” But sometimes,
 more seriously, I refresh the memories of my
 
knit-brow colleagues with Machi ­
avelli’s account of his engagements with the ancient authors during his politi
­cal exile, in a passage I happily underlined during an undergraduate political
 theory course in the long-ago year of 1981, when we all thought the end of the
 world was much closer than we do now.




wrote to his friend Francesco Vettori in December of 1513,  
describing his daily regimen.
[A] nd on the threshold, I take off my everyday clothes, which are covered
 
with mud and mire, and I put on regal and curial robes; and dressed in a
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more appropriate manner I enter into the ancient courts of ancient men and
 
am welcomed by them kindly . . . and there I am not ashamed to speak to
 them, to ask them the reasons for their actions; and they, in their humani
­ty, answer me; and for four hours I feel no boredom, I dismiss every afflic
­tion, I no longer fear poverty nor do I tremble at the thought of death. . . .
 I have noted down what I have learned from their conversation, and I com
­posed a little work, De principatibus, where I delve as deeply as I can into
 thoughts on this subject.
Would that we all possessed Machiavelli
'
s jauntiness in the face of worldly  
adversity, and his sense of the finery’s simultaneous mark of respect and bul
­wark against the misfortunes of this life. My buddy Mark Thompson used to
 own an expensive, cutting-edge tailored suit that he liked to wear to job inter
­views, not because it was suitable for them but precisely because it wasn’t. It
 was tasty and beautiful beyond the expectations of the working world, a suit to
 wear while strolling in the Piazza San Marco, a suit to wear on a date with Eliz
­abeth Hurley. Mark called it his “fuck-you suit.”
Whenever possible, your suit should be a fuck-you suit. It should some
­
how, very slightly, irritate the mundane prejudices and routine pomposity of the
 Cousin Jaspers of the world. The socks should be a little too sky-blue (Astaire)
 or champagne-colored (Grant). The tie should be a smidge too unsual for
 
Wall  
Street, the shirt too lavender or citron, the silhouette a little too exaggerated.
 Your raincoat should be, as Allan’s 
is,
 the result of a weeks-long quest in  
Parisian boutiques for the perfect white-cotton blouson with navy lining and
 dashing turned-back cuffs.
It also helps, of
 
course, if, like me, you don’t have to wear a suit every day,  
don’t have to wear a suit at all. Then the suit as costume may have free rein,
 and every foray into the world can take its proper place as an urban adventure,
 a complex encounter of beauty with ugliness, of style with boredom, of youth
 with time. Thus arrayed, you may glide through your day in a Todd Oldham
 quasi-Edwardian frock coat in purple raw silk. You may skim the sidewalk in
 your chunky Comme des Garçons shoes. Your bright blue tie may billow and
 flap out behind you. Think of the dandies of another, allegedly more decadent
 age, and wonder why we do not set our bar so high most of
 
the time, why we  
allow our own decadence to be all of the mind and spirit, a decadence of medi
­ocrity and acquisitiveness, rather than what it was meant to be, a challenge to
 received wisdom and bourgeois sluggishness.
Think, finally, of your father and his own sense of style. Think of what you
 
have borrowed, what you have invented, what you have painfully thrown off.
 Behind the careful tailoring and colorful silk, this stroll is a primal encounter
 with your culture and your upbringing. It is a personal story not yet told, a nar
­rative of self-creation waiting to happen. You only get one chance to take this
 particular walk — don’t waste it. You are the young and the restless. Don’t seek
 approval; demand only respect. Be a man. Be a dandy.
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How Not to Do Things with Art
For many years now I have dwelt among university
 
folk, especially those who cultivate the fields of the
 humanities. Anyone who has studied these people
 knows that one of their most cherished tales has its
 initial setting in a provincial town in Germany in the
 late eighteenth century. It is there, we are told, that
 Immanuel Kant, the legendary Sage of Königsberg,
 set out on the pathway to the world of
 
beauty. He  
documented this adventure in his Critique of Judg
­ment (1790), in which he reported his discovery that
 the fundamental criterion of beauty is uselessness.
As the folktale would have it, this discovery
 
proved influential because it was so brilliantly suited
 to the conditions of modernity 
as
 they were develop ­
ing around Kant and his contemporaries. If it were
 to be modern, art could no longer exist as an object of
 patronage, just 
as
 individuals would be enlightened  
only if they were awakened from the dogmatic slum
­bers of tradition, culture, and history. To be modern,
 art would have to be autonomous. Fulfilling the pur
­posiveness of its purposelessness, art might then
 model for us the harmonious perfection of conscious
­ness, communication, and civilization toward which
 humanity strives to find its way.
As all who have heard this tale know, Kant’s
 
argument has been passed down from generation to
 generation in many versions. (As just one example, I
 might mention Clement Greenberg, whose doctrine
 of formalism proved very impressive to a coterie of
 the Ab-Ex tribe gathered at the Cedar Tavern on the
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isle of Manhattan around the middle of the twentieth century.) As is only to
 
be expected, these retellings were accompanied by
 
various quibbles, cavils, and  
outright objections; and recently many have actually claimed that the Kantian
 legend has come to an end. In league with various allied movements, such as
 poststructuralism, feminism, and postcolonial studies, postmodernism is said to
 have relegated Kant’s universalist aesthetics to a past that we may now look
 back upon as a simpler, more primitive time. Yet it is evident that Kant’s influ
­ence has not simply disappeared, as we may gather from a recent collection of
 essays, Revenge of the Aesthetic, which is dedicated to Murray Krieger and to his
 argument that the aesthetic undermines all the coercive uses words may be
 made to serve.
I will have more to say of these matters in what follows. For the moment,
 
however, I wish to draw attention to a specifically pedagogical form in which
 the aesthetic criterion of uselessness has been popularized.
In the second half of the twentieth century, and especially in its last two
 
decades, the uselessness of aesthetic education became a compelling proposi
­tion in the Western art world. The criterion of uselessness thus jumped from
 the artwork, formally considered, to the artist, considered in terms of his or her
 formal training. Thus we arrived at the categories of the self-taught artist and
 of outsider art, and it is to these categories, and to the tales appertaining there
­unto, that I now turn my attention.
2.
 
When the Legend Becomes Fact...
John Ashbery’s Girls on the Run is an homage of sorts: “after Henry Darger” is
 
the annotation following its tide. In the fleeing girls of Ashbery’s title we may
 recognize the heroines of Darger’s "outsider” art, and ekphrastic moments that
 call attention to this connection are scattered throughout the poem. “I was
 looking at a book he created, glued and spliced” (23), for instance, evokes Darg
­er’s working methods.
Henry Darger, like Kant, is now a legend of some kind. Of what kind?
3.
 
How to Succeed in Art without Really Trying
Outsider art is defined from the viewpoint of the presumed insider. More
 
specifically, it is distinguished from art by academically trained artists on
 account of its institutionally eccentric origins. Outsider artists do not hold
 MFAs from Yale or from Cal Arts or even from Ball State University, and they
 often have no more than the most elementary schooling in the most basic of
 subjects. They may never have set foot in a museum; one does not find them
 sipping wine at vernissages in Soho; often they do not even dress in black except
 when they are going
 
to church or a  funeral. The men among them are not  given  
to sporting tiny ponytails, and the women do not seem to favor Oliver Peoples
 for their eyewear. In short, it is safe to say that they have not heard of Kant,
 not even as strained through the vernacular of Walter Benjamin or Jean Bau-
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drillard. They appear to be a people unto themselves: that is their distinction
 
and their virtue. In the words of
 
Arthur C. Danto, “They live and create in  
worlds of their own, often, as in the case of Henry Darger, for no one but them






 more mandarin than Ashbery’s, and yet none better stakes out the  
utopian ground on which people both “mainstream” and “idiosyncratic” and
 both “high” and “low” might communicate with one another, fully and peace
­fully. His lines are designed to allow “birds” and “earmuffs” (4), “pee” and
 “crinoline” (7), or “bowls of muesli” and “the sidelong bats of evening” (14) to
 be as the lion and lamb of Edward Hicks. This sort of encounter goes on and
 on, with even the last line of the poem — “The wide avenue smiles” (55) —
 recalling both the sanctified pavement of John Miltons canonical heaven and
 the perversities of surrealist streets. The diction of
 
his characters is similarly  
generous, as when Talkative speaks of skies that are “gilded and armored” and
 then of the chance to “get out of hock, / redeem Daddy’s dear old coupons”
 (53).
There could be no one more unlike an outsider artist than Ashbery, with his
 
academic background, prestigious awards, and international recognition, and it




The popular assumption 
is
 that the phenomenon of outsider art proves that  
education is not only useless but even worse than useless in matters of aesthet
­ic creation. In Sidney Janis’s pioneering book on this subject, a quotation from
 Horace Pippin, one of the most famous of
 
self-taught artists, serves to exem ­
plify this conviction: “To me it seems impossible for another to teach one of
 art” (189). Devotees of outsider art adore this kind of quote, collecting it in
 much the same way that “pickers” drive down dusty backroads looking for
 unworldly makers of paintings, sculptures, and other stuff to which the art
 world might extend its tender mercies.
To folks who are neither insiders nor outsiders, these sorts of dealings
 
might call to mind Pat Boone’s harrowing appropriation of the art of Little
 Richard. Yet in this case it must be said that outsider art people generally have
 not sought to remake works in a different
 
form so as to cater to a different audi ­
ence. Those who gag at the spectacle of well-heeled tourists eating the Other
 may be justly suspicious about these artworld goings-on, but it
 
is important also  
not to oversimplify the case, from which we have much to learn about the cul
­ture of educated folk at the end of the twentieth century.
In an era when MFAs in art, like those in creative writing, were coming to
 
be both popularized and relentlessly criticized, outsider artists were brought
 forward as “folk heroes, models for some of the most adventurous and impor
­
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 in the mainstream of things. In making this observation, the cura ­
tor Marcia Tucker went on to describe these heroes in the context of a “desire
 to leave the 
'
ivory tower '" (5). A governing paradox in the entire conception of  
outsider art, in fact, is that these self-taught creators are supposed to be a les




School was over, / not just for that day but forever and for seasons to come”
 
(20): in this state of being, too, things both high and low, the refined appurte
­nances of leisure and the relaxed impulses of undisciplined nature, may be




Outsider art is supposed to free us from the accumulated ignorance represent
­
ed by our colleges, museums, galleries, and scholarly traditions. One of the
 virtues attributed to this art, in fact, is that it can be described 
as
 the product  
of unconscious compulsion. In the context of an art world characterized in
 terms of narrow traditions, institutionalized training, and tendentious critical
 discourse, this compulsion represents freedom. This is not simply a freedom
 from academicism but from education in its broadest sense and thus from every
 aspect of culture.
This is the reason
 
writers on outsider art relish histories of colorful charac ­
ters who did not call themselves artists until collectors taught them to do so.
 To think of oneself as an artist, even tentatively, would be to think too much.
 One’s actions would then
 
be tainted  by a presumed interest in an audience, per ­
haps even by a concern with sales, success, and a career. And so instead of being
 an otherworldly force, one would be a human being preoccupied with the need
 for social adequacy — and thus slouching toward mediocrity like the rest of us.
 For the same reasons, those occupied with outsider art recount stories about
 people who do not call the objects they make “artworks” but rather “critters,”
 “toys,” or simply “things.” These things then seem to constitute art avant la let-
 tre, and the encounter with them creates, for the viewer or collector, a sense of
 being present at the dawn of culture. This time, though — to paraphrase
 another folk hero, John Rambo — culture will let us win. We can all triumph
 because this time, the birth of culture can seem to be purely individual rather
 than social, historical, and political.
Accordingly, although many makers of outsider art speak of
 
their work as  
being religiously motivated, the fans of this work need never take this prosely
­tizing to heart. They do certainly record the beliefs of its makers, with an
 earnest show of respect, but they never so much as imagine the possibility that
 they might be converted by these
 
works to a particular creed or prophecy. Such  
professions of religiosity — which sometimes are a major aspect of the, artworks
 themselves, 
as
 in the texts that cover the surfaces of many of the objects made  
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by Howard Finster — are but another quaint design element, the weirder the
 
better. (Similarly, when actually made a part of the artwork, the fetish value of
 these texts is elevated if they are lettered inexpertly and spelled idiosyncratical-
 ly, a la Finster.) The appeal of
 
an ante- or anti-cultural art is that it poses no  
risks to the viewer, who cannot be mocked, taken in, intimidated, or in any way
 made to feel ignorant. The spiritual motivations to which many artists testify
 are then valued not only for their quaintness, in a modern or postmodern con
­text, but also as evidence of guilelessness. Didacticism is a big plus when one
'
s 
concern is not with knowledge but rather with authenticity, in which case the
 more fervently didactic the work, the
 
better. In these circumstances professions  
of faith are signifiers of innocence, of an antique purity of heart, and thus of a
 valuable collectible.
The conviction that compulsion liberates also accounts for the conventions
 
governing the biographical portrayal of outsider artists, which are hyperre
­spectful even in the cases of those (such as Adolph Wolfli) who were incarcer
­ated for violent acts. The snarky asides one might expect to see in articles on
 figures such as David Salle, Cindy Sherman, or Richard Serra never appear in
 accounts of outsiders, who are presented as if they can do no wrong because
 they never have to strive to be right. Outsider art thus promises us that
 
we can  




Readers of poetry like to collect good lines. In fact, "That’s a good line,” said
 
with the right attitude, can help to mark one as an insider in some poetry cir
­cles. Sometimes Ashbery caters to this folkway, as when he writes, quotably,
 "But the unthinkable is common knowledge now” (12). More often he seems
 to strive deliberately to upset it. If the "bowls of muesli crooning to the side
­long bats of evening” fail to check your impulses in that direction, then perhaps
 you will be brought up short by, say, this line: "Under frozen mounds of yak
 butter the graffiti have their day, and are elaborate, / some say” (17). Or if you
 can still find that quotable (maybe you would allude to Gertrude Stein), one
 could pull out others that would be all but impossible to cherish in decontex
­tualized glory.
 A deceptively simple proposition is suggested: the fact that
 
you can collect  
things does not mean you can own them.
9.
 
What Becomes a Legend Most?
A composite of America’s favorite outsider artist, along the lines of the "Peo
­
ple’s Choice” artworks made by Vitaly Komar and Aleksander Melamid, would
 turn out to be a poor, illiterate black man who has spent some time in an insti
­tution (hospital, jail, or asylum) and who now obsessively makes things in
 which he takes pride but which he will not give away or sell unless he happens
 to be in the mood to do so. It is also crucial that the artist’s materials be cheap
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or makeshift: such stuff as mud, roots, scrap paper, plywood, house paint, and
 
found objects. This is important because these materials can then seem to
 embody the unfranchiseable quiddity of the artist’s being. The fact that draw
­ings have been made with ballpoint pens on old shirt cardboards, say, results in
 the same effect that is produced by idiosyncratic spellings, religious designs,
 and unpretentious makers. As we know
 
from popular movies such as Good Will  
Hunting (1997), the best packaging for genius is the most unprepossessing.
Once one has learned to appreciate the beauty of unlearning, one can move
 
on to understand why a truly ideal outsider must be like Henry Darger, who
 lacked only the distinction of racial otherness. Nicknamed "Crazy” when he
 was a boy, he spent several years of his childhood in an institution for mental
­ly handicapped children. He was religious, attending as many as four masses 
a 
day,
 and he composed his immense life’s work in a small apartment crammed  
with treasured junk. A janitor (just like Matt Damon in Good Will Hunting!),
 he worked in such secrecy that his masterpiece was totally unknown to the out
­side world until after his death. This is The Story of the Vivian Girls, in what is
 Known as the Realms of the Unreal, of the Glandeco-Angelinian War
 
Storm, Caused  
by the Child Slave Rebellion (c. 1916-73), a manuscript of
 
approximately nine ­
teen thousand pages accompanied by about two hundred and fifty illustrations
 on pieces of paper
 
glued into sheets six  to twelve feet long. The illustrations are  
made in
 
large part  from images of girls traced from magazines, newspapers, col ­
oring books, comic strips, advertisements, and other sources; the beleaguered
 girls, who are often naked, sometimes come decorated with rams’ horns, but
­terfly
 




Girls on the Run is delicious nonsense from beginning
 
to end, and in this respect  
it is markedly different from Darger’s work. Darger’s writing and art are filled
 with violence in the forms of slavery, war, and natural disasters, and this vio
­lence 
is
 often graphic (to use the language of parental advisories). One might  
mention, say, whole bunches of disemboweled girls.
Ashbery’s poem tones down this aspect of Darger’s work. The sole refer
­
ence to disembowelment is conditional: "Now it’s time to surrender, or be riven
 asunder, garroted, eviscerated / by
 
the actual time of the explosion” (32). Aside  
from a fugitive reference to "the awful bushel of shins” (29), carnage is not an
 issue. Bombs, explosions, war, and military matters are mentioned, but only
 rarely and in passing.
Yet all is not well in Ashbery’s words. In this poetry of goofy clarity there
 
are no profundities, nothing to be construed or puzzled out, just pleasure all the
 time. Since such a pleasure is inhuman, however, it is also a form of cruelty. It
 reminds us of why we may condescend to some artworks (say, some Impres
­sionist masterpieces) by judging them too beautiful: so that we may refuse to
 recognize how they mock every miserable accommodation we make to the stu
­pidities we dignify with the name of necessity.
Ashbery takes the same approach to Darger’s mythology that he does to his
 
violence. He remakes it into collaged images, idioms, and scenes that convey
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something of Darger’s oneiric intensity while eliminating, soothingly, any signs
 
of enslaving narrative. Whereas Darger’s work is generally regarded as the
 product of obsession, of an enslaving compulsion, Ashbery chooses to see it as
 a gift of an uncertain kind freely given from an unclear source and accepted for
 no definite end. In this way he emancipates Darger’s work, granting it auton
­omy of a sort.
As 
is
 evident from the way Darger’s work is invariably described, one of its  
most striking aspects 
is
 its sheer magnitude and the impression of obsessive  
accumulation and reiteration, beyond any conceivable practical purpose, which
 is conveyed thereby. Those thousands of handwritten pages, those hundreds
 and hundreds of stereotyped girls! Even if one reads only the poetry that Ash
­bery wrote prior to Girls on the
 
Run, one might readily imagine why this aspect  
of Darger’s work might appeal to him. It corresponds to the sense one gets
 from much of Ashbery’s writing that any given line or poem might just go on,
 with its beguiling inventiveness serving as its sole and sufficient justification for
 existence. His writing finally does not behave in this way, of course; all sorts of
 cagey measures divert it from the impossible ideal of free association. Before
 Darger’s work was even revealed to the world, Ashbery’s writing was attuned to
 its drives toward repetition, accumulation, and expansion, just 
as
 it  was attuned  
to the ironic enclosure of these drives within Darger’s menial person and
 rathole of an apartment.
11.
 
The Rise and Fall of the Outsider
Others before me have pointed out the seeming paradox that the so-called out
­
sider is now securely institutionalized within the world of fine art. In fact, the
 erstwhile "modern primitives” of outsider art are now so fully accepted into the
 art world that one may actually hear laments about the loss of their distin
­guishing outsiderness. The case of
 
the Reverend Finster is exemplary in this  
regard. Having become so successful that he was invited on “The Tonight
 Show” and commissioned to do album covers for R.E.M. and Talking Heads,
 he has become an institution and industry in his own right, cranking out mass-
 produced tchotchkes for the tourists who visit his Paradise Garden in Pennville,
 Georgia. Aficionados of outsider art now speak of their acquaintance with Fin-
 ster’s earlier work much as young people in the early nineties boasted of having
 listened to Nirvana back in the early days, long before “grunge” came and went
 as a marketing ploy, when the group had not yet left Sub Pop to sign with a
 major label.
This vexation is related to other disputes, some of which are even interest
­
ing, about the history, nature, institutionalization, and probable future of
 
out ­
sider art. For instance, there is the fundamental dispute about what to call this
 art. Although I have adopted “outsider art” here because this is the term that
 came to be most widely used at the end of the twentieth century, it 
is
 by no  
means an uncontested one. In fact, arguments over the naming of this sort of
 art, and hence over the interpretation of just what sort of thing it is, have been
 with us for as long as anything like it has been identified under any name.
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Since the 1930s the names that have been ventured include modern primitives,
 
Sunday painters, popular painters, amateurs, hobbyists, naïve artists, folk
 artists, creators of art brut, contemporary folk artists, grassroots artists, vision
­ary artists, nonacademic artists, vernacular artists, and isolate artists, in addition




In any case, and under any name, it remains a
 
remarkable phenomenon that  
so much excitement should have been occasioned in recent decades by the
 image of the artist set free from education. This 
is
 a phenomenon that bears a  
fascinating relation to other movements at the fin of the last siècle, including the
 so-called “return to beauty” among cultural insiders concerned with literature
 and the arts. As in the case of attacks on the 1993 Whitney Biennial, this
 return was called for in reaction against some recent art and cultural criticism,
 but it has also appeared in other contexts. An early contribution to this return
 was Dave Hickey’s 1993 book, The Invisible Dragon: Four Essays on Beauty.
 From the end of 1999 through the early weeks of 2000, an exhibition curated
 by Neal Benezra and Olga M. Viso at the Hirshhorn Museum in Washington,
 DC, “Regarding Beauty,” was devoted to the reconsideration of this allegedly
 neglected issue. A recent book by Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just
 (1999), is another sign of the times.
Insofar as it represents an ebb and flow of cultural energies, this return is
 
interesting or at least anodyne. At its best, as in the aforementioned collection
 of essays, Revenge of the Aesthetic, it shows an inspiring devotion to the stimu
­lation of art; at its worst, it 
is
 Hilton Kramer and Rudolph Giuliani. Most  
interesting in the present context, though, is the way this pledge of allegiance
 to beauty in the 1990s parallels the boom in outsider art.
As a reaction to recent emphases in criticism (cultural studies, feminist the
­
ory, postcolonial studies, and so on), the return to beauty shows a desire to
 reclaim a time presumed to have existed before an emphasis on marginalization
 shoved aesthetic tradition out of the center of things. And even though it 
is valorized precisely on account of its marginalization in relation to that hither
­to dominant aesthetic tradition, outsider art shows the same nostalgia. In both
 cases, art is to be made useless again — useless for politics and economics,
 ethics and ethnics, identity and sexuality, and other contemporary preoccupa
­tions — so that the aesthetic may be redeemed 
as
 an experience at least of  
philosophical value, if not of presumptive universality. In both cases, an out
­sider — self-taught artist in the one case, self-evident beauty in the other — is
 made to absolve the educated self of the preconditions to its judgments. This
 self may then rest easy in its learning. For if this learning in and of itself 
is demonstrably useless to qualify one either to create beauty or to appreciate it,
 one’s education can certainly not be accounted a privilege, much less a defining
 part of one’s values, now can it?
12.
 
We Are the Case
The debates over nomenclature that are de rigeur in the field of outsider art
 
find a parallel in the drama of names in Girls on the Run. These names are of
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such motley types as to suggest that one of the intentions of this poem is to pre
­
sent us with an apparatus in which we can see displayed the aesthetic possibil
­ities of naming, with particular reference to mid-twentieth-century American
 culture.
Some names, then, will be exceedingly ordinary, as if
 
taken from a forties  
movie or a fifties sitcom: Judy, Henry, Mary Ann, Dianne, and Peggy, for
 instance. This is the sort of name that appears in the greatest number of vari
­ations. Around this core we are also offered nicknames that might come from
 the same era, which is the mid-century recalled by the cute little cartoon girls
 on which Darger was fixated: Tidbit, Dimples, Tootles. These consort well
 with appropriate persons such 
as
 Farmer Jones, Uncle Wilmer, Aunt Jennie,  
Uncle Philip, and Old Mr. Jenkins, around whom we also meet predictable fig
­ures such as Mother, Daddy, the Principal, the relaxed policeman, the truant
 officer, the nurses, the crowd, the perpetrators, and the detective. Stuart Hof-
 nagel, Rags the mutt, the twins, General Forester, and even Mr. McPlaster,
 whose name invites friendly jibes: we will not be surprised to find the girls in
 their company.
Around these figures we encounter others whose monikers are less conven
­
tional, at least in terms of mainstream cultural history. Damion, Laure, and
 Larissa, for instance, seem to come from a slightly different register than the
 one whence the Peggies and Tommies arise. Larry Sue might well give us
 pause, as might Uncle Margaret. Shuffle and Spider might lead the likes of
 Dimples to some quizzical thumb-sucking, and it
 is
 hard to tell in advance what  
topics might ari e in a conversation involving Young Topless, The Overall
 
Boys,  
and Bill the barrel. Then we have the characters who seem to have wandered
 out of the realm of allegory (Pliable, Hopeful, Talkative), fable (Cupid), litera
­ture (Lochinvar, Jenny Wren, Swann), romance (the old seer), history (the
 king), and religion (the Creator). Yet all these figures, too, are dispersed among
 the others in the most matter-of-fact way imaginable.
In addition to those either named or identified by occupation or associa
­
tion, we must also note an indeterminate number who appear under the cloak
 of pronominality or, even more elusively, as interjected voices (“Ssh, you are
 loud” [25]). The overall effect is then to make Girls on the Run a flight from
 the coherence of the semantic, generic, sexual, and social orders conventionally
 presumed to be represented in names. In this respect it is notable that aside
 from a few who are marked as adults, such as Mr. McPlaster and General
 Forester, almost all the characters here have only
 
first names. (Stuart Hofnagel  
is the exception to prove the rule.) These are names without adult seriousness,
 or adult pretention, as the case may be. They do
 
whatever they do  without  fuss ­
ing about whether it amounts to beauty or art or nature or anything else. Per
­sons do not appear here as embodied beings in mortal comradeship, love, or
 community but rather as impulses, sensations, perceptions, thoughts, utter
­ances, and actions all on the same battleground or playground (Ashbery, like
 Darger, sensibly declining to draw a hard-and-fast distinction between the
 two). “We are the case” (49), it is asserted at one point, and that is about as
 much assertion as we can bear in this lexicon of fine art and popular rubbish.
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We Have All Been Here Before
At the same time that it has been exhibited, popularized, and marketed in the
 
last century, outsider art has given rise to criticism, sometimes of a withering
 sort. Most of this focuses on the issue of primitivism: that is, on the tenden
­cy to regard the outsider artist as a kind of Noble Savage uncontaminated by
 modern civilization, especially in the form of education.
To some extent such criticism has accompanied the categorization of self-
 
taught or outsider art virtually from its inception. Most of it, however, has
 appeared only within the last two decades. Adrian Piper, Kinshasha Holman
 Conwill, Amiri Baraka, Thomas McEvilley, Lucy Lippard, and
 
Wendy Steiner  
are among the scholars who have offered important critiques of the economic,
 curatorial, and ideological attitudes associated with outsider art. The motives
 behind the career of this art are not only
 
reprehensible, however, and the future  
of the phenomena that have come to be grouped under this term is by no means
 clear.




we should have encountered this primitivism redivivus at pre ­
cisely the time when one might have thought that the aftermath of the civil
 rights movement in the United States, as well as the history and ongoing poli
­tics of colonial liberation movements worldwide, would have warned educated
 people away from the pitfalls of this attitude. After all, it was in the last three
 decades of the twentieth century that primitivist attitudes were being self-con
­sciously rooted out in the discipline of folklore, to which outsider art objects
 would once have been relegated, as well as in the overlapping discipline of
 anthropology. And certainly theory and criticism in the art world fully partook
 of approaches critical of primitivism when not, as has often been the case, lead
­ing the way in their development. How then can we account for the career of
 outsider art, which even now continues to show considerable vitality, despite
 the criticism of scholars such as those I have just mentioned?
14.
 
But Before I Answer My Own Question . . .
I know it might seem that I am doing nothing here but breaking a butterfly on
 
a wheel. Regardless of whatever preconceptions you may
 
have about Ashbery’s  
poetry, you may
 
feel that my way of putting Girls on the Run into the context of  
all this “background information” concerning outsider art represents a pedantic
 approach, or worse, to the pleasures of
 
reading. I would then be committing  
the perennial sin of the critic against which all returns to beauty are directed:
 the tedium of annotation, the heresy of paraphrase, the crime of pressing the
 aesthetic into the service of a foreign army (history, sociology, politics, “theory,”
 what have you).
And yet I pay homage to Darger and Ashbery in doing so. All of Darger’s
 
art is precisely about the breaking of butterflies on wheels: about an absurdly
 excessive enslavement and torture of pie-eyed innocence. In keeping with
 Darger’s example, Girls on the Run teaches us that “foreground” can hope to
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emerge from "background,” or a given "inside” from any "outside,” only in 
a 
momentary, one-line-at-a-time way through which an obscurely motivated
 playfulness never resolves itself into exemplary forms. Taking a cue from one
 of Darger’s sources, one might call his and Ashbery’s work comic-book sublim
­ity, with an emphasis in both cases on the terrible unknowing that Kant so







 at once the antithesis to and the culmination of Kantian tradi ­
tion — and maybe, just maybe, it 
is
 something else besides.
It is antithetical to this tradition insofar as the surrealist movement, art
 brut, the disciplines of folklore and anthropology, Marxian criticism, and vari
­ous exponents of outsiderness have succeeded in their efforts to show that the
 autonomy of art has always been an ideological construction, not a transcen
­dental and universal condition. Kant may or may not be explicitly evoked in
 these efforts, but even where they make reference only to "academic art” or to
 "cultural institutions,” they cannot help but refer to the Kantian tradition.
 After all, in his Critique of
 
Judgment this legendary figure did take pains to point  
out that he found the notion of an unschooled artist unthinkable. Academic
 training is necessary to the artist, Kant argued, for the same reason that people
 in general ought to have an aesthetic education: because it is only
 
through such  
institutionalized measures that rudeness can be tempered, taste cultivated, cul
­ture itself made possible.
Nevertheless, the conception of outsider art 
is
 also the last gasp of Kantian  
aesthetics: a final, belated, vulgar attempt to establish that there may be such a
 thing as purposive purposelessness.
Kant foresaw the possibility that his work might come to such an end and
 
sought to head it off with his contrast between civilized beauty and uncanny
 sublimity, his mockery of untutored genius, and his disgust
 
with "New Hollan ­
ders” and "Fuegians” (258), whose appearance suggested to him that the very
 existence of humanity might be useless. He also foresaw that
 
in the future, peo ­
ple would be "ever more remote from nature” and so would "hardly be able to
 form a concept of the happy combination (in one and the same people) of the
 law-governed constraint coming from highest culture [Kultur] with the force
 and rightness of a free nature that feels its own value” (232). What he could
 not anticipate — even though contemporaries such 
as
 Denis Diderot were sug ­
gesting this lesson — was that the image of nature to which he was dedicated
 might grow so remote that it would have to be imagined entirely outside of the
 realm of his beloved humaniora, in the land of the exotic. Therefore, he could
 not foresee that his truest disciples, at the end of the twentieth century and the
 beginning of the twenty-first, would be those who disclaimed his notion of aca
­demic culture. Because it also demands that the figure of the cultural outsider
 must serve 
as
 the background to a universalized sensus communis, the phenom ­
enon of outsider art at the end of the twentieth century represents a logical
 unfolding of Kant’s aesthetics.
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But why should this Kantian logic, so often criticized in recent decades,
 
find its artworld culmination in this same era and in this form? This primi-
 tivism redivivus of outsider art results from the desire to maintain a traditional
 conception of the humanities at a time when such a conception has been found
 bankrupt both within and without the fields of academe. We live in a time in
 which, as Vincent Pecora has put it, we are witnessing “the slow dec
l
ine in the  
power of the university to create, legitimate, and preserve cultural capital in
 aesthetic forms and to convey it to its students in exchange for the price of
 admission” (205). Therefore, those who demand that their purposelessness
 must be purposive, like Kant’
s,
 must try to revive the traditional ideals of the  
humanities in the only
 
place where they can escape contemporary social histo ­
ry: within the untutored self. Accordingly, they must proclaim the uselessness
 of
 
education. Like critics of academia such as John Ellis, Gertrude Himmel-  
farb, and the Blooms, Allan and Harold, they cannot accept that there may be
 many good reasons — cultural, historical, political, intellectual, and, yes, aes
­thetic — why educated persons have lost their imaginary power (and it always
 was imaginary) over taste.
The devotees of the self-taught proclaim the uselessness of education
 
because it is now proving useless to them. It will no longer cater to their irra
­tional sense of
 
cultural entitlement. In the context of an American university  
system
 
under widespread attack for  its support of affirmative action and its pro ­
grams in ethnic studies, the fact that African Americans and other minorities
 are so highly valorized in outsider art 
is
 then easy to explain: they have not  
sought admission into cultural institutions, and so they are exceedingly attrac
­tive. The fact that many of the artists in question are absolutely brilliant is
 irrelevant to this question of how they have been framed within the world of
 art. In this case as in so many others — only
 
think of Joseph Conrad’s Lord  Jim  




Another ekphrastic moment from Girls on the
 
Run: “Thus, our doom, ringing  




The Beastliness of it All
If there is an exoticism reducible to fantasies, symptoms, and ideologies gener
­
ated by ethnocentrism, racism, colonialism, imperialism, and other tiresome
 forces, aesthetically speaking, there is also an irreducible exoticism. Neither
 outside (in categorically alien lands or persons) nor inside (in self-affirming
 images of the alien), this irreducible exoticism is what makes beauty such a
 beast.
In the case of Kant’s aesthetics, this irreducible exoticism appears in the
 
figure of the genius. As beauty
 
is unpredictable  —  “we cannot determine a  pri-
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ori what object will or
 
will not conform to taste; we must try it out” (31) — so,  
too, 
is
 the genius  who creates it. The genius "must be considered the very oppo ­
site of a spirit of imitation' and hence of the spirit of conventional education,
 “since learning is nothing
 
but imitation” (176). Kant did try to domesticate the  
irreducible exoticism of this figure by
 
making the genius a cultural hero, in con ­
trast to charlatans and primitives, and by raising the figure of the scientist above
 him. Yet in the profoundly unaccountable nature of this figure, as in the refusal
 of beauty to be dictated to, Kant had to leave open the possibility that cultural
 heroes of another sort might one day spring forth from nature, including artists
 who are Fuegians or New Hollanders or even self-taught persons. For though
 we grant, for the sake of argument, Kant’s insistence that an element of acade
­mic correctness is requisite in art, his premises still allow us to conceive that
 outsider artists might intuit that correctness for themselves, just as they are
 credited with doing by critics who compare the principles evident in their works
 to those followed by academically trained artists.
Despite himself, Kant showed that one cannot explain the nature of beau
­
ty, because it is beauty that discovers us. In fact, since its autonomy cannot be
 logically restrained by particular conceptions of nature and civilization, it actu
­ally discovers us through what is not us. In the moment in which we appre
­hend it, then,
 
we are transformed by it. We may be remade, for instance, by our  
perception of the primitive in the humanist, the charlatan in the philosopher,
 or the bewildered populace in the systematic pedagogue, to name but three of
 the bits of nonsense Kant’s art allows us to appreciate.
“[W]e shall put a brave face / on it for a time, then school will be over”
 
(53), Talkative assures us in Girls on the Run, beautifully, as far as I can see.
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Days and months are travelers of eterni
­
ty. So are the years that pass by. Those
 who steer a boat across the sea, or drive a
 horse over the earth till they succumb to
 the weight of the years, spend every
 minute of their lives traveling. There are
 
a
 great number of ancients, too, who died  
on the road. I myself have been tempted
 for 
a
 long time by the cloud-moving  
wind — filled with a strong desire to
 wander.
—Matsuo Basho, The Narrow Road
 
to the Far North
Old men ought to be explorers  
 
Here and there does not matter
 We must be still and still moving
 Into another intensity
—T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets
“My Destination”
I gave orders for my horse to be brought round
 
from the stable. The servant did not understand
 me. I myself went to the stable, saddled my horse
 and mounted. In the distance I heard 
a
 bugle call,  
I asked him what this meant. He knew nothing
 and had heard nothing. At the gate he stopped
 me, asking: “Where are you riding to, master?” “I
 don’t know,” I said, “only away from here, away
 from here. Always away from here, only by doing
 
so
 can I reach my destination.” "And so you know
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your destination?” he asked. "Yes,” I answered, “didn’t I say so? Away-From-
 
Here, that is my destination.” “You have no provisions with you,” he said. “I
 need none,” I said, “the journey is so long that I must die of hunger if I don’t
 get anything on the way. No provisions can save me. For it is, fortunately, a
 truly immense journey.”
—Franz Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes
I am no traveler of eternity, not yet, only a cosseted drifter, but I know that trav
­
el begins in childhood dreams, and wise old men die peregrine. We all think of
 our failures — the best think, as Robert Lowell said, with “suicidal absolution”
 — and wonder: where, where on this journey, did I swerve? That swerve, is it
 not part of the road? Perhaps only the absolved know it.
Still, though few fare in such absolution, journeys continue to beckon.
 
Men and women have an errant disposition. They go, hoping to catch one last,
 clear glimpse of the mystery, hurtling on a wet, crowded boulder through space.
Journeys do join time and space, human identity and human mortality, in a
 
secret motion. Yet I think of travel mainly as the story of time, that arch voy
­ager, 
a
 tale of days and months as Basho says, and so in some measure the tale  
of all sojourners, born to traverse their own span. Whatever its metaphysics,
 travel also throws us, pell-mell, into the world. We wake up one day and find
 ourselves there — Cape Town, Lahore, Paris, Sapporo, Perth, Milwaukee —
 without quite knowing how or why. There we stay, or move on, or backtrack.
What, then, brings on the traveling mood? Though I am no Ishmael — driven
 
out to sea by that damp, drizzly November in his soul — I think his mood can
 move us all. Or at least some version of it, packaged for a Crystal Line or
 Princess Cruise.
Certainly, I know counselors against travel. Thoreau boasted sourly that he
 
traveled much in Concord; and Emerson sadly confessed that place is nothing,
 his giant goes with him wherever he goes. Travel may
 
betray some insufficien ­
cy in us, a prickly need that deeper or happier natures refuse, a whim like a
 wound. Still, wandering the earth, we learn a little its ways and run against the
 stranger, within ourselves, we most dread to meet. We experience the world
 sensuously — that foreign, high-pitched ululation or wail, that rich, funky
 smell of garlic and urine — feeling the shock of differences even as we absorb
 each shock to some dark core. Seeing how human beings vary in
 
language, cus ­
tom, creed, color, mien,
 
we try to coax our divergences into wider civility. Shall  
we ever do better, turning our variousness into proofs of hospitality in a shared
 home?
The evidence of the past millennium is grim. We fill mass graves with oth
­
ers around the world, fertilize them with the killing fields. Or else we ironize
 travel, turning it
 
into a sly, kitschy,  postmodern joke,  like that ad  for Kuoni trav ­
el: Michelangelos David with a camera, in canary-colored shorts, blue shades
 and Day-Glo frames. For the desperately naive, the exotic can be packaged,
 sterilized. You are in Cairo or Calcutta? Look at the index, look at the moni
­tor of your guide; don’t look left or right where dirt, danger, squalor live. (It
'
s 
really the obverse of those sleek SUVs in suburbia, out on supermarket safaris.)
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Can we wonder that yuppies now take their Grand Tours in Patagonia, the
 
Gobi Desert, the Nullabor Plain, and when the gods go crazy in the sky, they
 now shower the Kalahari with empty bottles of Pepsi or Coke?
But let's curb our own irony here: Myth and Romance live. Who has not
 
turned the corner of an alien street and come suddenly upon Helen — she
 whose face launched those Grecian ships — Galahad, Bluebeard, or Tamerlane?
 Who has not heard, on a foreign pavement, somewhere over and behind the left
 shoulder, the hollow step and sigh of Infinity?
Voyages whisper loss, departure, things thrown to the wind. As Ecclesi
­
astes put it, man goeth to his long home, and the mourners go about
 
the streets.  
Yet in voyages we also hear the cadences of the universe, going hence, coming
 hither, a sound not wholly our own. Like quests, pilgrimages, initiation rites,
 shamanistic trances, near-death experiences, like epic journeys and orphic
 descents to the underworld, travel aspires somehow to what it can never pos
­sess or know. And this gives it 
a
 darker glow. Yes, journeys enact childhood  
dreams, but in later age, they may hint the void. What if the traveler can never
 return, or returned only as a pale revenant, a wan, unwelcome ghost? Who
 knows when dispossession lures us to naught, when it promises rebirth?
And is not America itself an ambiguous realm of nothingness and pleni
­
tude? Boundless in the eyes of its European settlers, its space became a vacan
­cy, fancy-filled. In emptiness grew the American Dream. For space is not
 place; it is nearer the Absolute. Is it what drew migrants such as myself here?
 Robert Pinsky warns his daughter about a certain kind of immigrant, in “An
 Explanation of America”:
Such a man — neither a Greek adventurer
With his pragmatic gods, nor an Indian,
Nor Jew — would worship, not an earth or past
Or word, but something immanent, like a shadow . . .
I, myself, sometimes feel that arid immanence in happy exile, as if the desert
 
could roll over the Atlantic, past the Mississippi, the Great Plains, the Rockies,
 to lap the Pacific. Nietzsche admired nomads, chandalas (outcasts): their free
­dom comes from traveling light, from a wide restlessness, he thought. I, too,
 admire them, but I know that if a dead shadow fell across my path, I would
 shudder out of its way.
Motion is no mere kinesis. Motion 
is
 an intellectual, often spiritual thing, and  
travel is a metaphor, rife with mischief and right for our times.
Paradoxically, travel, mobility, is a root, a radical, Mary Campbell says in
 
The Witness and the Other World (1988). Motion animates our myths of origins,
 our earliest literatures; it acts in metaphor, our most essential figure of speech,
 which etymologically means a change of place. As soon as we are, we learn to
 go. Movement
 
becomes an attribute of power, lately of glamour, earlier of dev ­
iltry or divinity. A meteor in the sky, a man on a galloping horse, strike awe in
 the sedentary heart. A jet-setter — preferably on the Concorde — with an
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unlimited air travel card strikes envy. This is no levity. Why else do joggers
 
attract so much irritation or derision? What tempts village ruffians to pelt 
a passing car? Even a man in a light skiff arouses a harassing instinct. “They
 shouted at me, they yodeled, they threw stones,” Paul Theroux laments as he
 rows around Cape Cod.
Bruce Chatwin gives that lament a deeper tone. In The Songlines (1987),
 
he moots the idea that natural selection has designed us, from brain cells to big
 toe, for a career of seasonal journeys through thorn scrubs and blistering desert.
 But why, I wonder, couldn’t natural selection, which alters in a few generations
 the beak of the finch, finally adapt human beings to the quiet computer, the
 cushioned jet? Is the brain more indurate than a beak? And supposing, as Dar
­win notes in The Descent of Man (1871), that the migratory instinct in certain
 birds overcomes the maternal, what can this tell us of women, who are not
 
fowl?  
And is it true that migratory species aggress less than those with fixed abodes?
 Would this apply to Hun and Tartar? Further, were the wandering tribes of
 Israel right to consider settled states, with all their pyramids and ziggurats, as
 behemoth or leviathan? And did the ancient Egyptians really project on the
 next world the journey they failed to make in this one, as Chatwin claims?
I have found no answer to such queries and speculations, only hints, aphorisms,
 
further queries. But I know that travel writers overflow the libraries of the
 earth. And the best of them — don’t miss Freya Stark — write shamelessly
 well. After all, the traveler we read 
is
 foremost a writer, often an artist. This  
artist may choose to make the curiosity and solitude of travel an allegory of the
 human condition. Like Jonathan Raban, say, they offer themselves 
as
 examples  
of the estranged hero, reporting on the foreignness we suspected, but failed to
 experience, in our world.
But the journey also becomes symbolic of the writing process itself and of
 
the artist’s own quest for self-understanding. In this perspective — a kind of
 silent translatif — inner and outer world, letter and deed, translate into one
 another. Indeed, in some cases the author need not travel at all. He can, like
 Italo Calvino in Invisible Cities (1974), let his imaginary Marco Polo do all the
 wandering for him on dusty roads. Or, like Emily Dickinson, she may simply
 board her frigate, a book, ride her courser, a page of ‘ prancing poetry.”
And isn’t Michel Butor right: travel becomes itself a kind of writing?
 
Romantic voyagers — François René de Chateaubriand, Alphonse de Lamar
­tine, Théophile Gautier, Gérard de Nerval, Gustave Flaubert — were often
 bookish writers; books frequently inspired their trips, and since they were writ
­ers, they often read on the trips, wrote journals, and produced books of their
 own later. Butor says, “They travel in order to write, they travel while writing,
 because for them, travel is writing.” Besides, most travelers mark (write on) the
 lands they visit; they name or disfigure them in some clear or hidden way.
Finally, writing itself is a kind of travel, a text of secret displacements. “If
 
reading is a crossing — even if it often pretends to be only an erased passage
 through the cloud of whiteness — writing, always the transformation of read
­ing, is necessarily
 
even more so.” Even as Butor writes two words in a sentence,  
the earth turns, traveling also in space with its writer. If this is a conceit, it still
 makes a larger point.
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I have needed to remind myself while traveling that this is also  
my life: the journey is a fragment of autobiography, first lived, then written
 down. But the living and the writing are never the same.
How can they ever be? I walk or ride or fly, gawking at odd things in far
­
away places. I may even make mental notes of my experience — but they are
 not my experience. The “bio” and the “graph,” despite all of what the scribes
 say (that goes for Jacques Derrida too), never wholly parse in nomadic autobi
­ography.




 the mother of the Muses, but she could have been their daughter too.  
Autobiography is living by other means, not only
 
after your death  but also while  
you live. Autobiography literally recreates your life: entertains it, creates it
 again in another mode, redirects it because writing makes you see what you
 ignored about yourself. And so you endeavor to become the person you have
 written out. We not only “construct” — hateful jargon — ourselves in autobi
­ography; we reconstruct our past and future as well. It’s dizzying.
In traveling, though, there come moments of brute existence, unmediated
 
by writing, perhaps by any words at all. They may be moments of mortal peril.
 Or of the natural sublime, demanding surrender to some awesome scene. Or of
 erotic frenzy, another kind of self-loss. Do not mock. The ambivalent lure of
 otherness — other features, other accents or hues — rages in every
 
exotic fancy,  
not to say lymph or gland. This call of distant loves hints at surcease from self
­hood, weird rebirth. The eros of travel is sinister, and a ruttish metaphysician
 born.
Travel and autobiography may be twin aspects of our internal life — I almost
 
said of the soul. But travel casts a wider net over the human condition, our
 whole roiled postcolonial world. It is not only the economic fact of travel, its
 incalculable revenues; it is also its geopolitical impact on nearly everything we
 know, we do.
For international travel, Dean MacCannell argues in The Tourist: A New
 
Theory of the Leisure Class (1976), has become the sign of our civilization, the
 best indication that modernity has triumphed over other social forms. Cer
­tainly, the non-modern world has not disappeared; it has been artificially pre
­served as the scene of tourism. Thus sightseeing becomes an attempt, doomed
 to failure, “to overcome the discontinuity of modernity, of incorporating its
 fragments into unified experience.” This insight, which applies only to certain
 kinds of travel, invites some further reflection on the geopolitical space we
 inhabit.
We live in a time of planetization, globalization, and retribalization, each
 
tribe seeking new autonomy. We live also in a time of
 
realignments, a world  
chaotically and sometimes viciously interactive. Yet current realignments —
 deals and whispers in the geopolitical dusk — are themselves evidence of an
 older process. The planetization of the earth may have begun with neolithic
 hunters or with the first outcast who mated elsewhere. But with Christopher
 Columbus, Sebastian Cabot, Ferdinand Magellan, Vasco da Gama, Francis
 Drake, the earth became interactive in another 
way.
 This was an exuberant and
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bellicose moment for the West, grievous for other people who gradually fell
 
prey to colonization, excepting some, like the Japanese, so remote and
 intractable as to stay free. Later, industrialization in the West made its power
 and knowledge paramount. By the middle of the twentieth century, Martin
 Heidegger could bewail “the complete Europeanization [he did not say Amer
­icanization] of the earth and of man,” an infection, he claimed, that “attacks at
 the source . . . everything that is of an essential nature.”
Heidegger proved purblind in politics. Where he saw only sameness, we
 
perceive now variety, a gallimaufry of cultures. Where Heidegger saw only
 hegemony, we see now rivalry and interdependence, whether in ethnic cleans
­ing or global warming. We see shifting tectonic plates in geopolitics 
as
 in the  
earth’s crust. And withal, the individual traveler, adventurer, seeker, still
 remains intent on plunging into essential being.
True, there is travel and travel. Some will put you on the Seabourne Goddess,
 
the Lindblad Explorer; some will earn you a knighthood or a seaswept grave.
 Yet travel — even in the cultural bubble, say, of a Japanese tour — always cross
­
es
 lines, transgresses realms, and so reminds us obscurely of our homelessness  
in the world.
It is something you feel when you are packing a trunk and three suitcases
 
to leave. How can any of it avail to preserve your identity when you are cross
­ing Asia or Amazonia in a boat or train? Or when you become lost (as I was
 once lost, in a Shanghai crowd) and suddenly
 
panic as a tide of Sinic faces car ­
ries you toward a destination you half-welcome, half-dread. It 
is
 a feeling of  
self-loss, hardly unique to feeling lost in China. Michael Parfit captures it per
­fectly, in South Light (1985) 
as
 his plane from Christchurch to McMurdo Sta ­
tion, Antarctica, passes the “point of safe return
”
:
Here in this airplane we have left all the encumbrances of our identities
 
behind. . . . Now all that is important about who and what I am is in two
 orange bags I can carry by myself, and is here in the aircraft with me. ... I
 have become lighter, freer, less burdened in life, and if my life itself ceases
 somewhere off on this unknown trajectory on which I have launched
 myself, it will perhaps not make as much smoke going out as I had thought.
 I have thrown my dreams into a sack over my shoulder and headed out.
For saints, homelessness 
is
 really at-homeness everywhere. Think of  pil ­
grimages — crossings between the sacred and profane — pilgrimages East and
 West. Think, say, of Eleanor Munro’s luminous work, On Glory Roads (1987),
 which shows that cosmic myths sustain pilgrimages even as they mirror the
 motion of migrant birds or planets. Munro responds to the force of these
 myths in local rites at Lourdes, transfixed “because through those imprisoning
 bodies, some entangled yet separate will had glinted out with shocking imme
­diacy.” In the pilgrim’s movement, then, we find a recapitulation of natural
 rhythms — the tides, the seasons, the stars — as well as the cultural history of
 humanity. We also find a presence that suddenly rushes to fill every moment
 and every place.
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But look East now. The same intuition tacitly inhabits many texts. One clas
­
sic example, Basho’s The Narrow Road to the Far North (circa 1693) will do.
 Basho took several journeys, pilgrimages to places hallowed by their natural
 beauty or ancestral piety. He traveled also to renew his own spirit, strewing
 verses as he tramped along, one foot in this world, the other, he said, in the
 next. Still, in the spirit of Zen, he drew his imagery from the tap-roots of the
 earth, the quivering instant.
For Basho, though, Being never shows its beauty bare. It is mediated by
 
every cherry blossom or frog in a pond. It is mediated 
as
 well by history,  
ancient sages, priests, heroes such as the tragic warrior Lord Yoshitsune and his
 giant retainer Benkei. Indeed, the epiphanies of Being abound in the very sor
­did midst of life:
Bitten by fleas and lice
I slept in 
a
 bed




Basho’s journeys betray no defiant transgressions. We hear no brash, self
­
vaunting notes, the kind Walt Whitman strikes in “Song of the Open Road,”
 or Huck
 
Finn sounds as he prepares to “light out for the Territory ahead.” We  
hear not the
 
jubilant cry, “I did it!” — the kind I gave out at Port Said.
I did not come to “Oriental serenity” early in life; I have hardly come to it at
 
all. I feel closer to characters such 
as
 the eponymous hero of Saul  Bellow’s Hen ­
derson the Rain King, all
 
rage and error, though  I admire more and more Basho’s  
way.
Still, I ask myself: why, why do so many Western travelers risk their lives
 
far from societies they seem to disavow? Often, they elude their own sahib
­kind, which they find more dangerous and repugant than any natives. Often
 they themselves go native, repugning a life they perceive 
as
 vapid, sated, nox ­
ious, a delirium of
 
boredom and high-tech genocide. Culture shock is what  
they experience on returning 
home.
 In short, their journeys are as much quests  
as escapes — rarely pilgrimages — no less judgments on Occidental
 
reality than  
forms of dissent and assays in utopia.
Why, again, all the errancy, the long desire, the clenched teeth and gimlet
 
eyes? Here we touch on something strange — something I want to call the
 traveler’s “wound.” Frequently this is a literal, if obscure, infection, a mysteri
­ous disease such as the Grail King’s. Herman Melville suffers it in 
Typee (1846), Francis Parkman in The Oregon Trail (1847), Ernest Hemingway in The
 Green Hills of
 
Africa (1935). They all endure some debility, some  “pathetic flaw”  
(Melville), a failure in their
 
pampered immune systems. It is as if, in each trav ­
eler, two organic 
as
 well as cultural orders struggle more than meet. Thus the  
wound, secret agon of the blood, throbs also with infections of the colonial
 plague. Yet the wound is not only external, a gash in history, cicatrix of cul
­tures. It
 
is also in the traveler’s mind, in his or  her divided consciousness, alien ­
ated state.
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How does this wound — an asymmetry of being — affect the wanderer in
 
each and all? Is travel writing a search by the homeless for the route home?
 Are only imaginary homes such as Oz real, which Salman Rushdie says is any
­where and everywhere, except the place from which we began. I like to think
 of the traveler’s wound as the mark of whim, Emersonian 
“
Whim”: "expect me  
not to show cause why I seek,” he cries in "Self-Reliance.” That is spirit in
 action, the gleam of light within, "more than the lustre of the firmament of
 bards and sages.”
In my life, I have taken some intellectual and fewer physical risks. I have never
 
endured ultimate tests: torture, outstaring death, loss of a beloved — yes, my
 first wife — the black dog of despair. I have never even seen a corpse. And as
 I have had no experience of the Emits, I have no ultimate, not even
 
penultimate,  
knowledge of myself. Perhaps that is what I thought to find in my easy jour
­neys.
Why do you and Sally travel so much, friends ask? Oh, I have ready
 
answers to give, give even myself. "I lecture, I go to international conferences.”
 Yes, like the wandering scholars of the Middle Ages, like jongleurs and trouba
­dours, I move around, without danger or squalor, pretending to serve literature.
 Or I say, "I go to revive my
 
mind in historic places.” What, like that dank, mal ­
odorous cave on Patmos, which I once visited because D. H. Lawrence had
 written in his Apocalypse (1931): "O lovely green dragon of the new 
day,
 the  
undawned 
day,
 come, come in touch, and release us from the horrid grip of the  
evil-smelling old Logos!”? Or again, I might murmur: "Well, there are
 moments, certain moments.”
And there were, such as that early morning stroll, on a summer day, by the
 
Sound of Arisaig, Scotland, when I walked in a soft western breeze through
 lush, green woods of creeping moss, larch, fir, oak, giant pines, the rustle of
 some unseen rivulet, somewhere off toward Drimindrach, light playing every
­where, gleaming on the water and flickering through the canopy of Druidic
 trees, and I thought: here everything
 
flows and flashes and breathes, even stone  
breathes, and I, seemingly alien to this scene, also breathe, what can this vast,
 
s
ilent con-spiracy of breath mean? Then I thought: it is enough that I see it,  
so much Eving beauty; that 
is 
what the unspeakable conspiracy means. But that  
was only a moment — it could recur in the awesome desertscapes and moun
­tainscapes of Uluru (Ayers Rock) or southern Utah — and it came late in my
 life.
I went to the antipodes also late in Efe. I was in my mid-sixties then, old by
 
any reckoning except my own; that reckoning was a child’s, the child within us
 ah. I felt wholly
 
myself, except for an arthritic hip joint, enough to impede jog ­
ging, and remind me on long walks that a body in pain aches also for the light-
 ness, the transparency of youth.
Could age become youth in the antipodes, pain a rarer joy? All
 
was invert ­
ed Down Under. July brought snow; drizzle fed from clear skies; swans glided
 in black plumage; trees shed bark instead of leaves. And whoever had seen a
 wallaby, wombat, dingo, platypus, kookaburra, pademelon, gecko, emu, or
 
195
Editors: Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (2000/2001): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Ihab Hassan
191
bandicoot in the rightside-up world, or woken to the screech of galah, rosella,
 
and sulphur-crested cockatoo? All was inverted in Oz, was everything possible
 there too? I began to read about Australia, as I had once done about America,
 before ever setting foot on their invented shores, and what I read helped to
 reinvent my life just a trifle more. But it’s what you see, what you sense and
 feel, what seeps through the flesh, that changes your life even more. (Couldn’t
 Emerson’s shadow "giant” see?)
Uluru, the heat and flies and shimmering, dry flood, blood-red, of Aus
­
tralia’s Red Center. Can you see it, the sheer, mad improbability of that rock,
 the size of a city cubed or of a smoldering asteroid upended in the earth — can
 you see it without sharing, at least for an instant, the aborigine’s sacred awe?
 Without thinking, Something passed this way long ago. Without altering per
­manently two or three synapses, a few circuits in your brain.
Certainly, for most of us, much of the time, travel may intensify our self
­
concerns, the needs of our bodies, the itches of our minds. Like bedridden
 invalids, we feel every pain, every discomfort even, as a betrayal of the universe,
 absent nurse. And so the desert flies at Uluru or Giza, the crippled mendicants
 near the Taj Mahal, the stench of excrement along the Great Wall of China,
 leave on us an impression as lasting as the Seven Wonders of the World.
Still, journeys may somehow
 
recover for us the quiddity of existence. How ­
ever tawdry, gaudy, arduous, equivocal, they may suddenly pluck the nerve of
 our lives, suddenly dispel the amnesia and anesthesia, the complacent nihilism,
 of our habits. They are metaphors, displacements, portages, crossing not only
 cultures but realms of our being, even as they put our selves at risk. For in
 homelessness — in no strange land — we may at last find our ease, become at
 ease, in the world. And like the great contemplatives whom Evelyn Underhill
 has lucidly described, we may attest to a “world that is ‘unwalled,”’ a personal
­ity progressively emptied, unlimited.
These are friendly abstractions. But why do I personally travel? Certainly not
 
for the lambent moment. It would be more honest to say: I don’t know. It
 would be more accurate to admit: it is the form my impatience takes — impa
­tience, our only sin, Franz Kafka says. And it would be more satisfying — aes
­thetically, mythically, metaphysically — to think: all my journeys recapitulate
 my first, out of Egypt — or 
is
 it out of the womb? — and rehearse another, yet  
to come. In any case, I find wise and pleasing these lines of Zbigniew Herbert
 about the journey we all take:
Then your native land will seem small
a cradle a boat tied to a branch with your mother’s hair
 
when you mention its name no one at the campfire
 will know which mountain it lies behind
what kind of trees it bears
So if it 
is
 to be a  journey let it be long  
a true journey from which you do not return.
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